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With the passage of nearly a quarter century since the end of communist rule 
in Central and East-Central Europe, scholars are developing fascinating new 
perspectives on the realities of governance, economies, societies, and culture in 
the various stages of communist development. We are learning that, just as the 
modalities and speed of establishing communist rule after World War II varied 
significantly from one country to the next, there also was no common blueprint 
for the implementation of the communist projects for transforming economic 
production, social relations, and the cultural sphere. Even in the high Stalinist era 
from 1948/49 through 1953, communist authorities in the various countries used 
differing tactics, proceeded at differing speeds, and had to negotiate with repre-
sentatives of many established institutions and interests. Comparative studies of 
those processes are challenging for researchers, but John Connelly’s pioneering 
study of higher education in East Germany, the Czech lands, and Poland, Captive 
University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Educa-
tion, 1945-1956 (Chapel Hill, 2000), demonstrated convincingly their great value 
for understanding the dynamics of communist transformations. 
David Tompkins’s research charts in revealing terms how communist au-
thorities in East Germany and Poland attempted during their first decade of rule 
to reshape the composition and public presentation of new concert music in the 
name of “socialist realism.” The study rests on a great body of research in origi-
nal documents of party officials, government ministries, and other administrative 
bodies in the two countries as well as memoirs, periodicals, and much relevant 
scholarship. Tompkins demonstrates that the relationships between government 
authorities and composers and performers in the two countries proved to be com-
plex and dynamic. Both governments called for new music to draw on popular 
national traditions and to communicate to the public in easily accessible ways, 
and they pointedly criticized “formalism” and abstruse harmonic experimenta-
tion. Tompkins shows, however, that in practice cultural authorities in both coun-
tries made compromises in their policies. For their part many composers found 
ways to live with the communist policies and to take advantage of government 
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sponsorship, and more proved willing during the high Stalinist period to compose 
in the genres and styles which the authorities wanted than many would admit 
later. The stronger position of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Ger-
man society and among East German artistic and intellectual elites than was the 
case for the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) in Poland resulted in greater 
and more lasting government influence on East German composers than was the 
case for their Polish counterparts. Indeed, Tompkins finds that efforts to induce 
Polish composers to produce socialist realist works largely ceased after 1955/56. 
There have been previous studies of individual composers, musical life in 
general, and general cultural policies under the East German and Polish commu-
nist governments, but this is the first archivally based examination of the efforts 
to develop socialist realism in music in the two countries and the first serious 
comparative study of the actual impact of communist rule on musical composi-
tion in any two Soviet bloc countries during the early Cold War era. With the 
access to archives in Central and East-Central Europe which scholars now enjoy 
and models such as David Tompkins’s work, one can hope for even more de-
tailed, analytic research in the future on the relationship between government au-
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1Introduction
As part of the program of the week-long East German Composers’ Union Con-
gress in October 1954, the assembled composers and musicologists traveled to 
the Leuna chemical factory “Walter Ulbricht” on the outskirts of Leipzig to at-
tend a concert performed by the State Symphony Orchestra of Gotha. In the pa-
latial “Clubhouse of the Workers,” built as the community house for the BASF 
chemical firm in the late 1920s and restored after the war, and with many of the 
factory’s workers in the audience, all present heard recent, representative instru-
mental works by five East German composers. The next day during the con-
ference proceedings, metalworker Otto Schnell took the podium in front of the 
assembled East German musical elites and expressed his disappointment with 
the concert in unvarnished terms. Schnell called on composers to “introduce the 
workers to music” and “create music that the broad masses can tolerate.” He 
encouraged them to write works that would be a moving experience upon first 
hearing, such as Tchaikovsky’s Fifth Symphony. In a sardonic turn of phrase, he 
stated that, as with a bar offering bad sausage, he and his peers would not return 
for a repeat of an unpleasant experience.1
The following pages seek to understand the deeper forces and broader con-
text behind this scene. Five years after the country’s founding, what had become 
of the project to create a new, socialist music? How did a factory worker find him-
self addressing the professional composers of his country? How was he familiar 
with Tchaikovsky, and more generally, what was the role of music in the every-
day life of citizens like Schnell during the first postwar decade in East Germany 
and its Soviet-bloc neighbor, Poland? With respect to the composers Schnell 
addressed, what did they make of him, and what were they doing at a concert 
in a chemical factory? What motivated some of the giants of twentieth-century 
music—Witold Lutosławski, Andrzej Panufnik, Hanns Eisler, and Paul Dessau, 
to name just a few—to compose music with workers in mind? And since this is 
a study of art under dictatorships—what was the role of the party and state in all 
this, and how did political power intersect with music?
In contrast to the overwhelmingly visual world familiar to us, Central Euro-
peans around 1950 inhabited a reality marked by the aural, with the ubiquitous 
public loudspeaker, high levels of household radio ownership, and a tradition 
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of concertgoing; the television did not yet dominate the public sphere and film 
served only as occasional entertainment. Additionally, music occupies a partic-
ularly significant place in the Central European imagination, especially in the 
German-speaking lands, as it has long been one of the key sites for the expression 
of national identity there.2 In light of its omnipresence and importance, it is not 
surprising that music would be essential to the political initiatives of the com-
munist regimes of the region. These factors linked up with the core communist 
belief, refined in the early Soviet Union, that the arts were essential for creating 
the new socialist society. Unsurprisingly, then, communists in Central Europe 
placed great emphasis on the musical world and pursued ambitious aims there. 
Cultural officials interacted extensively with citizens and composers, believing 
that music offered an exceptional power to shape their populations. Motivated by 
the conviction that “music is one of the few forces that, on a large scale and with 
nearly unlimited possibilities, seizes and influences all people,” they considered 
music “a colossal factor in the shaping of man. . . . it is today a powerful element 
in the formation of the political and ideological aspects of the nation.”3 Music 
thus served a peculiarly important function in the legitimation strategies of these 
communist regimes in their early phase from 1945 to the late 1950s. The combi-
nation of music’s historical resonance in the region combined with communism’s 
interest in culture as a tool of influence make music a rich, central site for an 
examination of the workings of power and everyday life.
This book is a comparative inquiry into the relationship between music and 
politics in East Germany and Poland from the aftermath of the Second World 
War, through Stalin’s death in 1953, and concluding with the slow process of 
destalinization thereafter.4 This study analyzes the communist parties’ claims 
about and intentions for all kinds of music, both “serious” and light, and exam-
ines how composers, performers, and audiences cooperated with and resisted 
these suggestions and demands. Following anthropologist Katherine Verdery, 
this study argues that music, as a significant part of cultural production in these 
countries, played a crucial role in instituting and maintaining the communist 
regimes of Central Europe. As part of the stalinist project to create and control 
the new socialist person, the ruling parties in East Germany, the Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED]) and in 
Poland, the Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (Polish United Workers’ 
Party [PZPR]) sought to influence musical production to saturate the public 
space with politically effective ideas and symbols that furthered the project to 
construct their version of a socialist society. Music helped the parties establish 
legitimacy; both extensive state support for musical life and messages in the 
music itself encouraged musical elites and ordinary citizens in the audience to 
accept the political elite’s dominant position and political mission. The parties 
invested considerable resources in an attempt to create an authorized musical 
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language that would secure and maintain hegemony over the cultural and wider 
social world.5
Despite significant efforts at totalizing domination from above, a striking 
degree of contestation, creativity, and even innovation existed throughout this 
period. Rather than describe a situation of absolute control over a stifled, mo-
notonous musical landscape, this study reveals considerable space for intense 
discussion and indeed negotiation among numerous, differing musical and politi-
cal pressure groups. Undeniably, and often with a heavy hand, SED and PZPR 
officials tried to limit the kinds of music produced and heard, especially in the 
early 1950s. These boundaries, however, were set fairly expansively, and proved 
to be quite porous in practice. The much-maligned aesthetic paradigm of social-
ist realism, often incorrectly described as dogmatic prescriptions mandating the 
production of ponderous ideological works, was surprisingly flexible. Moreover, 
many composers were intrigued and even felt inspired by its ideas of simplicity 
and the use of folk motifs, and they produced creative, interesting music that fit 
within a broad interpretation of its tenets.6
More broadly with respect to political and aesthetic issues, the following 
analysis moves beyond traditional explanations for artist involvement with the 
party, advanced perhaps most suggestively and famously in Czesław Miłosz’s 
The Captive Mind, with its writers who ingest the mind-altering Murti-Bing pill 
of dialectical materialism or engage in (self-)deception through Ketman.7 Rather, 
this work treats East German and Polish composers, musicians, and audience 
members as rational individuals who made a reasoned decision to work with the 
party in pursuit of their own interests and goals. While other factors behind this 
musical production are not denied, such as pressure from and fear of a state that 
demanded a significant measure of compliance, the following pages argue for 
genuine cooperation as a key motivation, one stemming from overlapping aims, 
a desire to bring music to new ears, an appreciation for state support of creative 
work, and an interest in the new musical culture being propagated—as well as 
less lofty aims like ambition and monetary rewards. This study engages in a care-
ful and contextualized analysis of what individuals said, wrote, composed, and 
attended at the time, while more problematic subsequent interviews and memoirs 
will be only infrequently and cautiously evoked where appropriate.8
This cooperation never meant the slavish following of orders, though party 
officials, especially in the years around 1950, did attempt to impose their program 
in an often heavy-handed manner. Rather, through a complicated, collaborative 
process, composers pushed for and often achieved their goals of professional 
autonomy and aesthetic integrity both with and against party directives, even 
as they—at times eagerly, at times grudgingly—helped negotiate and create the 
new political and cultural reality. Important and often repressed episodes in the 
careers of notable East German and Polish composers are examined in detail 
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throughout this study. In recent years, the politically inflected works of their So-
viet colleagues, most notably Dmitri Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev, have 
experienced a renaissance both in performance halls and scholarly writing. The 
former’s oeuvre has only grown in popularity, even as a synthesis has begun 
to emerge that strives to make sense of his life and work, especially during the 
stalinist years.9 Prokofiev’s socialist-realist works have achieved considerable at-
tention and increasing performances in recent years, with War and Peace included 
already in two Metropolitan Opera seasons this century and his political cantatas 
released on CD.10 For their peers in Poland and the GDR, such an examination 
of the equivalent periods is just beginning, and this book forces a reappraisal of 
key figures and makes a contribution to emerging debates. It illuminates and con-
textualizes the compositional decisions of Witold Lutosławski, one of the leading 
composers of the twentieth century, known for his avant-garde and experimental 
music after 1956, and Andrzej Panufnik, the most prominent composer in Poland 
during the postwar decade, both of whom wrote socialist-realist music but tried to 
hide or minimize it later. They, as well as Tadeusz Baird, Grażyna Bacewicz, and 
other influential figures in the Polish musical world around 1950, all wrote mass 
songs and larger politically themed works. In the East German context, it exam-
ines the struggles of left-leaning luminaries like Hanns Eisler and Paul Dessau to 
navigate complex political-aesthetic waters, the copious and influential socialist-
realist music of Ernst Hermann Meyer and Ottmar Gerster, and the musical mi-
lieu of the hundreds of professional composers who chose to live in the GDR.
This book also reveals the diverse responses to this musical production by 
the East German and Polish populations, and argues that a heterogeneous every-
day life existed where party undertakings intersected with audiences and amateur 
performing ensembles. The parties attempted to collapse the traditional distinc-
tion between high and low culture through the formation of a musical world 
where composers created a new popular music even as philharmonic orchestras 
performed in factories and workers and peasants entered traditional concert halls. 
Cultural officials encouraged composers to direct their creative production to-
wards the “working masses” through the composition of mass songs and other 
accessible works. The parties also helped organize sprawling music festivals and 
a rich concert life, but in cooperation with musical elites and audiences. Music 
lovers and ordinary citizens reacted to party initiatives with eagerness or disdain; 
the parties’ aim to mobilize all social groups through music met a motley real-
ity that sometimes included recalcitrant conductors and bored and surly audi-
ences. These consumers of music were not simply acted upon, but interacted in a 
complex manner with the authorities through open complaints as well as simple 
nonattendance. Music was of course at the center of the lives of composers and 
ensemble directors, and was also of great importance to everyday individuals; 
unsurprisingly, they all asserted their own aims and desires on an ongoing and 
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energetic basis. Individuals could stay away from concerts, applaud enthusiasti-
cally to music they appreciated, or even express opinions publicly as in the not 
untypical case of factory worker Schnell. Indeed, we can think of these Central 
European dictatorships as negotiated ones, with attempts at total political control 
modified by elites and ordinary citizens participating through a willing if partial 
embrace of party goals but also by resisting initiatives from above and actively 
pushing their own in a manner explored more broadly in the historical literature 
as Eigen-Sinn, generally translated as “a sense of one’s own interests.”11 This 
study describes how the nature of musical life evolved in unexpected ways as 
officials and composers responded to these responses and demands from below.
These mediated, multiple, and overlapping levels of cooperation and negotia-
tion make the musical world particularly revealing and important for a broader 
understanding of the workings of power in early socialism. Music provides a fas-
cinating prism through which to view the tension captured in Konrad Jarausch’s 
concept of the “welfare dictatorship,” that of emancipatory, egalitarian goals com-
bined with repressive, dictatorial practice.12 Although continued research on the 
party-state apparatus and high politics is necessary and will also be explored in 
the first chapter, the bulk of this study focuses on how composers and audience 
members interacted with the political initiatives of the time. Evoking Mary Ful-
brook’s notion of a “participatory dictatorship,” I examine how citizens, through 
their musical involvement, were “both constrained and affected by, and yet also 
actively and often voluntarily carried, the ever changing social and political sys-
tem of the GDR.”13 While recognizing the analytical value of the traditional con-
cepts of “state” and “society,” this study seeks to complicate these definitions and 
show the extensive blurring and overlapping of the two in an effort to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of the workings of power in these dictatorships. Cultural 
officials on all levels, from the Ministers of Culture to local bureaucrats, interacted 
with composers and ensemble leaders. They all found themselves in roles that 
required the communication of political aims and values to musicians and audi-
ences, but also to take citizens’ desires into account. In an excellent recent study 
focusing on the GDR in the 1960s and 70s, Esther von Richthofen has posited a 
third agent, that of cultural functionaries, who operated between the traditional 
categories of state and society.14 For the 1950s in East Germany and Poland, this 
characterization does not hold; instead, power circulated in a much more com-
plex manner as party leaders, cultural officials at all levels, composers, ensemble 
leaders, musicians, and audience members all pressed for the realization of their 
goals. The parties undeniably attempted to establish Gramscian-style hegemony 
over the musical world, but a more diverse reality took shape as actors at all 
levels brought in influences from the prewar years, from the west, and from their 
socialist neighbors. In line with recent research that broadens the field of inquiry 
to include investigations of social groups and the culture of everyday life in an 
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effort to understand lived experience under socialism, the following pages look 
at the complicated and often chaotic musical realms of both countries to illumi-
nate the construction of the East German and Polish social, political, and cultural 
landscape in the years around 1950.
The backdrop to this study is the deepening tension between the superpower-
led blocs, with a transcultural component that has recently become a focus of 
intensive research.15 Developments in both countries took place against the 
growing political—and artistic—clash between the United States and the Soviet 
Union: the cultural Cold War. Each side claimed to be the home of a true, human-
ist culture that both elevated and satisfied the needs of their respective societies. 
In the Soviet bloc, communists and sympathizers launched a campaign of ex-
treme vilification against American-inspired cultural production, combined with 
a thoroughgoing attempt to demonstrate the superiority of socialist culture. Both 
officials and leading artists promoted socialist realism in music as an alternative 
to the decadent consumer culture of the West. Belief and interest in the aesthetic 
tenets of this new socialist art began to wane by the mid-1950s, and East Ger-
man and especially Polish composers looked increasingly to modernism and also 
popular musical trends in the West for inspiration. In both countries, however, the 
encounter between stalinist politics and music made a lasting impression on both 
the musical and wider social world of elites and ordinary citizens through 1989 
and indeed beyond.
Unsurprisingly, then, the arts have increasingly attracted the interest of schol-
ars and a wider public.16 Controversies around well-known figures like writer 
Christa Wolf, reporter Ryszard Kapuściński, poet Zbigniew Herbert, and novelist 
Andrzej Szczypiorski have mostly given way to more measured examinations of 
the intersection between art and politics in the context of the cultural Cold War.17 
Until recently, music has largely been absent except for a few musicological stud-
ies that tended to be rather brief and furthermore dismissive of the works created 
during this time.18 Composers and musicians have themselves often contributed 
to this process of marginalization, retrospectively feeling ashamed of their pro-
duction during the early Cold War period. Especially in the case of Poland, many 
scholarly works rely on memoirs or interviews that appeared decades after the 
stalinist period; these sources often obscure more than they reveal, as the sub-
jects attempted to reinterpret past actions or cast a veil over them.19 Recent archi-
val access is only beginning to modify the dominant Cold War interpretation of 
cowed composers producing worthless works for a supine public, especially with 
respect to the stalinist era, treated in but a handful of books. The GDR, with two 
well-known early postwar controversies involving operas—Bertolt Brecht and 
Paul Dessau’s The Judgment of Lukullus and Hanns Eisler’s unrealized Faust 
opera—has had a number of studies of this musical genre.20 Several recent books 
in history have compared musical developments in East and West Germany at 
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this time, and a handful of German scholars have recently published significant 
studies of music in this period, though all tend to focus on musical and politi-
cal elites.21 With respect to Poland, the British musicologist Adrian Thomas has 
published several pathbreaking thematic articles and addressed the era in a larger 
study.22 Some Polish scholars are also finally beginning to examine the stalinist 
era more systematically in their biographies of composers, but in general the pe-
riod is ignored by both Polish musicologists and cultural historians.23
This book complements and extends this recent research with respect to mu-
sic, and also makes a contribution to our understanding of everyday life and the 
workings of power more generally in the early years of the Cold War.24 It contin-
ues the move away from totalitarianism theory’s focus on binaries like party/art-
ist, or state/society to complicate our understanding of the artistic and quotidian 
realities of early communism.25 Because it investigates the overlapping sites of 
contact between party, composers, and the wider population, this study belongs 
to the growing trend that examines “softer” forms of political control in the So-
viet bloc as essential tools for the ruling parties to influence society and maintain 
legitimacy. By studying the sounds and controversies of the musical world, it 
provides a richer look at an everyday life in stalinist Central Europe that has often 
been incorrectly viewed as stagnant, repressed, and colorless. The music world in 
the early Cold War era provides an excellent case study due to its relatively mod-
est but symbolically outsized presence in the wider cultural and political sphere; 
composers in each country constituted a group in the low hundreds, a size that 
lends itself to intensive examination, while music as a cultural activity made for 
a significant site of participation for the wider population.
The comparative approach used here affords a fresh perspective on the com-
munist world in the context of the early Cold War, and engages the transnational 
phenomenon of how a Soviet-inspired aesthetic ideology interacted with domes-
tic political and musical milieus. Surveys of the historiography on the region 
unfailingly and repeatedly call for such comparative studies, but to date these 
have been rare.26 As political and cultural entities, East Germany and Poland 
present two compelling examples of the range of possibility and development 
among the seven countries of the stalinist Soviet bloc, with roughly equivalent 
populations in 1949, of 19 and 24 million, respectively. This comparison per-
mits an examination of a similar interaction between politics and the musical 
and wider world in two neighboring, but historically quite different countries, 
both of which nonetheless experienced a parallel political, social, and cultural 
transformation in the postwar period. The two countries looked remarkably simi-
lar around 1950, but very different just a few years later, and this study explores 
why. Notable likenesses reveal much about the “successes” of stalinization, but 
analogous processes and institutions at times produced dissimilar results that il-
luminate the aims and limits of the stalinist project. This book thus increases our 
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understanding of both the unity and diversity of a Soviet bloc once thought quite 
homogenous during its first decade. Relatedly, the book grapples with the broader 
concept of sovietization. The parties in the GDR and Poland adopted and adapted 
the Soviet Union’s relatively developed political system as well as its dominant 
aesthetic ideology of socialist realism. While the USSR’s political and cultural 
life was hardly static at this time, and indeed developments there continually af-
fected events in the satellite countries, its aesthetic and political system serves as 
a baseline of comparison and point of reference.
This study examines these transnational dynamics on multiple levels, with 
this Soviet-inspired ideology and forms of control interacting with Polish and 
East German contexts. In addition, East Germans and Poles traveled to the neigh-
boring country, introducing their take on socialist realism and socialism, and also 
playing each other’s music, and thereby influencing the other. Despite the official 
rhetoric of friendship within the bloc, the GDR and Poland had relatively chilly 
relations at this time—perhaps unsurprising given the experience of the war and 
the fact that roughly a quarter of the GDR’s population was made up of expel-
lees from newly Polish territory. Furthermore, and especially after Stalin’s death, 
the SED looked suspiciously on Polish reforms and curtailed contact. Nonethe-
less, each country had an organization that promoted exchanges with the other.27 
Poles were generally more interested in organizing cultural exchanges than their 
counterparts in the GDR, both because they respected German culture and they 
wanted to acquaint East Germans with their own.28 The circulation of ideas, com-
posers, and ensembles will be explored throughout.
This study touches on the immediate postwar years, but truly picks up the 
story in 1947-48 with the increased party involvement in the arts, the concurrent 
push for socialist realism, and the intensification of the Cold War. The core of 
the book ends in 1956-57, when the PZPR abandoned socialist realism as part of 
the broader changes related to the Polish October, and as the SED reoriented its 
cultural policy during Walter Ulbricht’s reconsolidation of power. Although the 
following chapters pursue a top-down narrative, moving from the high-political, 
theoretical plane through the composers’ studio and then on to the festival stage 
and performance hall, this structure does not mean to suggest that party decisions 
manifested themselves effortlessly in this manner throughout the musical world. 
Indeed, considerable contestation marked the debates over both the nature of so-
cialist realism and how to influence and propagate this new music, discussed in 
an extended first chapter that also provides an overview of the period. The second 
and third chapters turn to the producers of new music and discuss the Compos-
ers’ Unions in order to illuminate the processes underpinning the composition 
and performance of music, and how cultural officials attempted to influence its 
production, in particular through the tool of commissioning works. The final two 
chapters examine how this music found its way to the population, and how these 
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audiences responded. Chapter 4 looks at a number of key musical festivals to 
determine their organization and the kinds of music commissioned and performed 
there. The final chapter examines concert life, both with respect to the professional 
orchestras as well as to the state-run concert agencies that organized smaller-scale 
concerts and recitals. Each thematic chapter covers the entire period from the 
later 1940s to mid-1950s and investigates the workings of power throughout the 
overlapping strata of officials, musical elites, and ordinary citizens to examine the 
negotiated musical reality in the two countries. Along the way, the sounds, person-
alities, and debates of mid-century Central Europe ring out.
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The Rise and Decline of Socialist 
Realism in Music
In Poland and East Germany in the early Cold War, amateur choirs sang the 
praises of socialism, professional orchestras played tonal and accessible instru-
mental music, and catchy mass songs with a political message filled the aural 
space—in short, socialist realism dominated the musical landscape. The parties 
in both countries devoted considerable sums as well as political capital and per-
sonnel to win over composers and commission ideologically appropriate works 
and then bring this new music to the general population. Almost without excep-
tion, composers responded to these initiatives with interest, and produced an as-
tounding number of socialist-realist works. Musical groups of varying size and 
skill performed these new compositions, and audiences attended concerts at fes-
tivals and in concerts halls in city and countryside.
The story of the origin and rise of socialist realism is strikingly similar in 
both countries, but with important and compelling differences due to a variety 
of factors, including the role of the parties, the place of music in each society, 
the experience of the war, the distinct geopolitical situations, and the attitudes of 
composers both as individuals and as part of their corporate bodies, the Compos-
ers’ Unions. In both Poland and East Germany, cultural officials were dependent 
on musicologists and composers to help them formulate and propagate this new 
aesthetic ideology, which gave the latter a real measure of power. Together, in 
shifting and overlapping coalitions, cultural officials and musical elites created 
socialist-realist music through a complicated process of negotiation, and the latter 
proved able to modify party goals throughout the period, even before but espe-
cially during the thaw after Stalin’s death in 1953. Composers did not initially 
perceive socialist realism as a dogmatic set of rules, but rather helped to develop 
it as a vibrant artistic theory that motivated and stimulated interesting work. In-
deed, throughout much of the postwar decade the theory of socialist realism en-
gaged the interest and imagination of composers in both Poland and the GDR.
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This examination of socialist realism in music will also emphasize the con-
tingent elements of the intersection between art and politics. Although party goals 
and the high political realities of the Cold War reduced creative options, the de-
bate around socialist realism in music shows that there was considerable room for 
open discussion, and that no result—beyond an extensive discussion of socialist 
realism in music—was preordained. The important differences between the East 
German and Polish cases reinforce this point. A complex interaction between 
and among artists and cultural officials produced the cultural situation in which 
composers wrote music and audiences went to the concert hall. Socialist realism 
as a set of rules was also, however, used as a means to influence and control the 
composers of Poland and East Germany. While many cultural officials and their 
allies in the musical world genuinely believed in the correctness of this aesthetic 
ideology, it also served as a blunt means to attempt to impose and evaluate com-
pliance. These prescriptive and restrictive aspects of socialist realism are the flip 
side to the utopian and emancipatory idea of a new, positive art with broad ap-
peal, and underlie the power relationships of the period.
Despite the early similarities, by the mid-1950s, the musical worlds of Po-
land and East Germany looked very different from each other—in Poland, the 
aesthetic ideology of socialist realism collapsed, while in East Germany, a less 
restrictive version of this music continued to be composed and performed for 
decades. In both countries, initial enthusiasm for socialist realism among a broad 
cross-section of composers gave way to growing disquiet and frustration at the 
increasing dogmatism and pressure by party officials and their allies in the musi-
cal world. Both parties made significant concessions to composer autonomy at 
the start of destalinization in 1953, but the SED handled this course correction 
much more successfully through a clever and judicious policy, in contrast to the 
excessive dogmatism and tactical mistakes committed by its counterpart in Po-
land. The SED could also count on a larger number of composers, both in abso-
lute and relative terms, who sympathized more fully with its goals.
This chapter will look at the rise and weakening of the concept of social-
ist realism in the postwar decade in these two countries, but will start with the 
aesthetic ideology’s development in the Soviet Union. This definition provides 
a baseline for an elaboration of the dominant formulations in East Germany and 
Poland. A detailed narrative of the period traces the debates on socialist realism 
from the mid-1940s through the later 1950s in each country, and introduces the 
major figures involved as well as representative works inspired by its ideas. A 
final section gives a brief overview of the party and state structures that promoted 
socialist realism and sought to influence the musical world.
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Genesis in the Soviet Union
Although the socialist parties in late nineteenth-century Europe had various theo-
ries and ideas about art and the working class, it was of course in the Soviet 
Union where the party had state power to back its aims. Most scholars view the 
1920s there as a period of intense experimentation as well as a time of conflict 
over the role of art in the new Soviet society. A great variety of artistic and politi-
cal groups jockeyed to preserve or assert their position. The cultural landscape 
can be broadly simplified into four general groups: old Bolsheviks, such as Lenin 
and Anatoly Lunacharsky, who believed in basing the new culture on the best art 
of the past; militant communist cultural organizations such as the Russian As-
sociation of Proletarian Musicians (RAPM) that wanted proletarian control over 
the arts and a new workers’ culture; the mainstream intelligentsia, with its tenets 
of professional autonomy, traditional values, and artistic freedom; and the avant-
garde, including figures like Vladimir Mayakovsky and Vsevolod Meyerhold, 
which desired to institute its radical program of change by excluding all former 
and competing visions of culture.1 During the Cultural Revolution of 1928-1931, 
the militant groups got the upper hand, but then fell from favor with a turn to 
more traditional values.2 In April 1932 the Soviet leadership dissolved the many 
different artistic associations, when each artistic discipline eventually became 
centralized into its own overarching professional union.
Socialist realism was articulated in this context. Stalin and leading cultural 
figures like Maxim Gorky formulated the term itself in the spring of 1932, and 
set down its main principles during an October meeting. It was proclaimed the 
official Soviet art at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934.3 In 
his speech there, cultural tsar Andrei Zhdanov offered a broad definition of the 
“method of socialist realism” as a way to “depict reality in its revolutionary devel-
opment . . . combined with the ideological remolding and education of the toiling 
people in the spirit of socialism.”4 After the hegemony of the militant communist 
groups during the Cultural Revolution, artists initially viewed the promulgation 
of socialist realism as a sign of liberalization.5 With respect to music, the head 
of the Moscow Composers’ Union assured composers that socialist realism was 
not dogmatic and would include a number of compositional trends.6 In any case, 
socialist realism appeared a compromise that knitted together the aspirations of a 
broad spectrum of artists, encompassed both avant-garde demands and tradition-
minded concerns, and united ideas of high and low culture.7
Its nature still notoriously difficult to pin down, socialist realism bedeviled 
both theorists and artists of the day. They discussed socialist realism incessantly 
in the 1930s, and then again after the war. Literary scholar Leonid Heller identi-
fies three intertwined, core concepts of socialist realism: an ideological commit-
ment (ideinost), in that the content of the artwork was related to an approved 
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idea and was more important than its form, that is, its formal structure should not 
dominate its content; a national or popular spirit (narodnost), in that art expressed 
the will of the people and was accessible to them; and most importantly, party-
mindedness (partiinost), in that the artwork aggressively supported the party and 
helped construct socialism.8 Related to these were the ideas that socialist-realist 
art was based on and drew from the classics of the past, that artists shared a uto-
pian vision and believed their works helped shape life towards that vision, that 
artists made contact with the people and joined up with “seething life,” and that 
artistic production expressed a dynamic vision of the world by showing reality 
not as it was, but in its “revolutionary development.”9 Far easier to identify was 
socialist realism’s antithesis, formalism.10 In theory, formalism meant that the for-
mal aspects of a work of art commanded more importance than the subject mat-
ter, or content. It became a concept that lumped together most of the modernist 
movements of the first decades of the twentieth century. The main catchwords in 
music associated with this vilified term were dissonance, atonal and twelve-tone 
music, cacophony, and composers like Igor Stravinsky and Arnold Schoenberg.
Soviet artists, critics, and officials debated and refined the nature of socialist 
realism and formalism over the next two decades, and indeed beyond Stalin’s 
death. How socialist realism actually translated into a novel or painting or, in this 
case, musical work, proved a difficult and fraught issue for Soviet artists. In the 
musical realm this was a particularly vexing question. The earliest theoretical 
and practical discussions of both socialist realism and formalism were worked 
out predominantly through the medium of literature, and the other arts thus had 
to struggle to adapt to it.11 With respect to music, cultural officials preferred text-
based compositions like mass songs and cantatas, with words designed to carry 
ideological messages desired by the party. Instrumental music had to be easily 
understandable to the broad masses and preferably melodic, stirring, and uplift-
ing. An important corollary to the official doctrine was the basing of new works 
on the great masters of the past, including a related emphasis on preserving the 
national musical tradition—focusing, however, on those aspects of composers or 
works that fit communist ideology. Musicologist Marina Frolova-Walker points 
to Nikolai Myaskovsky’s Twelfth Symphony, written in 1931, as anticipating the 
core tenets of socialist realism in its clarity, actual or rumored ideological content 
(in this case, collectivization), evocation of nineteenth-century Russian compos-
ers, and merging of past and contemporary musical styles both high and low. She 
identifies socialist realism as the product of collaboration in the 1930s between 
cultural officials and composers and as featuring a stylistic mix of “the classical 
Western, the classical Russian, the folk Russian, and the popular Soviet,” ex-
pressed in an immediate and unironic manner.12
The first issue of the journal Sovietskaya Muzyka attempted a theoretical ex-
planation, which none other than leading Soviet composer Dmitri Shostakovich 
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derided at the time.13 Soviet officials, critics, and composers vaguely defined it 
over the next years as a kind of “heroic classicism,” with qualities of tunefulness, 
folk-music elements, romantic harmony, traditional genre forms, grandeur, and 
simplicity.14 Music played an essential role in the broader debate on several key 
occasions in the Soviet Union, especially during the first major polemics about 
formalism. Even after socialist realism had been proclaimed in 1934, modernist 
styles continued to be quite present in new music.15 To counter these trends, an 
example was needed and found in Shostakovich’s opera, Lady Macbeth of Mt-
sensk. It came under withering criticism in a Pravda editorial, “Muddle instead 
of Music,” for being formalist and appealing to supposedly perverted bourgeois 
taste through its dissonant and vulgar musical language and subject matter.16 Ten 
days later, Shostakovich’s ballet The Limpid Stream was also attacked for formal-
ist deviations due to its alleged artificiality and failure to link up to the people. 
A huge debate ensued, and Soviet officials clamped down on some of the more 
extreme manifestations of modernism and suspended performance of some mod-
ernist works from the West. Many composers, however, defended Shostakovich, 
and while most composed in a more melodic style and relied on folk melodies, 
the following decade was not a period of constricting dogmatism.17
Soon after the end of the Second World War, aesthetic debates around social-
ist realism resumed again, and cultural officials conducted another campaign to 
influence and, increasingly, control the arts. The worsening Cold War prompted 
the Soviet leaders, and their equivalents in the people’s democracies, to push 
for ever greater societal transformation and ever more control at an ever greater 
speed in order to solidify their bloc. Communists expected the arts to take part in 
the building of socialism throughout East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union, 
and increasingly pressured artists to work within the tenets of socialist realism.
Constant debates and battles over the nature and application of socialist real-
ism marked the era from 1946 to 1953, associated with party ideologue Andrei 
Zhdanov, and the definition of styles condemned as formalism expanded.18 Three 
Central Committee decrees in August and September 1946 focused on literature, 
the theater, and film, and demanded that the arts depict contemporary themes 
in an optimistic manner and convey an ideological message.19 A fourth decree, 
in February 1948, denounced formalism in music and harshly criticized leading 
Soviet composers such as Shostakovich and Sergei Prokofiev for not being more 
accessible to a broad public and politically engaged more generally. These moves 
went even further than the 1930s debates in restricting the permissible, and this 
narrowing definition of socialist realism provided cultural officials with a more 
effective means to control artistic production.
The fundamentals of socialist realism were therefore largely set by the late 
1940s, but were by no means completely codified and resistant to interpretation. 
Indeed, significant debate continued in the late stalinist Soviet Union. The con-
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cept of socialist realism, restrictive yet nonetheless somewhat labile, was then 
exported throughout the bloc. This fuzzy template was, however, both interpreted 
and implemented somewhat differently in Poland and East Germany.
Socialist Realism in the GDR and Poland
With the terms developed in the USSR and translations of key Soviet articles re-
printed as guidance and fodder for discussion, officials and composers groped to-
wards a working understanding of socialist realism in the late 1940s. East German 
composers likely had more context due to debates in Weimar Germany and among 
left-leaning composers in exile before 1945. Many of their Polish counterparts 
had in contrast spent time in Paris during the interwar period, with discussions of 
impressionism and neoclassicism there, although a small minority that included 
the musicologist Zofia Lissa had some familiarity with socialist realism due to 
wartime experiences in Soviet-annexed Lwów (today Lviv, Ukraine) and else-
where in the USSR. In both countries after the war, socialist realism emerged as 
a framework that allowed for composer input and some individual interpretation.
Ernst Hermann Meyer speaks at the 1950 Bach celebrations in Leipzig. The slogan reads: 
“Bach’s work is the national cultural heritage of the entire German people” (SLUB Dresden / 
Abt. Deutsche Fotothek, Roger & Renate Rössing, 28 July 1950).
The most important figure for propagating socialist realism in the GDR 
was the important musicologist and composer Ernst Hermann Meyer. His book, 
Musik im Zeitgeschehen (Music in Current Events, 1952), became the bible for 
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socialist realism in East Germany. Meyer codified his ideas yet further for the 
1954 Composers’ Union Congress in order to better shape the debate and educate 
his composer colleagues, and his fourteen points in summarized and paraphrased 
form describe socialist-realist music as:
1. formed through personal experience, personality, and individual ideas, 
thoughts and feelings, and with content that is meant for working people
2. prepared to combat decadent imperialism and fight for the new socialist 
society and a better, more positive life
3. engaged in creating themes that concretely and actively address working 
people and their lives, and not vague or abstract
4. willing to fight for peace
5. reflecting reality without simply copying it, that creatively addresses the 
future
6. not engaged in abstract experimentation, but provides strength for people 
to solve today’s problems
7. reflecting the rich and diverse reality of our people through equally rich 
and diverse themes, genres, and artistic invention
8. helping to shape the typical conflicts of our time and not focusing on un-
important issues
9. national in form—containing and expressing the national character
10. truly popular and closely linked to folk music without being primitive
11. building on the classics without copying them but rather creatively de-
veloping them further
12. perfect in form without making form the absolute priority but rather con-
taining socially relevant content
13. humane, full of life, and life affirming
14. filled with the consciousness that composers have a powerful societal 
responsibility in this time of world-historical confrontation and social, mate-
rial and spiritual change.20
These tenets, sharpened as they were after several years of discussion, were ob-
viously still quite vague. Meyer’s colleagues discussed and contested his ideas 
extensively, and tried to use them in their own ways, or indeed alter or go beyond 
them in their compositions.
Meyer’s equivalent in Poland was Zofia Lissa, a musicologist somewhat 
more grounded in Marxist theory than her East German colleague. To paraphrase 
one scholar’s summary of her complex and numerous writings in nine theoretical 
points and six practical corollaries:
1. Music reflects reality.
2. It is a social phenomenon.
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3. It possesses an ideological character as part of the superstructure; it re-
flects and supports the aspirations of the social class that is the historical 
motor of that era.
4. Each era has its own music linked to the forces of progress: “progressive” 
music.
5. Music linked to the forces of progress is always in accordance with the 
proper interpretation of reality with respect to its historical dynamic and is 
called “realistic” music.
6. Music of the bourgeois era, like the music of other eras, proceeds together 
with the leading class of that era and overcomes reactionary music.
7. The fall of bourgeois music meant the end of technical considerations 
dominating social and ideological considerations—the end of form dominat-
ing content, which is formalism.
8. Realistic music of the socialist era reflects and supports the historical dy-
namic of its era and thus helps to shape the new social system.
9. This development of socialist realism benefits not only the working class, 
but all of society, since a classless society is being built.
These highly theoretical, Marxist considerations had six broad implications for 
the compositional process, in Lissa’s view:
1. Vocal and programmatic music was more important than instrumental.
2. Music should have themes appropriate to the era.
3. It should be melodic,
4. Tonal,
5. Linked to folk themes,
6. And tied to the great national and European musical traditions without be-
ing a regression to nineteenth-century style.21
As in the case of Meyer, Lissa’s tenets left considerable room for interpretation. 
Though Polish composers comported themselves with more reserve and skepti-
cism than their East German counterparts, they also engaged in discussion of 
socialist realism, and produced an impressive number of musical works that fit 
into this theory.
In both countries, musicologists played key roles in the formulation and 
dissemination of socialist realism. In Poland, Lissa’s ideas dominated, and her 
fellow musicologists Józef Chomiński and Stefania Łobaczewska contributed to 
the articulation of socialist realism. Several composers, like Witold Rudziński 
and Jan Maklakiewicz, also strongly supported socialist realism, but they did 
not offer practical guidelines. Cultural officials like Stefan Żółkiewski provided 
another source of directives, and the main conduit for the musical world was 
Culture Minister Włodzimierz Sokorski. In the GDR, the main theoreticians of 
socialist realism were a group of musicologists led by the aforementioned Ernst 
Chapter One   ♦   23
Hermann Meyer, and also included Eberhard Rebling, Harry Goldschmidt, and 
Georg Knepler. A greater number of composers engaged with the debate there, 
and even published articles and pamphlets. Several cultural officials here also 
influenced policy considerably, and included culture minister and poet Johannes 
R. Becher as well as cultural officials Hans Lauter, Hans Pischner, and Anton 
Ackermann.
The overwhelming majority of Polish and East German composers responded 
to the initial political interventions into the music world in the late 1940s either 
positively or at minimum with cautious curiosity. They found much to agree with 
in the party’s calls to reach out to the people, engage in rebuilding the coun-
try, and formulate an antifascist nationalism, and warmly greeted the large sums 
made available for new compositions. In both countries, this good will began to 
sour somewhat in the early 1950s, as the party increasingly emphasized dogmatic 
compliance. Equally important to the aesthetic considerations around socialist 
realism and formalism were of course the political ones. By the late 1940s, the 
titanic battles of the Cold War were underway, and through socialist realism as 
the dominant aesthetic ideology, cultural authorities sought to shape and control 
both artists and the wider population. Officials constantly exhorted composers 
to close ranks behind the party program and combat the pernicious influences of 
the West. Increasingly, however, growing numbers began to resist limits on their 
compositional freedom, leading to a less hardline socialist-realist paradigm in the 
GDR and its disappearance altogether in Poland.
Debate and Decline in Poland
When socialist realism burst onto the Polish musical scene in 1948, few Polish 
political figures and artists had knowledge of it. The Polish Communist Party 
garnered only minimal support in Poland during the interwar period, and Stalin’s 
purges took the lives of hundreds of its members, leading to its dissolution in 
1938.22 A number of cultural figures worked closely with the Soviet authorities 
in Lviv after its annexation by the USSR in 1939 and became versed in the theo-
ries and politics of socialist realism there.23 The communist musicologist Zofia 
Lissa worked at the radio and conservatory in Lviv at this time, and wrote for 
the official Polish-language daily newspaper.24 She spent the war years in the 
Soviet Union, and was a member of the procommunist Union of Polish Patriots 
in Moscow. In 1947 she returned to Poland, where she joined her musicologist 
colleagues Chomiński and Łobaczewska, as well as younger protégés, in elabo-
rating the tenets of socialist realism through positions in the state bureaucracy 
and Composers’ Union. She used Marxist principles to analyze musical works, 
and her writings were frequent and ubiquitous at the time. In the eyes of most 
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composers, she became increasingly disliked and mistrusted for her party-line 
views and consistent condemnation of competing musical styles.
The dominating figure from the party side was without a doubt Włodzimierz 
Sokorski, a Polish Communist Party member in the 1930s who also spent the 
war years in the Soviet Union. A highly influential Deputy Minister of Culture 
from March 1948, he was appointed Minister in 1952. Sokorski was instrumental 
both in the implementation of socialist realism in the late 1940s and its attendant 
political control, and in the process of decentralization and retreat after 1952. In 
the years from 1954 to 1956, he attempted to compromise with an artistic world 
increasingly dissatisfied with him and his goals, and his authority among artists 
gradually eroded.25 Sokorski interacted frequently with composers, as he attended 
most union congresses and many other concerts and meetings. Composers seem 
not to have feared him, and indeed often spoke well of him. Sokorski was given 
to the grand gesture and hyperbole; his words carried significant weight, but seem 
to have been taken with a healthy dose of skepticism.26 Party leaders eventually 
removed him from his post in April 1956 as part of the far-reaching changes that 
peaked with the Polish October that fall.
More generally, most of the leading musical figures had survived the war, 
and they brought a diverse musical heritage into the new postwar Polish reality. 
During the interwar years, many had studied in Paris with the famous pedagogue 
Nadia Boulanger and soaked up the dominant neoclassical trend whose most 
influential proponent was Igor Stravinsky, vilified in the stalinist period as the 
worst of the formalists. A strong interest in composing “national” music similar 
to that of Béla Bartók coexisted with the neoclassical style among Polish com-
posers.27 The most influential legacy here was that of the towering figure of early 
twentieth-century Polish music, Karol Szymanowski, who took up national and 
folk themes especially in the final phase of his creative production after the First 
World War and before his death in 1937; cultural officials were more attracted by 
these works rather than those from his more modernist and experimental early 
periods.
Relative freedom in the artistic world marked the first few years after the 
Second World War.28 The Communist authorities concentrated on asserting their 
dominance over the political realm, while culture remained fairly autonomous, 
in part because the party initially tread carefully with respect to Polish national 
culture as it sought to build support. The PZPR nonetheless encouraged artists 
to create for the broad masses, and most composers found common cause in the 
suggested turn away from the alleged elitism of the interwar years and toward 
the people. The atmosphere began to change in late 1947, as the party began to 
exercise control over the arts, and initiated discussions about socialist realism, 
and this first phase of growing debate lasted through 1949.
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Initial Engagement
Although the PZPR had formulated and gradually begun to implement a cultural 
policy already in 1944, most scholars date the party’s concerted turn towards 
control over the cultural world from November 1947, with President Bolesław 
Bierut’s speech at the opening of a new radio station in Wrocław. His call for 
increased focus on and organization of the artistic realm initiated a campaign 
that culminated in a series of conferences in all the arts in 1949, where officials 
and sympathetic cultural figures pushed socialist realism as the dominant ideol-
ogy for Poland’s artists. They defined it, however, in a general manner, and did 
not exert much pressure until the following year. At this moment, it was not a 
foregone conclusion that a narrow, dogmatic version of socialist realism would 
be promoted.29 The myriad contingent factors that led to this outcome included a 
broad initiative to emulate the Soviet Union, the introduction of the Six-Year Plan 
in 1950, and the intensification of the Cold War that radicalized politics more 
generally and produced increasing calls for ideological conformity.30 Undeniably, 
however, the party intended throughout 1948 to influence more significantly the 
artistic world, and in a manner to its liking. Włodzimierz Sokorski became Dep-
uty Culture Minister that spring, and made known the party’s intention to direct 
the ideological evolution of Polish artists.31
In the musical realm, events moved rapidly towards increased politicization 
and eventually socialist realism. During the Composers’ Union’s Third Congress 
in October 1947, already a month before Bierut’s Wrocław speech, the very ac-
tive cultural official and composer Witold Rudziński called upon his colleagues 
to transform their union into a “forge for ideological issues.”32 Several fellow 
composers echoed his calls for musical production to become more ideologically 
engaged.33 The ministry also organized a meeting between composers and writ-
ers to collaborate on the production of mass songs and postulated the idea of an 
“engaged music,” or one with political content.34
Composers in Poland soon experienced the fallout from the early 1948 
Zhdanovian polemics in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1948, in the first of 
many such visits, a group of Soviet composers, led by young, energetic, and hard-
line Soviet Composers’ Union president Tikhon Khrennikov, came to Warsaw 
to discuss formalism and realism with their Polish counterparts.35 Immediately 
after, the main music journal Ruch Muzyczny published an article by Khrennikov 
that praised “realistic” music while attacking formalist music by Stravinsky and 
Schoenberg.36 Opposing position pieces on the formalism debate by Poles ap-
peared on the pages of Ruch Muzyczny soon after.37
An international musical meeting at this time in Prague also had some sig-
nificant influence in Poland. Contrary to the commonly accepted view, however, 
this Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in late May 
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1948 did not mark the beginning of the Soviet Union’s attempt to impose social-
ist realism throughout Eastern Europe in the context of the Cold War’s onset.38 
While the numerous Soviet delegates gave strongly political speeches, delegates 
from all over Europe discussed the less than felicitous state of music at the time in 
an open manner. A planned “International Union of Progressive Composers and 
Musicologists,” feared by some contemporaries as a potential stalking horse for 
Soviet control, in fact never came into being. In Poland, the congress proceedings 
appeared in Ruch Muzyczny, but discussions within the Composers’ Union reg-
istered dissatisfaction that a broader spectrum of Polish views on contemporary 
music was not represented in Prague, and composers insisted on more input in 
any future meetings.39
Although not recognized as such by most scholars, the musical world has the 
particular distinction of being the first site in Poland where cultural officials co-
herently called on cultural figures to engage with the party’s aesthetic program.40 
At the Fourth Congress of the Composers’ Union in late November 1948, Deputy 
Minister Sokorski gave the keynote speech that touched on formalism and (so-
cialist) realism, though he described both in general terms.41 With respect to the 
latter, Sokorski insisted that it “should not be treated mechanically or as an artis-
tic school” and used vague concepts like “artistic passion” and “unity of form and 
content” to explicate it.42 His overall message was that the party and composers 
should work together towards a common goal, and he claimed that the era’s most 
prominent composers, Andrzej Panufnik and Witold Lutosławski, had already 
advanced well along the correct path. His moderate tone served to introduce new 
terms and ideas for discussion, and composers greeted his speech with “lengthy 
applause.”43 Newly elected union president Zygmunt Mycielski, a widely re-
spected composer who, despite his aristocratic background and leading position 
among the neoclassically inclined Polish music community in 1930s Paris, af-
firmed many of Sokorski’s themes during his speech, even as he maintained that 
composers should have the autonomy to choose the form and style of their works. 
He showed genuine interest in the new ideas and urged his fellow composers to 
seek to understand the realism-formalism debate. Mycielski portrayed the new 
aesthetic ideology as embodying the composition of accessible but high-quality 
works that would appeal to a broad audience.44 Mycielski would play a crucial 
role in the discussions of socialist realism around 1950, and served in key insti-
tutional positions that transmitted party aims to composers and composer desires 
to cultural officials. Dominating the discussion at this point in late 1948 was the 
concept of popularization (upowszechnianie)—that composers should try to cre-
ate music for the workers and peasants who made up the overwhelming majority 
of the population—and all composers approved of this initiative. The congress 
“Declaration” also focused on this issue, as it called on composers to reject “elit-
ism . . . [and] to reach out to the new listener . . . and educate him,” while also 
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asserting that a turning point had been reached where composers would receive 
state support and help fulfill its—as yet vaguely defined—goals.45 While discus-
sion at the congress focused mostly on practical issues, union members did be-
gin an open, exploratory engagement with the new aesthetic postulates, one that 
would continue over the succeeding months and years.46
After the congress, Ministry of Culture officials noted with satisfaction that 
this had been the first meeting with such an engaged ideological debate.47 In early 
1949, Sokorski followed up on his speech by calling on the union leadership to 
organize a series of discussions on the topics of formalism and realism.48 At this 
point, Sokorski and many of his fellow cultural officials hoped that composers 
would find the way towards socialist realism on their own, with but a modicum of 
party-supplied guidance, financial and moral support, and encouragement.49 And 
indeed, the overwhelming majority of composers proved themselves willing to 
back the party’s aims at this time.
Debates on socialist realism continued in the wider cultural milieu through-
out the spring of 1949 as officials rhetorically pushed for artists to join in the fight 
for a new, party-sanctioned art. The PZPR Central Committee held a particularly 
important meeting in late May that focused on cultural issues. The party trium-
vir responsible for culture, Jakub Berman, stressed the importance of the arts 
for shaping worldviews, and insisted that socialist realism was the direction art-
ists must take—though he claimed this offensive did not inhibit artistic freedom, 
since limited experiments would be permitted.50 With respect to music, Berman 
referenced Zhdanov’s theses and attacked composers for creating in a formalist 
manner. Other party authorities present discussed music and claimed that com-
posers like the country’s most noted, Andrzej Panufnik, were responding to the 
party’s efforts and becoming “enemies of formalism.”51 Soon after, prominent 
party official Stefan Żółkiewski asserted that artists realized how much they had 
to change in themselves, and were ready to learn to “think and feel in our way 
(po naszemu).”52
Composers confronted the issues of formalism and (socialist) realism head 
on at a conference in the small town of Łagów in August 1949.53 In much of the 
relevant literature, Łagów has incorrectly become synonymous with the mailed 
fist of the totalitarian state imposing socialist realism on helpless composers.54 
Composers and officials did indeed discuss realism and formalism, and officials 
clearly favored the former, but did not impose dogmatic definitions or make any 
threats.
Over four days, Deputy Minister Sokorski, 25 leading composers and mu-
sicologists, and a smattering of officials and musicians discussed the nature of 
formalism and realism, often through the prism of recently composed works per-
formed live at the conference by the Poznań Philharmonic.55 The Music Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Culture organized the conference and specifically chose 
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musical works to promote a discussion of formalism and realism in music.56 So-
korski opened the proceedings by formulating two aims for the following days: 
to define the nature of realism and formalism in music and to set the course for 
composing such works over the next year in preparation for a major festival.57 The 
Deputy Minister led the free-flowing discussion and made frequent interventions 
into the debate, but never claimed to have superior knowledge—in fact, he often 
prefaced his opinions with caveats that he was not a musician, but rather simply a 
“lay person.”58 Far from asserting a strict dogma, he allowed that realism is “not 
a defined movement or already crystallized form of musical expression . . . [there 
is not] a magic formula or ready-made prescription.”59 In a much more political 
closing speech, he proclaimed both the end of eclecticism and an approaching 
turning point for all composers towards realism and away from formalism. Surely 
his references to Lenin and Zhdanov made some composers uneasy, but his gen-
eralized guidance for compositions based on folk music and accessible to average 
citizens held broad appeal at the time. In addition, Sokorski conceded that no one 
knew what the “realistic, national art of the new, socialist era” looked like, and 
by exhorting composers to develop such a music, attempted to calm any doubts 
about limitations on artistic integrity by cautioning them against “oversimplifica-
tion, one-sidedness, and following the path of least resistance.”60
Composers’ Union president Zygmunt Mycielski, an accomplished com-
poser in his own right and much esteemed by his colleagues, gave the confer-
ence’s keynote speech that set the stage for discussion with an overview of Polish 
music history and an assertion of the need to establish the path that composers 
should follow.61 He noted that the musical world found itself in an almost unbe-
lievably favorable situation since World War II, with considerable state support 
for composition, musical ensembles, and music education. With reference to 
Zhdanov, he laid out the main points of socialist realism in music: content linked 
to the people, nonelitist, a national style, simplified language, an increased focus 
on vocal and programmatic works, and a compositional technique subordinate to 
expression and not a goal in itself. He looked forward to discussing his general 
tenets with officials and fellow composers, but he did not think it was possible to 
decide exactly what was a formalist or realist work.62
Many composers shared Mycielski’s interest in engaging the concepts of re-
alism and formalism, and in charting a new path for Polish music. Roman Pales-
ter, who was soon become one of the few Polish composers to choose the life of 
a permanent émigré, expressed great curiosity in the new aesthetic tenets, though 
he maintained in a much later interview that his colleagues at Łagów displayed 
“reserve” and “were not speaking honestly about everything.”63 Other composers 
as diverse in background as Kazimierz Sikorski, Jan Ekier, and Piotr Perkowski 
also engaged in the specific discussion of the terms.64 Composers sympathetic to 
the party aims at the time, such as Bolesław Woytowicz, Witold Rudziński, and 
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Tadeusz Baird, talked about the relationship of realist music to the new audiences 
of what they termed their developing socialist society.65
A key element of the conference was the performance of works followed by 
related discussion on their relationship to formalism and realism. In much of the 
scholarly literature, this is sometimes presented as tantamount to a show trial, 
complete with the condemnation of individual works; and part of the negative 
mystique of Łagów is linked to this labeling of works as formalist. A close read-
ing of the conference proceedings shows the truth to be rather different, however. 
Sokorski often weighed in first, but his opinions seem not to have particularly 
influenced participants, who had little compunction in expressing opposing view-
points.
One example pertains to the work of Andrzej Panufnik, arguably Poland’s 
leading composer at the time. In his 1987 autobiography, Panufnik writes that 
he intentionally declined to come to the Łagów conference, but adds that one of 
his compositions “had drawn more fire than any other work.”66 And indeed, his 
experimental and somewhat abstract Nokturn (1947) for orchestra was one of 
three contemporary Polish works that Sokorski labeled formalist, but the Deputy 
Minister delivered the critique even as he called it “a work of great caliber.”67 
Furthermore, Sokorski did not reiterate his criticism in his closing comments or 
in an article published shortly thereafter.68 Two composers generally supportive 
of the party expressed appreciation for the piece despite Sokorski’s comments: 
Bolesław Woytowicz, well respected for running a wartime Warsaw café where 
much excellent music was performed, found the Nokturn quite good, and his 
colleague Tadeusz Szeligowski, composer of Poland’s first socialist-realist opera 
and future president of the Composers’ Union from 1951 to 1954, also found it 
comprehensible to potential audiences.69
More fraught and complex were the discussions of Zbigniew Turski’s three-
movement Second Symphony, Olympic, which had achieved a stunning suc-
cess with the gold medal at the competition linked to the 1948 London Olympic 
Games. Sokorski found the musical language and content too pessimistic and not 
appropriate for the new socialist person—perhaps not a surprising criticism, since 
Turski introduced the piece by explaining that he had tried to evoke the difficult 
war years and the smoke of the crematorium, and the work is marked by a dark, 
somber, and dissonant musical language.70 The musicologists Zofia Lissa and 
Józef Chomiński gave nuanced, critical appraisals of the work and a number of 
composers praised it, while only youthful party member Andrzej Klon attacked 
it fiercely.71 Turski asked Sokorski if the latter’s criticism was directed at him or 
his symphony, and Sokorski acknowledged that he considered only the work for-
malist. The composer thanked his critics and declared himself ready to undertake 
new projects—which flowed freely from his pen in the following years, some 
with a socialist-realist cast, and often funded by the party.72 This symphony did 
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subsequently disappear from the repertoire for a time because of its alleged pes-
simism, but this was an anomaly.73 The experience seems to have gotten under 
his skin, however, as Turski was one of the main antagonists of socialist realism’s 
proponents just a few short years later.
The great majority of the participants at Łagów praised most of the performed 
works, or at minimum judged them to be on the correct path towards realism. The 
youthful and increasingly prominent Tadeusz Baird premiered his light and ac-
cessible Sinfonietta, which received great applause and was even given a repeat 
performance. Baird joined with his peers Kazimierz Serocki and Jan Krenz, later 
better known as an accomplished conductor in Poland and abroad, in the Grupa 
’49, a collective of younger composers initially devoted to fulfilling the aims 
of socialist realism. Baird and Serocki declared themselves ready to compose 
“clear and simple music” and rejected the idea of art for art’s sake. Serocki even 
announced that he had recently burned all his previous works upon realizing that 
his artistic views had changed.74 Krenz composed a number of socialist-realist 
works at this time while also pursuing a successful career as a conductor. Such 
enthusiastic attitudes were the most extreme, but did represent the eagerness or, at 
minimum, openness of the broad majority at this early moment; the evolution of 
these younger composers away from socialist realism and towards a more com-
plex and experimental musical language by the mid-1950s is also characteristic 
for most Polish composers. Baird and Serocki were the prime movers behind the 
Warsaw Autumn Festival, begun in 1956 and featuring music deemed formalist 
just a few years earlier.75
Perhaps most interesting at Łagów was the lack of unity among those who 
would be most expected to support and propagate the new doctrine. Party mem-
ber and musicologist Zofia Lissa criticized Sokorski’s approach to realism and 
formalism as overly psychological, and offered an expansive, undogmatic defini-
tion of realism—“a trend just becoming postulated”—as “humanistic art.” She 
defined formalism as dehumanized, anti-emotional, abstract, privileging techni-
cal experimentation and formal construction over content, not based on folklore, 
atonal, and pessimistic.76 Sokorski in turn belittled her carefully presented ideas 
on formalism as points of discussion rather than theses; she was also criticized 
by fellow party member Jan Maklakiewicz.77 Composer Witold Rudziński, until 
recently head of the ministry’s Music Department and future president of the 
Composers’ Union, contradicted his former boss Sokorski in praising Turski’s 
symphony. Such dissension hardly represented a supposedly united front in a 
party-inspired, totalizing project to impose dogmatic norms. Instead, Łagów re-
veals the exchange of a diverse and overlapping set of political and aesthetic 
opinions from officials as well as musicologists and composers from inside and 
outside party ranks.
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The atmosphere at Łagów was rather one of self-criticism and of defining the 
nature of socialist realism and formalism through open discussion. Sokorski and 
Zofia Lissa set the general guidelines for what was expected of composers, but 
with frequent caveats that these were not fixed rules and that socialist realism was 
not a hardened formula. In an article written just after the conference, Sokorski 
summarized the contemporary state of affairs with respect to the fight for social-
ist realism and against formalism. He encouraged composers to turn away from 
“imperialist,” American, cosmopolitan, atonal, and abstract influences and to-
ward socialist realism, a term now with the adjective “socialist” but still vaguely 
defined as tonal, harmonic, and meaning the unity of form and content. He re-
iterated that socialist realism was not an “artistic school,” but rather a “creative 
method,” and cautioned composers against simplifying their music language to 
the point that it became primitive. Finally, he maintained his criticism of Turski 
(but not Panufnik) and rather muddily tried to explicate the formalist elements 
of the Olympic Symphony, while nonetheless emphasizing that Turski was “a 
great talent.”78 At Łagów and in its aftermath, socialist realism was presented as 
the future of Polish music, but how it would actually look in practice was open 
to discussion.
Encroaching Dogma
The space for continued discussion and experimentation began to narrow in late 
1949 through 1950, as cultural officials and their musical allies pushed for com-
posers to produce concrete results in their new compositions. Deeply symbolic 
was the closure of the more independent, Kraków-based journal Ruch Muzyczny 
and its replacement with Muzyka, published in Warsaw and under the control 
of the party. Thematically, attention turned to composing works for Stalin’s 70th 
birthday and for the first Festival of Polish Music, the latter meant as a showcase 
for socialist realism in music. To both, composers responded willingly with polit-
ically engaged compositions, though initial rumblings against excessive political 
interference began.79 At another major conference in early 1950, Sokorski urged 
composers to create works of a realistic character, both to educate fellow compos-
ers in the new ideology and to shape the worldview of audiences. He used charged 
phrases like “the battle” for creating new, expressive, socialist-realist works and 
overcoming formalism, urged that the small changes already seen should become 
a huge leap towards socialist realism, and criticized individual compositions.80 
The participants also discussed several works, including Shostakovich’s cantata 
on Stalin’s reforestation campaign, Song of the Forests, which was held up as 
a prime model for new composition throughout the Soviet bloc and performed 
frequently due to its positive political message and accessible, melodic musical 
language.81 Shostakovich produced this seven-part work for chorus and soloists 
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that celebrated the engagement of young people in the reforestation of Siberia 
after the Second World War and extolled Stalin as “the great gardener.”
Composer Zygmunt Mycielski, who had to this point worked closely for 
the party’s cultural program and would continue to do so, though with growing 
doubts, captured this turning point in his diary entry in March 1950: “Up to now 
there has been a cultural NEP. Now the revolution must go farther.” Although 
feeling himself unable to represent this new line and continue as president of 
the Composers’ Union, he did not give up on working towards composing a new 
music that would be acceptable in the socialist era to come: “I have the sense 
that I am on the track of certain musical qualities that would produce a simple, 
useful, clear music—clear thematically, harmonically, rhythmically—sufficiently 
bright and light. Perhaps they would call this realism?”82 These impulses likely 
informed the composition of his first, Polish Symphony (Symfonia polska, 1951), 
in which he attempted to fill the traditional classical form with a national char-
acter through a fresh take on folk-based melodies, and his one-act ballet Fun in 
Lipiny (Zabawa w Lipinach) that thematized tractors, the new countryside, and 
the tension between traditional rural and contemporary Western culture.
Despite his uncertainties about the new line and his relation to it, Mycielski 
nonetheless opened the union’s June 1950 conference with a thoughtful, stirring 
speech that described what he believed to be that next historical step, socialist 
realism, in an effort to convince his fellow composers to engage with this aes-
thetic ideology. He called on his colleagues to abandon their old ways of thinking 
and composing, to step out of their “comfortable carriages”—traditional genres 
of music like the sonata—and into different forms of locomotion. They all lived 
in a new era of massive changes, which their music must reflect. He advised 
his peers to break out of their isolation and elitism—by reaching out to the new 
listener, they could not but create the music of the coming age, a socialist-realist 
music based on national and folk tradition and for the entire nation, including 
especially workers and peasants. He interpreted the revolutionary slogans from 
the Soviet Union as opening a “broad line of artistic possibility” for composing 
great, creative works that would appeal to and educate the people, works that 
were simple but not simplified, and that contained deep emotion and ideological 
content. He praised the progress his colleagues had already made, noted the con-
siderable sums the state provided for composition, and encouraged an embrace of 
the possibilities of the new era just now coming into being.83
Mycielski thereby set the tenor for the first several days of this 1950 confer-
ence. Unlike ten months earlier at Łagów, proponents of the party line now as-
sumed that composers had a general grasp of the formalism/realism debate, and 
therefore they focused here on how to best overcome the former and embrace the 
latter. Over half of the 40 union members present spoke during the four days of 
discussions and concerts, and all who did agreed that formalism must be fought. 
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Musicologists, cultural officials, and their ideologically inclined colleagues en-
couraged composers to look within themselves and expunge negative influences 
held over from earlier formative periods in their lives. No one disagreed that 
socialist realism should be the goal and that all should reach out to the newly 
forming society and help shape it through their compositions. Zofia Lissa made a 
typical contribution, as she praised composers for progress made, but urged them 
to engage more actively in the pursuit of the socialist-realist program.84
A relatively moderate tone gave way to the hardliners later in the conference. 
Surely chilling was the sharply critical intervention by soon-to-be Composers’ 
Union president Witold Rudziński, who fiercely attacked many composers, in-
cluding prominent figures like Panufnik and Witold Lutosławski, for not mak-
ing more progress in overcoming formalist influences.85 Antiformalist enragé 
Jan Maklakiewicz replicated his Łagów performance and fulminated against “the 
terror of the formalist clique.”86 Deputy Minister Sokorski expressed deep dis-
appointment that a “new current” of music had not developed in the year since 
Łagów and lamented the “strange atmosphere of resistance.” He claimed com-
posers had muddled the concept of formalism and called upon each of them to 
produce new realist works, concluding: “the creation of an atmosphere of honest, 
combative criticism, in which the Polish music of the socialist era will arise—that 
is our mission!”87 He closed the conference with a highly political speech about 
the need to fight American imperialism and its aesthetic sidekick, formalism. 
Harshly criticizing leading composers, whom he urged to engage in self-criti-
cism, Sokorski demanded that they renounce formalism in their compositions.88 
For Sokorski and the hardliners, the time of discussion had ended; for most com-
posers, a difficult period of considerable political pressure began, but one that 
presented opportunity as well as struggle.
There were thus four broad camps at this 1950 turning point in the debate 
over socialist realism in music: Deputy Minister Sokorski and a handful of 
composers and musicologists who demanded that composers embrace a narrow 
version of socialist realism immediately; a sizeable group of communists and 
sympathizers who agreed that socialist realism was a desirable goal, but that time 
was needed for composers to work on themselves and develop a new musical 
language; perhaps the largest group, composers who were broadly sympathetic 
to the socialist-realist program, but wanted some compositional freedom and the 
ability to experiment; and a very small group who renounced socialist realism en-
tirely. Starting in 1951, and then accelerating quickly thereafter, increasing num-
bers in groups two and three came also to question and ultimately reject socialist 
realism, as they found it dogmatically interpreted and rigidly imposed.
The election of Witold Rudziński as president of the Composers’ Union at 
this Fifth Congress in June 1950 inaugurated a year-long attempt to realize the 
party’s goal of instituting a hardline version of socialist realism. Born in 1913 and 
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active in Vilnius and the surrounding area in his twenties, Rudzińsnki brought 
an energetic and politically engaged sensibility to his work for the state and the 
Composers’ Union, as well as in his own numerous socialist-realist compositions. 
At the first meeting of the newly elected Executive Committee in late June 1950, 
this former Culture Ministry official laid out his vision for a politically engaged 
union. He called for “the ideological formation of composers—to recognize 
the basis of socialist ideology, especially Marxist aesthetics, [and for] the fight 
against the principle of formalism.”89 Rudziński further demanded that compos-
ers write for the “mass listener,” concentrate on vocal works like the mass song, 
undertake a yearly two-week stint to interact with workers and peasants, and in 
general participate actively in the realization of the political goals of the party.90
Many of the union leaders present at the June meeting considered Rudziński’s 
plan too ambitious, including party members Lissa, Jan Maklakiewicz, and prodi-
gious writer of mass songs Alfred Gradstein, as well as other composers usually 
sympathetic to party goals like Tadeusz Szeligowski. Others were less negative, at 
least at this initial stage; Andrzej Panufnik merely complained that material sup-
port for compositions should be emphasized more, and Zygmunt Mycielski in fact 
called the plan “excellent.”91 Rudziński’s highly ideological agenda soon proved 
too much for a growing number of composers, however. One of Rudziński’s ma-
jor initiatives was the institution of audition concerts (przesłuchania), at which 
composers performed and discussed new works. He envisioned them as “a direct 
site in the fight for socialist realism, as an expression of our era, as an instrument 
for the formation of the masses, [and] as a ‘factory of joy.’”92 Most composers 
appeared to be less enthusiastic, and many resisted participation, finding them 
overly ideological.
Similarly, on a broader scale, the initial interest among composers in socialist 
realism and related willingness to work with the party gave way to misgivings 
about excessive limitations on artistic freedom. The situation in the Compos-
ers’ Union deteriorated rapidly, as Rudziński’s actions produced a “crisis” there 
by the end of 1950.93 In December 1950, Andrzej Panufnik and Poland’s most 
prominent female composer Grażyna Bacewicz, followed by Jan Maklakiewicz 
one month later, resigned from the Executive Committee, apparently in protest 
of Rudziński’s actions.94 Two composers sympathetic to the party, Mycielski and 
Szeligowski, were brought onto the Board to replace those who had resigned.95 
At a key meeting of union leaders with Deputy Minister Sokorski in January, 
Rudziński acknowledged the criticism, but sought political cover from Sokorski. 
The latter provided this handsomely, asserting, “The more liberal tone in current 
discussions on artistic production has been wrongly interpreted as a manifesta-
tion of a weakening of the battle against formalism,” and called for renewed 
focus on socialist realism to combat mistaken artistic experiments in naturalist 
and formalist styles. He pushed composers to continue their self-criticism and 
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discussions, but in a conciliatory move, admitted that questions of quality were 
just as important as questions of ideology.96
Growing dissatisfaction with and resistance to Rudziński’s policies—and by 
extension those of the party—caused his resignation in the summer of 1951, the 
only time in the history of the union that a president did not serve a full term.97 
Similar expressions of discontent throughout the artistic world at this time led 
the party to moderate its policies slightly. At a large meeting in the fall, Sokorski 
relied on the carrot as much as the stick when he praised many composers for the 
progress they had made in the two years since Łagów and urged them to continue 
along the “difficult, sometimes painful, and prolonged process” of overcoming 
formalist tendencies and to do so with more “ideological zeal.”98 Another minor 
retreat was in evidence during an important Council of State meeting at the end of 
October 1951, where Jakub Berman continued to call for artists’ full engagement 
behind socialist realism, but pointed to “schematism”—a problem supposedly 
manifested in some works of art that followed the rules of socialist realism but 
were of poor quality.99 Again, the emphasis on the aesthetic value of the artwork 
was indeed a concession, but also surely a straightforward desire for technically 
accomplished works in the socialist-realist idiom.
Sokorski reinforced this slight change of course at the Sixth Congress of the 
Composers’ Union in December 1951, where he praised many composers for 
their works performed at the first Festival of Polish Music that year. Although 
calls to fight against formalism and for ideological engagement continued, the 
harsh prescriptions about socialist realism from the previous year were toned 
down considerably. Echoing Berman’s October speech, Sokorski condemned 
“schematism” as a deviation from socialist realism.100 The intent was to focus 
more on the technical quality of the composition, and less on the programmatic 
or political, and thus was something of a retreat from socialist realism’s primary 
focus on politicized content.
The other main speakers at the December 1951 Congress broadly praised 
composers for having made ideological progress in the previous two years. My-
cielski appealed for more contact with the masses and for smaller and more ac-
cessible compositions that would fit comfortably within a socialist-realist mold.101 
Lissa echoed this call in her speech, which included a largely favorable overview 
of the compositions played at the Festival. She praised composers’ ideological 
development and overcoming of formalism, and even accepted the use of some 
compositional techniques from the interwar period that two years earlier would 
surely have been deemed formalist.102 Party members and composers of social-
ist-realist popular music Edward Olearczyk and Witold Elektorowicz called for 
more ideological engagement, but dissenting voices were heard as well, as when 
frequent gadfly Turski attacked party member Alfred Gradstein for his cantata 
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A Word on Stalin for not being “national” (i.e., Polish) enough, and for natural-
ism—two deviations from socialist-realist norms.103
Witold Rudziński’s exercise in self-flagellation at this congress, five months 
after his resignation as president, represents a fitting summary of both party 
and hardliner attitudes in late 1951: he felt composers should have supported 
his efforts to propagate socialist realism, but admitted that his program was too 
“maximalist” and that he did not recognize what he called the “gradual and in-
dividualized political and ideological maturing process” taking place in his fel-
low composers. He nonetheless affirmed the larger goal of fighting for socialist 
realism and committed himself to doing so as an individual union member.104 
Respected middle-generation composer, pedagogue, and future Composers’ 
Union president Kazimierz Sikorski closed the congress by noting that the era of 
ideological battle had come to an end, and that a less disruptive era of synthesis 
should follow.105 For the most part, and despite the continuing efforts of party 
officials and a dwindling number of their composer allies, this new era proved in 
practice to be a gradual but steady distancing from socialist-realist norms on the 
part of most composers.
Even with the slowly mounting dissatisfaction in 1951, composers produced 
a breathtaking number of compositions consonant with the norms of socialist real-
ism during its high point from 1949 to 1953. Scholars have largely passed over 
these works, and composers themselves have often disavowed them. Nonetheless, 
all Polish composers worked within the socialist-realist paradigm at this time.106 
And there is too much evidence of cooperation, and too little of coercion, to have 
the latter be a dominant explanatory factor.107 Rather, composers agreed with many 
of the party’s goals, especially in bringing music to a wider audience, and found 
significant common ground in the precepts of socialist realism. After the horrors 
of the war and Nazi occupation, and the weakness and mistakes of Poland’s pre-
war conservative government, combined with the perceived treason of the West-
ern democracies before and during the war, many composers wanted to help the 
party rebuild the country and accepted the alliance with the Soviet Union, and 
proved willing to support the party’s vision. Prominent figures like Panufnik and 
Lutosławski as well as their colleagues of all ages and backgrounds composed 
political mass songs as well as larger vocal and instrumental works with ideologi-
cal themes and in a simplified musical language that drew heavily on folk music.
In the decade after the war, Polish composers produced roughly 1500 mass 
songs, a genre particularly prized for its supposed ability to communicate po-
litical messages readily to the population through catchy melodies.108 Witold 
Lutosławski wrote around ten mass songs on political themes in the early 1950s, 
and many of them proved quite popular among the public, with frequent radio 
play and multiple printings of the sheet music.109 Two marches, Nowa Huta and 
A Most Beautiful Dream (Najpiękniejszy sen), the latter a rousing celebration of 
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young people “forever in love with steel,” thematized the showpiece new indus-
trial town outside of Kraków. Comrade (Towarzysz), proclaimed victory under 
the red flag, while Service to Poland (Służba Polsce) lauded youth activism in 
a jaunty krakowiak rhythm. We Go Forward (Naprzód idziemy) described the 
reconstruction of Poland, and The Victorious Path (Zwycięska droga) celebrated 
Polish soldiers’ wartime victory that created “a worker and peasant Poland” of 
“singing tractors” and “red neckties.” These songs show real compositional skill 
and engagement, and Lutosławski took them seriously, as evidenced not least by 
his anger over the publisher modifying some of the lyrics without his approval.110
Panufnik contributed a handful to the genre as well, including perhaps 
the most infamous, the Song of the United Party (Pieśń Zjednoczonej Partii), 
composed in 1948 to commemorate the fusion of the communist and socialist 
parties, an important step in the stalinization of the country.111 His simple but 
stirring piece to a text by poet Leopold Lewin praised the new party as “leader 
of the masses . . . leader of the entire nation.” An only slightly less ideological 
song was his A New Era (Nowy czas), written in 1954 on the occasion of the 
PZPR’s Second Congress and extolling the accomplishments of the past decade 
in a march-like rhythm. Yet another addition to the genre was Peace on Earth 
(Pokój nad światem), on a theme used by the party to appeal to a war-weary 
population, and a political issue with which Panufnik was closely involved 
throughout this period.112
One of the most notable composers of mass songs was Alfred Gradstein, 
one of the few party-member composers of any stature. His march Salute the 
Party (Cześć partii) is representative in its far-reaching claims for the party’s 
good works and a refrain ending “Glory, glory, glory to the party. Salute the 
party!” He is perhaps best known today for the still appreciated On the Right a 
Bridge, On the Left a Bridge (Na prawo most, na lewo most), which describes 
the reconstruction of passage across the Vistula river with a catchy waltz-like 
melody. He also wrote a seemingly limitless number of songs on every conceiv-
able theme, including brotherhood, unity, and stakhanovite workers, and several 
on the Union of Polish Youth (Związek Młodzieży Polskiej, ZMP), one of which 
lauded its members’ work in the rural areas (ZMP pomaga wsi, The Union of 
Polish Youth Helps the Countryside).
An equally accomplished practitioner of the genre was the young Edward 
Olearczyk, who wrote dozens of songs covering a range from solemn hymn to 
the lively march. An example of the latter is one of the earliest and most popular 
mass songs, Millions of Hands (Miliony rąk, 1950), on the building of People’s 
Poland with young people “linked by work and song.” He tackled such other ide-
ological themes as Song in Praise of Comrade Bierut (Pieśń na cześć towarzysza 
Bieruta), about Poland’s president, with the lines: “Your words are signposts for 
us, / Simple, powerful, tough as steel, / We will head into the clear future with 
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you, / A difficult path of sacrifice and battle.” He also celebrated the MDM, War-
saw’s socialist-realist architectural core, and Our Party (Nasza partia) in song. 
Several works put to appealing melody the politically inflected themes of peace 
and youth organizations. His nearly exclusive focus on such ideological mass 
songs made him a target of those in the Composers’ Union who sought to mini-
mize political influence a few years later, an episode described in chapter 2.
Meeting of the ZKP Plenum in Poznań in December 1952. From left: Stefan Bolesław 
Poradowski, Tadeusz Baird, Jerzy Jasieński, Andrzej Markowski, Grażyna Bacewicz, Tomasz 
Kiesewetter, Jan Ekier, Wawrzyniec Żuławski, unknown, Tadeusz Szeligowski, Hieronim 
Feicht, Zofia Lissa, Marian Sobieski, Kazimierz Jurdziński, Edward Olearczyk, Bolesław 
Szabelski, Stanisław Wisłocki, Zygmunt Mycielski, Witold Lutosławski (Photo 0044a, Polish 
Music Information Center).
A sizeable number of composers added political mass songs to more tra-
ditional popular song production during these years. Władysław Szpilman, the 
protagonist of Roman Polański’s 2002 film The Pianist and a prodigious writer of 
eminently danceable and well-liked songs, wrote a number of works that blurred 
the border between political mass song and popular song, including The Brick-
layer’s Waltz (Walczyk murarski), Song about Friendship (Piosenka o przyjaźni) 
and To Work (Do roboty). Tadeusz Sygietyński, famous as the founding director 
of the wildly successful folk-dance troupe Mazowsze, composed Song about the 
Six-Year Plan (Piosenka o 6-letnim planie), which described workers and peas-
ants working together to fulfill their norms. Perhaps his most popular was Be-
loved Country (Ukochany kraj) to a text by Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński that 
mobilized patriotic feelings to encourage all in the building of a new socialist Po-
land. Other key works include his March for Peace (Marsz pokoju) and Parade of 
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Friendship (Pochód przyjaźni), with its musical portrait of young people united 
in friendship and led by the Soviet Komsomol. One of the most hagiographic 
songs of the era was his Song about Bierut (Piosenka o Bierucie), which praised 
the Polish president with the refrain:
How proudly the sun now rises
And each of our steps is lighter
Because Bierut leads us today,
And he and the people govern the country.
Bierut—the pride of People’s Poland,
Bierut—leader of the masses,
To a brighter tomorrow, to a better future,
At the head of the Party he leads us.113
Other highly ideological contributions include Witold Rudziński’s To the Party 
(Do partii), which in march rhythm describes the PZPR as inspiration and fea-
tures the stirring refrain: “You taught us how to work / and give our life for our 
country / Lead us, our Party, lead / into the era of prosperity!” Party member Jan 
Maklakiewicz wrote two songs about Stalin, Song about Stalin (Pieśń o Stalinie) 
and Stalin is with Us (Stalin z nami), the latter written shortly after the Soviet 
leader’s death. Zbigniew Turski, criticized for his Olympic Symphony at Łagów, 
wrote Song for the First of May (Piosenka pierwszomajowa), which portrays red 
flags as the hope of millions on the traditional workers’ holiday. All in all, nearly 
every composer, young and old, from the well-known to the obscure, tried their 
hand at mass song composition. The party consistently encouraged this important 
aspect of the democratization and politicization of musical culture at the time.
Larger-scale vocal works were particularly prized for their assumed ideo-
logical impact, and the showpiece genre of the period was the cantata, designed 
to educate and appeal to a broad audience. Many composers of the period tried 
their hand at one, which generally featured some combination of soloists, choir, 
and significant musical ensemble, and linked up with a tradition of nineteenth-
century secular cantatas that was continued in the Soviet Union. The most famous 
Polish cantata was perhaps Alfred Gradstein’s A Word on Stalin (Słowo o Stali-
nie, 1951), and future world-renowned conductor Stanisław Skrowaczewski used 
parts of the same text by poet Władysław Broniewski for his Cantata on Peace 
(Kantata o pokoju, 1952).114 Other notable contributions to the genre of the po-
liticized cantata included Tadeusz Szeligowski’s Charter of Hearts (Karta serc, 
1952), about the new constitution of People’s Poland, and Witold Rudziński’s A 
Peasant’s Lot (Chłopska droga, 1952), which traces the fate of the peasant from 
bondage to freedom in the new socialist reality. Labor was often celebrated in 
these works, as in particular Bolesław Woytowicz’s Cantata in Praise of Work 
(Kantata na pochwałę pracy, 1949), and Jan Maklakiewicz’s Silesia Works and 
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Sings (Śląsk pracuje i śpiewa, 1950). Each of the young composers in the Grupa 
’49 produced large, programmatic vocal works: Jan Krenz a Conversation of 
Two Cities (Rozmowa dwóch miast, 1950), between Warsaw and Moscow, Ka-
zimierz Serocki the cantata Warsaw Bricklayer (Warszawski murarz, 1951) and 
his second symphony, Symphony of Songs (Symfonia pieśni, 1953), inspired by 
folk music and with texts thematizing peasant life, and Tadeusz Baird the canta-
tas Song of Revolution (Pieśń rewolucji, 1951) and Ballad of the Soldier’s Cup 
(Ballada o żolnierskim kubku, 1954). All these works employed an accessible 
if often bombastic musical language that communicated a political message 
clearly to the listener.
While opera in Poland did not have the same history and contemporary va-
lence as was the case in East Germany, cultural officials did encourage the genre, 
with little success.115 A particular challenge was motivating writers to produce 
an appropriate libretto, and despite incentives such as a contest, this initiative 
largely failed.116 Tadeusz Szeligowski created the most notable example, The 
Scholars’ Revolt (Bunt żaków, 1951), which dramatized a sixteenth-century re-
bellion among Kraków students. Witold Rudziński contributed Janko the Musi-
cian (Janko Muzykant, 1948-51), based on the Henryk Sienkiewicz novella about 
a musically inclined peasant who is unable to realize his ambitions in the context 
of nineteenth-century class society.
As prescribed by socialist realism, instrumental music in general was writ-
ten in a more understandable style that drew on folk themes and built on national 
and historical traditions. The works of Poland’s best-known female composer, 
Grażyna Bacewicz (1909-69), are representative of many composers’ output dur-
ing this period.117 In her several concertos, three symphonies, and a broad array of 
chamber music works between the late 1940s and the mid-1950s, she maintained 
her own take on the neoclassical style she encountered while studying in interwar 
Paris, but also included significant folk-music elements that fit into the socialist-
realist idiom. Her Third Symphony (1952) is fairly representative, with its clear, 
folklike melodies and trajectory from tension to climax. Also of note is the ballet 
The Peasant King (Z chłopa król), which portrays noble and peasant settings, the 
latter filled with vigorous folk dances while the former come across as grotesque 
and empty.118 The cultural authorities found much to like in her instrumental mu-
sic and these works won several state prizes in the first half of the 1950s. She 
was an accomplished violin soloist who turned increasingly to composition, and 
seems to have thrived in this period, with considerable sympathies for the com-
munist project.119
Lutosławski’s instrumental works of this period similarly derived from the 
folk sources encouraged by socialist realism, including his light and lively Little 
Suite (Mała suita), with original folk melodies from the Rzeszów region. Most 
noteworthy is his Concerto for Orchestra, begun in 1950 and completed in 1954. 
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Also based on folk themes, it was hailed at the time as a major achievement of 
socialist realism—and is one of his most popular and well-known works today. 
It is a powerful and expressive piece containing moments of grandeur and a stir-
ring finale, and was greeted with enthusiasm at its premiere, although some were 
disoriented by the relative novelty of the piece and left the hall in disgust.120 
Panufnik similarly drew on folk music for a number of works, including his Sin-
fonia Rustica (1948), which received many performances in 1948 and 1949. It 
was a technically accomplished and melodic piece that used folk music from the 
northern area of Poland. Although Panufnik claims in his autobiography that it 
was banned for not fulfilling the tenets of socialist realism adequately, it was an 
official submission for the International Peace Prize in the summer of 1950 and in 
fact performed several times in the following years.121 Nearly all composers fol-
lowed the lead of Panufnik and Lutosławski, and created accessible instrumental 
works that linked up with Polish folk traditions.
The Thaw in Music
Throughout 1952 and into 1953, the party continued to push for socialist realism 
while making minor concessions, even as composers gradually turned away from 
it due to increasing frustration with its narrowly interpreted tenets. A sharpening 
of the battle lines took place; the ministry took control over the process of com-
missioning works, while a growing number of composers, led by Lutosławski, 
began a process of requalification of union members that marginalized a num-
ber of left-leaning composers of lighter popular music. A pattern emerged over 
these years: calls for ideological purity continued, but in more moderated form as 
the party made small retreats in the face of artists increasingly demanding more 
aesthetic freedom. Early in 1952, the Ministry of Culture attempted to generate 
discussion on the formalism-realism debate by sponsoring articles and initiating 
contact with composers on the subject, but significant cracks in the paradigm 
soon began appearing.122 In a striking example of a transnational development 
across the two countries, a December 1952 visit by Bertolt Brecht’s theater 
troupe, the Berliner Ensemble, prompted an influential series of articles in the 
Polish press that attempted to broaden the definition of socialist realism.123 That 
month, a discussion of Stalin’s theses on linguistics at the Council of Culture and 
Art saw the first organized and coherent attempts by artists to press for a more 
elastic interpretation of socialist realism.124 An article by Zofia Lissa on the same 
subject soon after also exhibited a slight loosening of her interpretation as well, as 
she emphasized the autonomous aspects of music.125 The developments of 1952 
culminated in long discussions at an expanded plenary session of the Compos-
ers’ Union Executive Committee in December, where a number of composers 
demanded more compositional freedom, while at the same time Zofia Lissa con-
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tinued to bemoan composers’ “lack of passion” in ideological matters, and still 
called for socialist-realist works that would appeal to the broad masses and that 
were linked to the issues of the day.126
In the first half of 1953, party officials continued their campaign for social-
ist realism with a policy of gradual concessions to artistic autonomy. Ministry 
officials pushed for “the further deepening of the battle for socialist-realist art,” 
and called for the next major music festival to “show the further progress of Pol-
ish music on the path to socialist realism.”127 Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, 
resulted in a short period of increased dogmatism during the public commemora-
tions and outpourings of grief; this harder line manifested itself most clearly in a 
meeting of the Council of Culture and Art in April.128 It focused on artistic criti-
cism and produced a resolution calling for “the deepening of the fight for a zeal-
ous, Marxist, socialist-realist based . . . literary and artistic criticism, which will 
be an active force in the formation of contemporary artistic production . . . and 
will sharpen vigilance with respect to the danger of leaving the path of socialist 
realism.”129 Ministry official Jan Wilczek gave the keynote speech that acknowl-
edged a weakening of the campaign for socialist realism but exhorted artists to 
resume the battle to institute it.
The gathering thaw thereafter provided the catalyst for an opening that had 
been underway publicly since at least late 1952. In the music world, as more 
broadly, voices of dissent and dissatisfaction had been growing for some time. Jan 
Ekier’s suggestion that political considerations had prevented the performance of 
works by Zbigniew Turski and others, and a consequent demand for more open-
ness, was greeted with loud applause at an important Composers’ Union meet-
ing.130 At another forum, Grupa ‘49 member Jan Krenz complained openly about 
his treatment by Minister Sokorski, who had attacked Krenz’s music at previous 
conferences.131 Composers began turning away from the genres of music, like the 
mass song and cantata, preferred by the proponents of socialist realism.132 These 
developments culminated in a December 1953 meeting of the expanded Execu-
tive Committee of the union to discuss the proposed second Festival of Polish 
Music. The gathering featured an extraordinary speech by Sokorski who admitted 
“a concept of socialist realism” had not been created. He indeed advocated that 
composers continue to try to develop such a concept through their works, but al-
lowed that “a broad range of individual styles and possibilities” was permitted.133 
Mycielski, who had heretofore largely echoed the party line, now spoke openly 
about how previous prescriptions relating to socialist realism and formalism had 
been mistaken, and he called for an end to “demagogically formulated and inter-
preted slogans about realism.” He asserted that composers still did not know the 
true nature of realism in music, and advocated for a diverse selection to be played 
at the upcoming Festival, including works formerly condemned as formalist like 
Turski’s Olympic Symphony (1948) and Lutosławski’s First Symphony (1947).134 
Chapter One   ♦   43
Sokorski’s speech in particular marked a significant blow to the dwindling num-
ber of proponents of socialist realism in music, while Mycielski’s about-face was 
highly symbolic of a collapse in composer interest.
In early 1954, continuing discussions and a more permissive atmosphere 
in the Soviet Union created space for increased experimentation both there and 
abroad, and at the Second Congress of the PZPR in March and the meeting of 
the Council of Culture and Art in April, Sokorski advocated giving artists more 
autonomy—though party officials did not yet widely share this opinion.135 At the 
much-delayed Seventh Congress of the Composers’ Union in late April 1954, the 
concept of socialist realism was further called into question. Zofia Lissa opened 
the proceedings with a speech that praised the progress made toward socialist 
realism, and continued her usual calls for composers to help influence society 
and to be politically engaged. In an surprising and telling move, however, she 
also conceded a damning number of mistakes. She employed a strategy of affirm-
ing the broad goal of realizing socialist realism in music, but now attempted to 
define the concept more expansively and advocate for its establishment at a more 
gradual pace, while also criticizing the means employed to foster it over the re-
cent years. She accorded significant blame to Sokorski in an attempt to exculpate 
herself, thus revealing the continued and growing fractures among PZPR sup-
porters. She lamented black-and-white thinking, especially the false dichotomy 
of formalism versus socialist realism, and asserted that the “vulgarization” of 
equating formalism with difficult music, and socialist realism with simple, had 
been deleterious to the music world. In a significant concession to composers, 
Lissa affirmed that experimentation with new compositional techniques was de-
sirable, but with the caveat that it must serve the greater goal of contributing to a 
music linked to the party’s goals.136
In this manner, Zofia Lissa sought to preserve and indeed reinvigorate so-
cialist realism, while granting that mistakes had been committed and that some 
autonomy should be allowed, and a spirited, forthright, and at times angry debate 
ensued. Several composers took her speech as an opportunity to condemn her 
and the policies she stood for, and they asserted composers’ rights to autonomy 
outside of the strictures of socialist realism. Turski criticized her for imposing 
the “hegemony” of musicologists, as well as her views and tastes, on compos-
ers.137 Piotr Perkowski, a more traditional composer who occupied important 
roles in the Composers’ Union and as a pedagogue, echoed this rhetoric as he 
called her a “dictator” and pleaded for the freedom of experimentation.138 Party 
members and sympathizers such as Mieczysław Drobner, Chomiński, Rudziński, 
and Szeligowski continued to press for socialist realism and sought to curb com-
poser claims for the right to experiment.139 In a reversal of the format of previous 
years, where he opened these congresses with directives and suggestions, So-
korski gave the closing speech and tried to finesse the state of affairs in a man-
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ner similar to Lissa’s. He conceded mistakes but nonetheless pushed for a more 
general concept of socialist realism in a less dogmatic manner. He cleverly said 
the difficult previous years had prepared the current phase of reduced ideological 
control, as long as composers were prepared to follow the party’s more expansive 
cultural-political line. Oddly and improbably, he tried to implicate composers in 
the ideological excesses of the previous years by asserting they were equally at 
fault for “jumping out the window” as he was for ordering them to do so. While 
approving of experimentation, Sokorski echoed party luminary Jakub Berman’s 
recent slogan that freedom of expression must be accompanied by “a socialist 
compass.”140 Overall, those who had advocated for socialist realism were on the 
defensive, but still advocated it as a less dogmatic goal and by less restrictive 
means. The next meeting of the Executive Committee showed which side had the 
momentum, however, as Kraków composer, Catholic intellectual, and frequent 
party critic Stefan Kisielewski started a discussion on revising the “aesthetic the-
ories . . . used in evaluating works.”141 A growing number of composers, in words 
and through their compositions, were moving away from the party at this time of 
a broader post-Stalin thaw.
These bitter debates typified the contentious atmosphere in the Compos-
ers’ Union at this time, and even the elections to the Executive Committee were 
marked by rancor and mistrust. Lissa received the lowest possible number of 
votes to make it onto the committee, and her position weakened steadily during 
1954, despite her efforts to continue directing the artistic output of composers, as 
did that of the several other communist composers, like Edward Olearczyk, who 
would soon be demoted in the union.142 Of symbolic importance were the prepa-
rations for the second Festival of Polish Music, held in the first half of 1955 and 
controlled by the younger, increasingly independent composers on the Executive 
Committee; the committee steadily marginalized Lissa, leading to her resignation 
in the spring of 1955.143 Tellingly, the union’s most prominent member advocat-
ing socialist realism had been forced out of its leadership. Most composers con-
tinued to press for more autonomy and freedom, as for example, Kisielewski’s 
call to have more jazz performed.144
Party officials began a renewed offensive in the arts in early 1955, and pro-
claimed the attempt to recover socialist realism from “narrow and vulgar inter-
pretations” an important goal.145 Increasing resistance from artists hindered these 
efforts, as did the aforementioned growing discord among party members them-
selves.146 In music, this friction can be most clearly seen in the mounting divide 
between nominal allies Lissa and Minister Sokorski. Their differences on the is-
sue of socialist realism became only more evident over the following year. Lissa 
again blamed the collapse of socialist realism on Sokorski and his composer al-
lies like Rudziński and Maklakiewicz, who had in her view advocated a “vulgar-
ized” version of socialist realism.147 Lissa’s vision and authority had been nearly 
Chapter One   ♦   45
completely undermined in the eyes of most composers by the Eighth Congress in 
June 1955. At the congress, composers repeatedly attacked her in moves intended 
to increase their autonomy from the strictures of socialist realism and political 
interference in their activities. She did try to defend herself and her advocacy of 
socialist realism, but revealingly admitted that she and her fellow musicologists 
may have gone too far in interfering with the creative process.148 Nearly all of her 
allies had turned against her or were silent, save for Bolesław Woytowicz, who 
broadly supported her program and even at this late date encouraged composers 
to fulfill Stalin’s exhortation to be “engineers of the human soul.”149
Building on his speech at the Seventh Congress one year earlier, Sokorski 
in 1955 engaged in a breathtaking exercise of revisionist spin. He scarcely men-
tioned socialist realism, and only to claim that he never proclaimed a model of it 
in music, and further asserted that all composers should be proud to have made 
it through a period of battle over the issue in the spirit of creative searching. He 
also maintained that he had never pressured composers, but that each had fol-
lowed his or her own conscience. Unlike just a few years earlier, he criticized 
almost no work, but rather meekly suggested that composers should create more 
accessible music. Overall, instead of pushing composers to engage in a party-
directed ideological project, he made vague assertions that recent compositions 
were somehow part of the party’s general plan.150 If there had been any doubt over 
the last year or two that socialist realism in music lay dying, Sokorski gave it the 
effective coup de grâce in June 1955.
Although a number of party officials and artists, most notably Central Com-
mittee cultural official Stefan Żółkiewski, continued to push for socialist realism 
and ideological control of the arts, the term itself largely disappeared from debate 
after 1956.151 At a key Council of Culture and Art meeting soon after Khrush-
chev’s secret speech, most leading artists condemned socialist realism roundly 
and proclaimed full freedom of artistic expression.152 In music, the breakthrough 
first Warsaw Autumn festival took place that October, and featured works for-
merly considered formalist.153 By the time of the next Composers’ Union Con-
gress in the spring of 1957, Lutosławski declared that composers could at last 
meet in “an atmosphere of true artistic freedom” where no one would be per-
secuted for formalism.154 In a sign of how radically the frame of reference had 
changed, one speaker made a plea that all music should be heard and respected, 
not just the works of “modernists” and “formalists”—a stunning upending of the 
former situation—while another cautioned that composers should not blindly em-
brace the new possibilities and reject everything from the previous decade.155 
Most composers, however, celebrated their expanded freedoms, and some even 
began the project of interpreting the past decade, and their actions during it, as 
“a period of political terror” when they were forced to be “instruments of propa-
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ganda.”156 Such a characterization, widely believed today in popular and some 
scholarly writing, does not stand up to scrutiny.
In the Polish musical world, the term socialist realism was scarcely heard 
again. Those composers and musicologists who had represented that line became 
marginalized or slowly changed their views. The forms of political control associ-
ated with socialist realism largely disappeared as well, as the Composers’ Union 
achieved nearly complete autonomy from party interference. Genres linked to it, 
like the political mass song, dropped almost completely from sight, as did canta-
tas in praise of Stalin or the party. The proponents of socialist realism, within the 
party as well as their sympathizers in the wider musical realm, lost the battle they 
had so enthusiastically engaged in 1949-50. In attempting a complete and ac-
celerated domination for socialist realism, they had alienated the overwhelming 
majority of Polish composers, nearly all of whom had early been willing to create 
within the socialist-realist idiom and had indeed produced a considerable number 
of musical works. Initial interest, combined with an openness to cooperate with 
the party had, however, turned into growing disquiet and frustration in 1951, and 
produced a gradually decreasing willingness to work within the party line in the 
years following. As a result, composers gradually worked to carve out an autono-
mous space for their creative and professional pursuits. As the party’s position 
weakened yet further after 1953, most composers seized the opportunity to press 
for even greater compositional and institutional freedom, and turned away from 
socialist realism and towards its previously vilified antipode, formalism, and the 
panoply of modernist styles emanating from the West.
Formulation and Modification in the GDR
By the late 1950s in East Germany, the situation looked very different from that 
in Poland, as socialist realism continued to be discussed and explored composi-
tionally by the great majority of composers and musicologists. During the previ-
ous decade, however, developments in the musical world were strikingly similar. 
With a slight time lag due to the GDR’s geopolitical situation, the encounter with 
socialist realism unfolded in a manner largely similar to that in Poland. Initial 
wide-ranging discussion in the late 1940s gave way to an offensive by the SED 
and its sympathizers in the musical world in the early 1950s, when they promoted 
a restrictive version of socialist realism. As in Poland, cultural officials made con-
siderable concessions to composer demands for more autonomy with the 1953 
thaw and the related liberalization of the “New Course,” but continued to propa-
gate a less dogmatic form of socialist realism. This more expansive definition 
of the ideology’s tenets, plus the greater political loyalty of many East German 
composers, meant that socialist realism continued to be the accepted aesthetic 
ideology well beyond the late 1950s. In essence, the SED and its musical allies 
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reacted more cleverly and flexibly to cases of composer discontent than did the 
PZPR, and managed to maintain socialist realism as the official ideology, albeit 
in a weakened form.
To a far greater extent than in Poland, the debates around socialist realism 
and formalism were fairly well known to many of the leading political and cul-
tural figures in the GDR in the second half of the 1940s. The German participants 
at the Soviet Writers’ Congress in 1934 made up the largest foreign delegation, 
and in his speech there, poet and future GDR Culture Minister Johannes R. 
Becher called Zhdanov’s propositions a model for a new humanistic German 
culture. Well-known German communists in both the exile community in Mos-
cow and elsewhere, including the renowned composer Hanns Eisler, debated the 
relationship between modernist art and politics in the 1930s.157 Unsurprisingly, 
then, officials and composers discussed socialist realism from an early stage in 
the Soviet Zone, but in a context of considerable artistic freedom through the late 
1940s.158 Already in February 1946, leading cultural official Anton Ackermann 
used the common socialist-realist formula of “socialist in content, and realistic 
in form” to describe the preferred ideal, but claimed the party would not enforce 
an aesthetic dogma or compromise artistic freedom.159 It was clear that the party 
had a preference, and that at some future point it desired an art that supported its 
program, but both the timing and the exact nature of that art were very much open 
questions. Particularly illuminating are the immediate postwar activities of the 
Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands (Cultural League for 
the Democratic Renewal of Germany), a mass organization inspired by the Com-
munists, led by Johannes R. Becher, and supported by the Soviet administration, 
but that included members of many different political backgrounds from all over 
Germany. It pushed for a broad-based, antifascist, democratic culture to serve 
as a foundation for the new Germany; with respect to music, it even organized a 
number of concerts that included works by composers who would later be con-
demned as formalist.160
Early Discussion
As in Poland, the year 1948 saw a flurry of cultural-political activity related to 
socialist realism, but much of it had the character of initiating discussion rather 
than attempting to impose dogmatic prescriptions. Individual composers and 
officials in eastern Germany noted and debated key developments originating 
outside the Soviet Zone, but they had little practical effect. The fallout from 
Zhdanov’s fourth edict in early 1948, which accused leading Soviet composers of 
formalism and creating in a spirit inimical to the people was, unlike the first three 
edicts eighteen months earlier, printed and discussed widely in the East German 
press, although its reception in the cultural world was moderated.161 The Second 
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International Congress of Composers and Music Critics met in Prague at the end 
of May, and intense discussion about the future direction of music, as well as so-
cialist realism, took place there and also back in eastern Germany; a major speech 
by Hanns Eisler occupied a central role.162
These international cultural influences came in the context of a broader Cold 
War atmosphere of growing ideological polarization. At this time, the SED held a 
“Culture Conference” to express its growing desire to guide artists and their pro-
duction. Many delegates articulated the postulates of socialist realism in general 
terms, as in Anton Ackermann’s call for the “popular/folk basis in music linked to 
the continuation of the classical tradition.”163 In September 1948, Walter Ulbricht 
announced to fellow party members that the SED would push for a “realistic 
art.”164 The SED also devoted greater attention to artists with the announcement 
of the coming Two-Year Plan in 1948. It sought to engage artists in the implemen-
tation of its program, and pushed them to develop a “realistic art,” but defined the 
nature of this art loosely.165 This year represents a first if tentative turn towards a 
harder line in the cultural world.166
The Soviet cultural officer Alexander Dymschitz made an important inter-
vention into this gathering debate in late 1948 with two articles in an East Ger-
man newspaper that linked formalism to imperialist aggression and bourgeois 
decadence, and called for a democratic and realistic art.167 While these articles 
have often been viewed as a Soviet signal to impose a dogmatic form of socialist 
realism, it is equally plausible that Dymschitz was translating the Zhdanovian 
theses in a less rigid way for his East German audience. In general in the years 
immediately after the war, the first generation of Soviet cultural officers tended 
to soften the hard line coming from Moscow and were broadly open to modernist 
trends and cultural experimentation.168 The SED planned a nationwide discus-
sion to follow the Dymschitz articles, in an effort to convince artists to join in 
the campaign to produce and transmit the new socialist musical culture.169 The 
attempt, however, faltered for two years, as many artists proved initially reluctant 
to engage with the new theories of socialist realism, and the SED was not con-
fident of its strength. The weakness of the party with respect to cultural affairs 
on the local level presented a further problem. Director Stefan Heymann of the 
Central Committee’s Department of Culture, who had taken an active role in 
the discussions, criticized the lack of action by provincial party members in the 
spring of 1949.170 The Department acknowledged the “flagging discussion” in 
the spring of 1950 and planned to reinvigorate the drive to spread socialist real-
ism, in part by mobilizing the “progressive forces” of the arts-related schools.171 
Heymann listed a number of interventions he had made, including writing articles 
for newspapers, but concluded that his influence was minimal and that “the posi-
tion of the formalists remains unshaken.”172 Further to blame was the fact, seen 
in later departmental self-criticism, that discussions with artists were “not always 
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conducted in a competent manner so that a positive attitude toward realism would 
develop among bourgeois artists.”173
The first major discussion of socialist realism among leading figures of the 
musical world took place somewhat belatedly in comparison to literature and 
painting, at a conference of 31 party composers and musicians on December 15, 
1948.174 Culture Department Director Heymann gave the opening remarks and 
urged his fellow comrades to begin engaging with the new aesthetic program. 
Musicologist and composer Ernst Hermann Meyer delivered the main address, 
which pushed for social-realist music, as the eventual term was not yet in com-
mon discourse. The theory was generally the same, however. Meyer called for 
the new, desired music to use a simplified language, link to past masters, be un-
derstandable by the people, and fight against the pessimism of the bourgeoisie, 
prefiguring his 14 points outlined above. As elsewhere in the cultural realm at 
this time, the debate on the new realism fell largely flat for the next two years. 
Musical life was decentralized and poorly organized—the GDR itself was not 
established until October 1949 and the Composers’ Union and main music jour-
nal Musik und Gesellschaft were not founded until 1951—and thus the lack of 
a necessary critical mass also contributed to what in retrospect looks like a lull.
The “Formalism Campaign”
Renewed efforts to reinvigorate the debate began in earnest after the SED's Third 
Party Conference in July 1950, which called for a “new progressive German 
culture” and a “realistic art.”175 Harder and more dogmatic language entered the 
discourse, and more strident tones manifested themselves over the next year. A 
key report a few months later reiterated the need for the SED Culture Depart-
ment to do more to shape the debate and laid out a detailed plan to encourage 
artists to discuss and follow socialist realism; although somewhat incoherent, it 
demonstrated the department’s desire to control and shape all aspects of artistic 
production.176 And indeed, unlike in the winter of 1948-49, the campaign against 
formalism, and for (socialist) realism gained traction.177 Helped by stronger So-
viet influence in the context of the Cold War, and also by party artists increasingly 
opposed to the toleration of bourgeois, modernist trends, a more determined party 
with somewhat better trained and disciplined officials worked to propagate the 
new aesthetic doctrine.
A new debate on formalism in the press began, catalyzed by the publication 
of two key articles under the authorship of N. Orlow in November 1950 and 
January 1951. The first attacked Ruslan and Ludmilla and other works performed 
at the Berlin State Opera for formalist stagings. The author also accused other 
musical and artistic institutions of being similarly anti-democratic, subversive, 
and influenced by “American barbarism.” The second article criticized formal-
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ism especially in painting and sculpture, and called for artists to follow the path 
of realism.178 Wilhelm Girnus, the editor of the main party daily Neues Deutsch-
land, also published a two-part article at this time that attacked formalism and 
cosmopolitanism as anti-German.179 The Central Committee’s Culture Depart-
ment organized an extension of this discussion in the musical realm, as it planned 
the publication of eight articles in Neues Deutschland by leading figures like 
Ernst Hermann Meyer, music critic and historian Karl Laux, and composer Kurt 
Schwaen on subjects that included formalism, learning from the Soviet Union, 
and how to develop a progressive musical life.180
A high point in the debate came at the meeting of the SED’s Central Commit-
tee in March 1951, where Culture Secretary Hans Lauter delivered a key speech 
written in consultation with Soviet authorities as well as SED leaders.181 It attacked 
formalism, and called on artists to develop a “realistic art.”182 This speech launched 
the so-called “Formalism Campaign,” and was continually referenced in the suc-
ceeding years. With respect to music, Lauter saw “formalism and decadence . . . 
in the destruction of true emotional value, lack of humane emotional content, feel-
ings of despair as well as world-fleeing mysticism, distorted harmony, and stunted 
melody,” and called upon composers to engage in “constant discussion and criti-
cism on the question of formalism in music.”183 Though Poland lacked a similarly 
high-profile political, programmatic speech, this party engagement, subsequent 
discussion in the press, and organization of all artists into nationwide unions in 
1951 all bear great similarity to the events of 1949/50 in Poland. And also as in 
Poland, it commenced a period of intense debate and criticism in the GDR.
Concurrently, controversy around Bertolt Brecht and Paul Dessau’s opera 
The Judgment of Lukullus came to a head.184 Although this incident has often 
been mentioned as an extreme example of party interference in the arts, the story 
is in fact more complicated.185 Concern among party members and some musi-
cologists had been building during rehearsals for this high-profile, antiwar op-
era about the legendary Roman general’s imagined trial and condemnation in 
hell. Dessau’s music did indeed have many of the characteristics of formalism 
in his modernist and dissonant musical language, and his supporters squared off 
against his detractors. Though the latter were more numerous, and included key 
musicologists like Meyer and Georg Knepler, as well as the important music 
functionary and future Composers’ Union head Nathan Notowicz, both groups 
were represented in high party circles and among party artists during the many 
discussions.186 On March 17, Lauter criticized the work during his party confer-
ence speech, and that same day a closed performance of the opera coincidentally 
took place. Although hardliners like Erich Honecker had instructed the Free Ger-
man Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend [FDJ]) and other members of the party faith-
ful to disrupt the performance, many in the audience appreciated the opera.187 
Soon after, Dessau and Brecht met with President Wilhelm Pieck, Prime Minister 
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Otto Grotewohl, and other important cultural officials to discuss the work. They 
decided that some revisions would be made, and a public premiere was set for 
the fall.188 In fact, the two artists made but minimal changes, and the opera indeed 
received several performances later that year.189 Even the criticism of a delegation 
of Soviet representatives did not seem to convince Dessau to make significant 
modifications to his spiky, jarring music.190
The debate among SED officials and musical figures was lively and open, 
and thus this was not simply an example of the party crushing creativity, let alone 
a polarized conflict that pitted party officials against artists.191 Unquestionably, 
hardliners in the SED and from the Soviet Union along with their sympathizers in 
the musical world wanted to demonstrate that limits to artistic expression existed, 
and that the party had the authority to determine these boundaries. It was also cer-
tainly not coincidental that Brecht and Dessau—the latter Jewish—had recently 
returned from emigration at a time of show trials and suspicion throughout the 
Soviet bloc, and that their left-modernist style did not mesh well with the tenets 
of socialist realism.192
Nonetheless, and despite ongoing criticism, Dessau continued to resist a 
narrow definition of socialist realism and to compose in his more experimental 
idiom. Throughout his life, this committed communist and SED member clashed 
with cultural officials and his more party-line colleagues; an excellent recent 
study describes him as “honored and harried, praised and reticent, canonized and 
marginalized.”193 Like Brecht and his more famous contemporary Hanns Eisler, 
Dessau continued to believe that modernist techniques could express politically 
progressive content, and he produced an impressive number of choral works in 
the first half of the 1950s. Also with Brecht around the time of Lukullus, he wrote 
the Herrnburger Bericht (Report from Herrnburg, 1951), about the alleged mis-
treatment of West German youth returning from a rally in East Berlin. His Appell 
(Call, 1952), against war and militarism, musically evoked Prime Minister Otto 
Grotewohl’s September 1951 appeal for all-German free elections for a national 
assembly through the use of a broad expressive palette that included a speaker, 
soloists, mixed choir, children’s choir, and orchestra. Another notable and typical 
collaboration with Brecht is Die Erziehung der Hirse (The Cultivation of Millet, 
finished 1953, premiered 1954), dedicated to the 35th anniversary of the October 
Revolution in 1952 and about a Kazakh farmer who developed millet thanks to 
the technical help of the collective farm. Finally, Lilo Herrmann (1953) thema-
tized the communist resistance fighter executed by the Nazis in 1938. Although 
Dessau continued to be criticized for his modernist musical language, he occu-
pied an active and leading position in the cultural life of the GDR, and his stature 
increased in the succeeding years. He stands as an example of how compos-
ers could realize their creative and professional goals by working both with and 
against the party.
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The founding conference of the Composers’ Union in April 1951 took place 
in the context of the “Formalism Campaign” and the SED’s attempts to exert 
more control over the artistic world.194 Culture Secretary Hans Lauter played the 
key role in the planning of this initial congress of the union, and tied it closely to 
the antiformalist campaign, which he was concurrently organizing. He planned 
Ernst Hermann Meyer’s main speech on the formalism-realism debate, and the 
SED Politburo edited the conference resolution.195 In the centerpiece speech, 
Meyer attacked formalism, cosmopolitanism, twelve-tone music, Stravinsky, 
and American kitsch. He urged composers to link their work to the classical 
tradition and to compose in a realist style; he never used the term “socialist 
realism,” probably because he sought to appeal to a wide range of composers, 
including those still not completely convinced of the party’s goals.196 The reso-
lution passed at the end of the conference also avoided the adjective “social-
ist,” as it called on composers to develop an “artistic realism.”197 Hanns Eisler 
praised Meyer’s speech, but questioned how his formulations could be incor-
porated into compositional practice—a question that would vex discussions on 
the issue for years to come.198 Also at the conference, the peripatetic head of 
the Soviet Composers’ Union, Tikhon Khrennikov, evoked the authority of the 
Soviet experience and called for composers to “free themselves from formal-
istic tendencies.”199 The resolution passed at the end of the conference called 
on all composers to resist negative American influences, specifically formalism 
in music, and to compose in a realistic style that was understandable to all and 
would motivate the populace to realize the SED’s goals.200 In general, despite 
the heavy-handed party involvement, openness characterized the debate here, 
and the participants seemed genuinely concerned with exploring the issues sur-
rounding formalism and realism.
During this period—as in Poland—composers and musicologists from the 
Soviet Union and to a lesser extent the other People’s Democracies played an im-
portant role in the discussions on formalism and (socialist) realism, all contribut-
ing to a transnational discourse on multiple levels. In addition to Khrennikov, 
Yuri Shaporin and Boris Yarustovsky gave ideological speeches at the founding 
conference in 1951, and received loud applause, especially at the mention of 
Stalin.201 Andrei Shtogarenko and composer Anatoli Novikov did the same at 
the next meeting, the First Union Congress in fall 1952. A stream of articles by 
composers and musicologists appeared in the main music journal, Musik und 
Gesellschaft, including most notably a special insert by the Soviet musicologist 
W. W. Wanslow that explicated Zhdanov’s 1948 Central Committee resolution 
and gave an overview of musical-political developments in the Soviet Union.202 
Cultural officials constantly exhorted composers to discuss these issues and 
learn from the Soviet example. In early 1953, eight leading composers gave 
their positive reaction to Zhdanov’s resolutions on music on the occasion of the 
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fifth anniversary of their publication.203 The Soviet version of socialist realism 
thus circulated widely in the East German context.
Furthermore, with respect to the GDR and Poland, a member or two from 
one country’s composers’ union typically attended the major conferences of the 
other, contributing some kind of programmatic statement to the discussion and 
then reporting back to colleagues in the home country. In late 1951, for example, 
the young composer Günter Kochan and musicologist Karl Laux attended the Pol-
ish union’s Sixth Congress.204 Soon after, Paul Dessau spent a few days with his 
Polish counterparts in Warsaw and Kraków, and brought back mass songs to share 
with his colleagues as part of a discussion of this genre.205 The following year, 
Witold Rudziński and Witold Lutosławski attended the First Congress of the VDK 
and its related festival in Berlin. Lutosławski reported back to the Polish music 
world through the leading music journal and offered his opinions of the contem-
porary musical works on offer, thus contributing to the debates in Poland. He 
criticized, in remarks relevant to concurrent Polish debates, young East German 
composers for imitating nineteenth-century Romanticism and many of their elders 
for eclecticism with respect to cantatas.206 For his part, Rudziński unsurprisingly 
expressed genuine-sounding praise of his East German colleagues’ progress to-
wards socialist realism. At his own union congress, he referenced his observations 
made in East Germany to express to his Polish colleagues the idea that “conscien-
tious and constant ideological work among creative artists” can bring impressive 
results.207 From the neighboring country as well as the Soviet Union, ideas and 
directives were introduced directly at these major meetings and shaped debates 
and discussions, as Poles and East Germans engaged and influenced each other.208
Beyond composers and musicologists interacting among themselves, party 
and state institutions also played an increasingly active role in the discussions 
and implementation of socialist realism in music at this time. From the relatively 
weak and disorganized position prior to 1951 described above, the SED’s Cul-
ture Department began to engage the artistic world more systematically.209 Cul-
ture Department officials felt the debate needed to be prosecuted in a “consistent 
and determined” manner, as artists were reluctant to follow the calls for socialist 
realism.210 The precursor to the Ministry of Culture, the much-reviled Stakuko 
(Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten, State Commission for Artistic 
Affairs), came into being in the summer of 1951, and its very raison d’être was 
imbued with the party’s fight to influence the development of socialist realism. 
This state organ undertook to engage in “persistent struggle against the hostile 
influences of cosmopolitanism and formalism and for realistic methods in art” 
through the organization of conferences and festivals and by influencing concert 
programs and commissions.211
The debates resulting from the Formalism Campaign in the spring of 1951 
reached a high point at the SED’s Second Party Congress in July 1952, where the 
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party proclaimed the construction of socialism. Walter Ulbricht demanded that 
artists free themselves from formalism and embrace socialist realism to help mo-
tivate people for the building of socialism. He further called on artists to develop 
a closer relationship with working people, tie their activity to folk traditions, and 
learn from the example of the Soviet Union.212 Johannes R. Becher, who in his 
early Kulturbund days had represented a tolerant position of working with bour-
geois artists, now summed up the new party line:
The rise of a great German art is only possible with the building of social-
ism. A great German art will either be socialist-realist, or it will not come 
into being. Socialist realism is not one creative variant among many, not 
one creative possibility among others, but rather socialist realism is the 
only possibility, the only creative method, that can lead to the rise of a great 
German art.213
In its political and ideological implications for the East German musical world, 
the March 1951 SED Central Committee Plenum was equivalent to the 1949 
Łagów conference in Poland, and the Second SED Party Congress in July 1952 
and East German Composers’ Union Conference close on its heels paralleled 
the Fifth Polish Composers’ Union Congress in June 1950. This modified line 
represented a narrowing of the possible. With a two-year time lag compared to 
their counterparts in the PZPR, the SED hardliners were in the ascendant, and 
attempted to impose a dogmatic interpretation of their preferred aesthetic ideol-
ogy. The ever intensifying Cold War served as catalyst to tighter political control 
and a turn to a more rigid definition of socialist realism. In the recollection of one 
participant in these debates, the musicologist and editor of the key music journal 
Musik und Gesellschaft Eberhard Rebling: “The daily crackling ill-will, intoler-
ance, and constant threat of a new war came at us from the West, and forced us 
into exaggerated one-sidedness and an extreme impatience even towards fuzzy 
but well-meaning opinions from those in our own ranks.”214 A harder line was 
emerging, and it initially encountered curious interest if also confusion from 
nearly all East German composers.
With a slightly higher level of vigor than seen in Poland, composers in the 
GDR engaged with socialist realism during the period of intense debate through-
out 1951 and 1952.215 The overwhelming majority embraced the call to build 
socialism through socialist realism in music. Composers applied themselves to 
understanding and formulating the concepts that would aid musical composition 
in a nonformalist and socialist-realist manner. In one example of broad-based 
interest in socialist realism, a handful of composers from Saxony attempted to 
develop their own concrete ideas on the subject in early 1952 in the form of an in-
formational pamphlet designed for discussion among all composers.216 In the first 
half, they defined formalism as subjective in form, being extremely individualis-
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tic, cosmopolitan, and constructivist, and marked by naturalism, primitivism, and 
decadence. To better illustrate its nature, they discussed concrete examples, in-
cluding works by Stravinsky, Schoenberg, and Webern, but also, controversially, 
from works by East German colleagues like Hanns Eisler and the young and 
favored André Asriel. In the second part, they formulated realism as exhibiting 
the reflection of societal truth, links to the people, a recognition of the role of the 
national cultural tradition and a further development of that tradition, both idea-
filled content and an artistic mastery of form. Positive examples here included 
the great masters of the German classical tradition, as well as Shostakovich and 
several contemporary East German composers. Composers’ Union Secretary Na-
than Notowicz and Eberhard Rebling took the collective to task, however, for 
unclear analysis and ideological weaknesses.217 These two made up part of a core 
group of Berlin-based musicologists and pedagogues who were bound together 
by the experience of war years abroad, the choice to move to East Germany, and 
that all save Rebling had Jewish roots (and Rebling a Jewish wife). This loose 
cohort also included Meyer, Harry Goldschmidt, and Georg Knepler, and pos-
sessed great influence in shaping an ideological line approved by the party. It 
was perceived as an unjustly powerful group by many composers at the time. Al-
though Notowicz did not possess an advanced degree in music, he occupied the 
powerful position of Union Secretary for nearly two decades and was a consistent 
supporter of party aims. Knepler was a well-respected Marxist musicologist born 
in Austria, and Goldschmidt in Switzerland. Rebling and Notowicz spent the war 
years in the Netherlands, and Meyer in England.218
The primus inter pares and most influential figure in these discussions was 
the musicologist and composer Ernst Hermann Meyer, who had contributed 
numerous articles and speeches on the subject over the past several years. He 
codified his position in the magisterial work Musik im Zeitgeschehen (Music in 
Current Events, 1952), which became the standard text for socialist realism in 
music. Meyer also composed works, and in this dual way attempted to guide his 
colleagues down what he considered the correct, socialist-realist path. His choral 
output in the early 1950s led the way for the production of many East German 
composers. The sprawling, seven-part Mansfelder Oratorium (1950), with a tra-
ditional tonal structure evoking Handel, gave musical expression to the heroic, 
centuries-long struggles of Mansfeld workers against feudalism and capitalism, 
and won a national prize. Meyer traveled with the author of the text, Stephan 
Hermlin, to this copper mining region to get to know its workers, and produced a 
large-scale vocal piece that became one of the foundational works of East German 
socialist-realist music. The first four sections critique capitalism from the mid-
dle ages through the nineteenth century, and the final three celebrate the Soviet 
Union, socialism, and the victory of the working class. Meyer sought to combine 
the musical styles of past centuries “in the spirit of the time,” but it was criticized 
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by some of his peers for being overly imitative and unoriginal.219 Its premiere in 
fall 1950 featured both professional and amateur singers, thus incorporating one 
of the ideals of the new era.220 Although it was only performed on a handful of 
occasions in the early 1950s, it was also praised by many composers and cultural 
officials, and the latter pushed for it to be played more frequently, resulting in a 
hundred or so performances in the following decades.221
Such cantatas were promoted as much in East Germany as was the case in 
Poland, from the Dessau cantatas mentioned above, to several by Hanns Eisler, 
to many more by a wide range of composers. Though not acknowledged by those 
creating or commissioning them, these monumental vocal works were similar 
in form if of course rather different in content to many Nazi compositions with 
titles like the Saar-Kantate, German Hero-Requiem (Deutsches Heldenrequiem) 
or The Words of the Führer (Führerworte).222 Meyer himself composed a number 
of other large-scale choral works at this time, including the Flight of the Dove 
(Flug der Taube, 1952), with its praise of the Soviet Union and peaceful construc-
tion. A number of colleagues criticized the work as too derivative and even bor-
ing, and that and its positive portrayal of Stalin caused it to be rarely performed 
both before and after 1956.223 Better received but also infrequently played was 
Des Sieges Gewissheit (The Certainty of Victory, 1952), dedicated to the SED and 
premiered at its Second Party Conference, and with a text by Johannes R. Becher 
calling for peace and thanking the Soviet army.224 Meyer garnered significant 
praise and encouragement from political leaders for his efforts, and he considered 
himself an example for his peers, who followed his lead in composing such large-
scale choral works with political themes. In addition to Dessau’s oeuvre related 
above, Jean-Kurt Forest contributed Kantate auf Stalin (Cantata about Stalin, 
1949), Fred Lohse Arbeit für den Frieden (Work for Peace, 1951), and the young 
Günter Kochan Die Welt ist jung (The World is Young, 1952).
The President of the Composers’ Union, Ottmar Gerster, also contributed 
a large and influential cantata at this time, Ironworks East (Eisenkombinat-Ost, 
1951). Its 13 sections stretch over three-quarters of an hour and feature a full or-
chestra and mixed choir energetically proclaiming, in straightforward and often 
stirring fashion, lines that can seem clunky to present-day ears like: “The Five-
Year Plan stipulates . . . / Coal and iron, coal and steel, / For construction, / For 
peaceful construction. / Construction of the needed heavy industry, / For peace, 
/ For peaceful construction.” Born in 1893, Gerster worked with worker sing-
ing groups in the 1920s, and despite occasional cooperation with the Nazis, had 
largely kept his head down after 1933. He emerged as one of the more prominent 
East German composers after the war and served as president of the Composers’ 
Union from its founding through 1968, the year before his death.
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The Berlin Radio Symphony Orchestra and Choir perform Ottmar Gerster’s cantata Ironworks 
East (Eisenkombinat-Ost) in Eisenhüttenstadt on the eve of the 1952 May 1 celebrations; SED 
General Secretary Walter Ulbricht was in town for the event (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-14539-
0009 / photographer: Horst Sturm).
Gerster was also one of the leading composers of socialist-realist instrumen-
tal music. Indeed, his Festouvertüre of 1948 was one of the first semi-official new 
and approved works, as it thematized well-known songs like the Internationale, 
the Marseillaise, and several traditional German and Russian workers’ songs in a 
romantic and easily playable idiom. Gerster composed it for the centennial of the 
1848 revolutions, which the SED looked to as a precursor to their own revolution. 
It was performed frequently and taught in schools through 1989.225 His Second 
Symphony, Thuringian (Thüringische Sinfonie, 1949-52) was another popular 
and well-received instrumental work with a traditional four-movement arrange-
ment and tonal musical language. In the words of the composer, he sought to cap-
ture the essence of Thuringia, both its historical greatness as well as its “struggle 
for humanity’s progress today.”226 In its form and content, it is an exemplary 
artifact of socialist realism.
Nearly all composers, of course, created instrumental works of various size 
and ambition. Johannes Paul Thilman in Dresden and Johann Cilenšek in Wei-
mar represent that generation of composers born just before the First World War; 
they composed a number of symphonies and concertos for various instruments 
that fit comfortably into the socialist-realist idiom of the day. Thilman, initially 
self-taught in Weimar Germany, became increasingly prominent as a composer in 
East Germany after the war. He wrote a handful of symphonies in this period, as 
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well as concertos for tuba, trumpet, violin, and piano, in a melodic style inspired 
by folk music.227 Cilenšek is an interesting case in that he was a former Nazi party 
member and stormtrooper who suppressed his past to create a successful career 
in the GDR.228 He composed five symphonies and five concertos in the 1950s in 
a tonal and conservative style. Of particular note is his three-movement Second 
Symphony from 1956, which commemorated the tenth anniversary of the libera-
tion of Buchenwald and included a middle movement of “harrowing funeral mu-
sic” (Trauermusik).229 As an official music history of the GDR described it: “In 
the third movement an attitude of strength and confidence overcomes the idea of 
bitterness and accusatory suffering. The extraordinary dimensions of the Adagio 
middle movement—its contradictory sections, the depth of its expression, the in-
strumental chromaticism, and its dynamic variety—all result not only in a general 
protest against inhumanity, but also originate from the concrete engagement of 
the composer for the anti-fascist fighters.”230 Clearly, Cilenšek had successfully 
reinvented himself to assimilate to the new political reality.
One of the leading voices on instrumental music and the musical world more 
generally was Max Butting, who played an influential role in the Composers’ 
Union and Academy of the Arts. He was open about the fact that he had joined the 
Nazi party and desired to work through and atone for that act. His music reflected 
this, as for example his Seventh Symphony and a never-performed oratorio The 
Memorandum (Das Memorandum), both from 1949 and thematizing Nazism and 
its aftermath. These works received a mixed reception, probably because the em-
phasis at the time was on positive, future-oriented works rather than working 
through the difficult past.231 A somewhat more successful example was his Eighth 
Symphony, The Vacation Trip (Urlaubsreise, 1952), a melodic and energetic, 
four-movement work that captures the relaxed atmosphere of a summer break in 
Thuringia in three of the movements, while a fourth takes a darker turn with an 
evocation of Buchenwald.232 At its premiere, the audience was appreciative but at 
least one reviewer lamented the depressing passage.233
After roughly a year and a half of intense discussions in the press and music 
journals, as well as in the regional union organizations, and following an initial 
phase of socialist-realist musical production, composers and musicologists came 
together for their union’s first postfounding congress in the autumn of 1952, and 
formalism and socialist realism were a main subject of debate. In his opening 
speech, union President Gerster called for discussion that would help in “the de-
velopment of a truly valuable new realistic music,” and Stakuko Director Helmut 
Holtzhauer followed with the demand that “the struggle of the representatives of 
socialist realism against those of formalism should dominate your congress.”234 
Meyer assumed his natural role as one of the former and delivered a long talk 
on the nature of socialist realism and what qualities composers needed in or-
der to compose in this style.235 Many other musicologists and several leading 
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composers, including Thilman, discussed the meaning of socialist realism with 
respect to music in an open and critical manner, often basing their comments on 
contemporary works played at the congress. An atmosphere of comradely debate 
prevailed.236
Congress discussions exhibited a tone of people genuinely trying to under-
stand a phenomenon presented positively, while also attempting to shape it in 
ways that made sense to them. The postulate that music should not be an elitist 
activity, but rather be shared by every member of society, found complete ac-
ceptance. By this time, in late 1952, widespread support for socialist realism 
existed throughout the East German musical world, as composers made their 
first real engagements with a doctrine that in theory seemed to include many 
different approaches and styles; the resolution of the congress stated that “our 
creative method can only be socialist realism.”237 Union leaders resolved to con-
duct the fight against formalism in an even more decided manner in the coming 
year through “open and sharp criticism against formalism in new works.”238 Both 
cultural officials as well as a broad cross-section of composers were involved 
in this thoroughgoing examination of socialist realism. One significant conflict 
began to emerge, as the aformentioned group of party-affiliated musicologists led 
by Meyer claimed the authority to direct composers in the pursuit of a socialist-
realist line, an assertion that caused a growing unease among many composers, 
and even open complaints in the following years.239
This phase of intense discussion of socialist realism reached its apogee in the 
first half of 1953, as did party interventions in the musical world. A typical ex-
ample is a programmatic article by Eberhard Rebling, published in the spring of 
1953.240 Here Rebling gave an overview of socialist realism in music based on the 
writings of Zhdanov, and praised recent examples of works that fit within this ide-
ology. He then discussed the nature of formalism, and mentioned composers who 
exhibited these negative tendencies, including major figures like Eisler, Rudolf 
Wagner-Régeny, and Max Butting. Significantly, the editors of the party journal 
Einheit, as well as members of the Culture Department of the Central Committee, 
discussed and altered the article so as to communicate the harder line that cul-
tural officials wanted.241 As in Poland, the debates over socialist realism involved 
considerable criticism of fellow colleagues, and no figure, no matter how well-
regarded—Eisler, Panufnik, Dessau, or Lutosławski—escaped the critical eye of 
cultural officials, musicologists, and fellow composers.
Concurrently, Hanns Eisler became involved in polemics surrounding his 
libretto for a planned opera, Johann Faustus, which he himself wrote on the cul-
turally significant theme of the Faust figure.242 Like Dessau, Eisler had recently 
returned to Central Europe from exile and redbaiting in the United States and al-
ready had a long and complicated career of composing politically engaged music, 
much of it in collaboration with Bertolt Brecht, as well as works inspired by his 
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teacher, Arnold Schoenberg. In late 1952 and the first half of 1953, however, cul-
tural officials, musicologists, and fellow composers criticized Eisler for alleged 
ideological deviations with respect to his critical portrayal of German history and 
culture, and in particular his revisions of Goethe’s version of Faust to represent 
negative aspects of Germany’s fate. As a result, Eisler fell into a deep depression 
and abandoned the opera. While certainly an example of hardliners interfering in 
the compositional process, the complicated motivations of the protagonists indi-
cate that this debate over German identity was not a black-and-white example of 
the party crushing individual creativity.243
Hanns Eisler in November 1948 (SLUB Dresden / Abt. Deutsche Fotothek, Abraham Pisarek).
More broadly, Eisler struggled to write aesthetically interesting music ac-
cessible to the workers and peasants of the GDR in the years around 1950. He 
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frequently collaborated with Johannes R. Becher to create mass songs, and 
contributed some of the most noteworthy examples, including perhaps the best 
known of the genre—the East German national anthem Risen from the Ruins 
(Auferstanden aus Ruinen), which interestingly came together in a Polish setting. 
He and Becher had gone to Warsaw for a Goethe celebration in October of 1949; 
Becher gave him the poem there, and Eisler worked on the melody on none other 
than Chopin’s piano at Żelazowa Wola.244 The two also collaborated on the cycle 
of the New German Folk Songs (Neue deutsche Volkslieder, 1950-51), including 
the oft-played We Are Changing the World (Die Welt verändern wir), Lenin, and 
The Song of the Blue Flag (Lied von der blauen Fahne), about the Free German 
Youth (FDJ). The two men were enthusiastic about the texts and felt this compo-
sition “was a useful and urgently necessary task,” a sentiment about mass songs 
clearly shared by most East German composers.245
As in Poland and throughout the communist world, these mass songs were 
a hallmark of the era in East Germany. Eisler’s student André Asriel, like many 
young composers, wrote a large number of mass songs, for which he was awarded 
a third-class national prize in 1951 and the considerable sum of 25,000 marks. 
East German Radio played a significant role in the production and dissemina-
tion of these new songs, as many younger composers like Asriel found fruitful 
employment there.246 Perhaps unsurprisingly for someone born in 1922, he com-
posed a number of songs on youthful themes, including Friendship, Unity, Peace 
(Freundschaft, Einheit, Frieden), about international friendship among young 
people, and The Young Guard Laughs Bravely (Tapfer lacht die junge Garde), a 
collaboration with the writer KuBa (Kurt Bartel).
And like Panufnik and Lutosławski in Poland, other heavyweights besides 
Eisler contributed extensively to the genre. Ernst Hermann Meyer wrote many 
mass songs, including Song of the New House (Lied vom neuen Haus) and Thanks 
to the Soviet Army (Dank an die Sowjetarmee), to a text by Johannes R. Becher, 
a frequent and ideologically proven provider of mass song lyrics. Paul Dessau 
contributed a number of songs, including Construction Song of the Free German 
Youth (Aufbaulied der FDJ) and Hello, Brothers from Warsaw (Hallo, Brüder aus 
Warschau), a fine and melodically interesting song that promotes unity across 
the troubled border. Its simple but evocative text by writer Armin Müller situ-
ates a German worker who sings to his Polish counterparts about fulfilling their 
respective economic plans, which represent parts of a much larger plan to re-
shape the world. Many songs focused on postwar reconstruction and the build-
ing of a socialist Germany, like Jean Kurt Forest’s Lay the Ground for a New 
Life (Legt den Grund zu einem neuen Leben), which cheerily proclaims “join 
in! It’s a time of change! The liberated land will give us all bread!” as well as 
Kurt Schwaen’s The Song of Construction (Das Lied des Aufbaus). Mass songs 
frequently celebrated workers and peasants, as in Joachim Werzlau’s Morning 
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Song of the Tractor Driver (Morgenlied der Traktoristen), which harmonizes the 
sound of tractors “waking village and field,” and Eberhard Schmidt’s Railway-
man’s Song (Eisenbahnerlied), celebrating young conductors moving forward at 
full steam. Schmidt also contributed the popular Fritz the Tractor Driver (Fritz 
der Traktorist), which features a folklike melodic line carried by the accordion, 
and extols Fritz’s skills as a student, singer, and on the tractor—qualities that 
win the affection of Gretel. Works with more explicitly political themes were of 
course not lacking as well, as in Louis Fürnberg’s The Party is Always Right (Die 
Partei hat immer recht). Such mass songs made up the most prominent feature of 
the socialist-realist landscape, as they were played frequently on the radio, sung 
by amateur groups, and appeared in film.
Thaw and Course Correction
This outpouring of socialist-realist musical production did not satisfy East Ger-
man cultural officials. Their repeated interventions and criticisms, particularly 
by the cultural officials in the Stakuko, began to provoke growing dissatisfac-
tion among an increasing number of composers. The resultant turn towards the 
New Course announced on June 9, 1953, as well as the fallout after the June 17 
Uprising thereafter, caused the party and Stakuko to back off the campaign to 
force the acceptance of socialist realism through bureaucratic methods in favor 
of persuasion, and to declare that artists had complete creative freedom.247 In the 
aftermath of the Uprising, artists in the Academy of the Arts as well as leading 
figures in the Composers’ Union called on cultural officials to give composers 
more autonomy.248
The Fifteenth Plenum of the SED’s Central Committee in late July 1953 
acquiesced to many of the demands emanating from the artistic world. Party 
leaders admitted to a litany of errors, including overcentralized decision mak-
ing, meddling bureaucratic methods, and unfruitful, suffocating criticism. Of-
ficials nonetheless affirmed that socialist realism remained the goal, but one that 
would be achieved through tolerance and persuasion rather than with bans and 
impatience.249 In the view of the officials in the Stakuko’s Music Department, 
discussions were nonetheless to be intensified, with socialist realism deemed es-
sential.250 And indeed most composers broadly agreed with these policies—their 
dissatisfaction resulted more from the invasive administrative methods employed 
by some cultural officials. A more expansively defined concept of socialist real-
ism continued to appeal to the great majority.
The SED launched a new cultural offensive in the fall of 1954, but it focused 
more on getting artists behind the party’s broader political goals rather than in en-
forcing a narrowly-defined aesthetic ideology. Nonetheless, the fight for socialist 
realism had not disappeared; new Culture Minister Johannes R. Becher encour-
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aged composers on the eve of their Second Congress to engage in theoretical and 
ideological discussions on socialist realism, “which now as before remains our 
great goal.”251 Cultural officials desired that composers should not feel forced into 
following the postulates of socialist realism, but rather that it should be privileged 
and encouraged as the best way to compose music.252 The head of the ministry’s 
Music Department, Hans Pischner, bemoaned the fact that “socialist realism has 
often disappeared from view this past year,” and asserted that, though it should be 
the goal of every artist, the party would allow freedom of expression for all those 
“whose work serves a national German art.”253
The ministry’s stance was one of three broad positions taken at the Compos-
ers’ Union’s Second Congress in late October of 1954. Becher’s Deputy Minister, 
Fritz Apelt, echoed Becher’s call in asserting that “our goal remains socialist 
realism.”254 The indefatigable Meyer further refined his ideas about socialist re-
alism into the fourteen points outlined earlier in the chapter, and musicologists 
Knepler and Goldschmidt also maintained a harder line.255 A number of compos-
ers and union Secretary Notowicz occupied a middle ground—they all accepted 
socialist realism as a goal, but redefined it less ideologically and felt that more 
discussion was needed as to its nature.256 A third group of several younger com-
posers, however, in effect wanted to expand dramatically the concept of socialist 
realism. Wilhelm Neef called socialist realism a “distant goal” and demanded 
more experimentation in the interim, while asserting that socialist realism was 
becoming a “doctrinaire ossification” leading to a dead end.257 Siegfried Köhler, 
born in 1927 and a leader in the less conformist Leipzig branch of the Compos-
ers’ Union, called for the right to more experimentation, claiming that the concept 
merely meant composing for the people in the spirit of socialism, and tried to 
link the party’s demand for socialist content to his desire to use new composi-
tional techniques.258 In an apparent compromise, the congress’s closing resolution 
maintained that the “application of the method of socialist realism is necessary,” 
but acknowledged that its realization would take some time and require friendly 
criticism.259
The middle position slowly gave way to relatively polarized extremes 
throughout 1955. Among the hardliners, cultural officials encouraged socialist re-
alism with “special support” and sought to fight “petty-bourgeois influences.”260 
In late 1955, the editors of the official music journal Musik und Gesellschaft 
committed themselves to a “pronounced attitude of a fighting spirit” in the strug-
gle against formalism and “the various manifestations of petty-bourgeois ideol-
ogy.”261 Typical for the cultural winds of the time was the Fourth German Writers’ 
Conference in January 1956, which passed a binding statement that writers would 
work for “a strong, socialist literature, a literature of socialist realism.”262
But a greater spirit of openness also maintained and gathered strength among 
those calling for more experimentation in 1955, and then especially after Khrush-
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chev’s “Secret Speech” early the following year. The Staatsoper presented a stag-
ing of Alban Berg’s opera Wozzeck in the fall of that year, and other such works 
by composers formerly considered anathema also appeared in the concert halls 
of the GDR. The union leadership, normally so hardline, helped organize con-
certs that included the music of composers previously condemned as formalist, 
like Anton Webern and Schoenberg.263 Those composers who argued for more 
experimentation and freedom grew more numerous and emboldened during this 
period. The appearance of three articles in the journal Sonntag by composers Paul 
Dessau, Kurt Schwaen, and Gerhard Wohlgemuth in early 1956 manifested this 
change clearly.264 All three demanded the right to experiment more, and especially 
attacked Ernst Hermann Meyer’s ideas about socialist realism. The union called 
a special meeting of its Executive Committee and conducted an open and wide-
ranging discussion about socialist realism and the mistakes made in relation to 
it.265 Hardliners in the socialist realism debate like Meyer and Knepler admitted 
mistakes, the former for being intolerant at times, the latter for labeling too much 
music formalist.266 Younger union members Köhler and Wohlgemuth talked of a 
“psychosis” in previous years, in which composers felt like they could not speak 
their minds or compose as they wished due to the hard line coming from union 
leaders and the SED; Wohlgemuth directed particularly sharp attacks at the lead-
ing musicologists.267 Even one of the young exemplars of socialist realism, Günter 
Kochan, complained that his Violin Concerto had received too much acclaim as a 
model work, and that he had in fact suffered from the lack of criticism.268 Union 
Secretary Notowicz claimed that “we recognize now that socialist realism is not a 
style, but rather allows for a large difference in styles.” He also admitted errors had 
been made, but asserted that the basic theses were correct.269 Shortly thereafter, the 
SED echoed Notowicz during the thaw after the Twentieth Party Congress in the 
Soviet Union, as it officially opened the door to “other creative methods.”270
The eve of the Third Composers’ Union Congress in February 1957 saw a 
flurry of activity with respect to the still contested issue of socialist realism. In 
one article, SED member Paul Kurzbach, who was deeply involved in the effort to 
create a national opera for the GDR, attacked many aspects of Zhdanov’s theory 
of socialist realism as dogmatic, and called for the union to “cultivate different 
styles and currents.”271 In another article, published early that year in Musik und 
Gesellschaft, Siegfried Köhler praised the “rapid surmounting of the dogmatism 
in the area of music aesthetics” and claimed that the “recent aesthetic opinions . . . 
with their ossified exaggerations are no longer tenable.”272 Despite this attack on 
the tenets of socialist realism and praise for composers like Schoenberg, Webern, 
and Berg, he cautioned against going too far in embracing the musical styles of 
a different, past era. Köhler provides a illuminating example for the situation in 
the GDR. He reacted strongly to a narrow interpretation of socialist realism, but 
his own mass songs and cantatas at this time hewed thematically and sonically to 
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a fairly traditional definition of socialist realism. Noteworthy in both articles is 
an affirmation by these composer critics of some of the basic ideological under-
pinnings of socialist realism as well as a rejection of some Western, “formalist” 
music—a marked contrast to contemporaneous developments in Poland, where 
composers turned away from socialist realism entirely. In the GDR, the spectrum 
of dissent was much narrower than that in Poland, and even the seeming noncon-
formists were broadly supportive of the party and its aims.
The defenders of socialist realism began marshaling their forces as well. In 
a meeting just before the 1957 Congress, musicologist Harry Goldschmidt called 
for further use of the term socialist realism and Thilman stated his desire to pre-
serve the tenets of the ideology.273 Meyer acknowledged that the concept had 
been discredited, but called for its continued usage as it incorporated their goals 
and stood in opposition to formalism, now defined more weakly as music without 
appropriate content. He advocated granting more latitude in the choice of musical 
language as long as the theme proved acceptable. Notowicz again admitted that 
union leaders had made mistakes, and wanted to move beyond this to give social-
ist realism a “better, deeper definition.”274
Notowicz’s opening speech at the 1957 Congress struck a conciliatory note, 
and the theoretical discussions at the conference were correspondingly muted. 
He admitted that both formalism and realism had been used in an “abstract and 
schematic way,” and he moved away from attempting to define formalism, even 
suggesting that works by Berg and Schoenberg were not necessarily formal-
ist.275 He wanted to abandon the search for exact definitions of socialist realism, 
and asserted publicly the new idea that it was not a “definite style.” Realism, he 
stated, meant simply that a musical work “communicates an impression of the 
best thoughts, feelings, and sensations of its time,” while the adjective “social-
ist” merely indicated that the work was created with socialism in mind. Deputy 
Culture Minister Hans Pischner also admitted past “distortions,” called for com-
posers to move beyond “dogmatic restrictions,” and broadened the definition of 
socialist realism in maintaining that it was not “an ossified [method], but rather 
something in constant development through the inspiration of socialist ideology.” 
He stressed a “socialist standpoint” as necessary for composers, but granted that 
there were many ways to achieve socialist realism.276 Meyer limited his theoreti-
cal contribution to calls for melody and appropriate themes in a musical work, 
and in general praised the diversity of composition in the GDR.277 During a dis-
cussion of the union’s constitution, he was able to convince members to agree 
to declare socialist realism as of “central” rather than “particular” importance, 
perhaps because the term had become so expansive.278 Paul Kurzbach, a frequent 
critic of dogmatic definitions, called on composers to work in a socialist spirit, 
and stressed that the path to socialist realism would be a slow one.279 The new 
constitution for the union stated reasonably that it consisted of “composers and 
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musicologists of differing ideological and artistic persuasions, who are taking 
part together in the socialist construction of the GDR.”280 Composers like Wolf-
gang Hohensee praised the new atmosphere of openness and freedom of expres-
sion, and the important ministry official Hans-Georg Uszkoreit announced that 
the Music Department would work in a less bureaucratic manner.281 Equilibrium 
appeared attainable and imminent.
Broader political developments intervened in the musical world, however. 
Ulbricht and the hardliners began their campaign against their reform-minded 
opponents late in 1956, and the 30th and 32nd Plenums of the Central Committee 
announced the end of tolerating so-called “revisionist” tendencies in the arts, and 
heralded a consolidation of the party line.282 In meetings with ministry officials, 
Deputy Culture Minister Pischner called the three 1956 articles in Sonntag, “a 
false discussion,” and urged his colleagues in the provinces to encourage public 
debate on Meyer’s socialist-realist tract Musik im Zeitgeschehen.283 And during 
a speech at a party school, he called for “a struggle for the carrying through of 
socialist realism.”284 The SED organized a “Culture Conference” in late October 
1957, designed to put an end to the ideological fluctuations of the recent past and 
affirm socialist realism, albeit in the less dogmatic form of a “creative method” 
rather than a style.285 A certain amount of experimentation and artistic freedom 
was to be allowed, but the goal of the “ideological battle of opinions” had to 
be the development of a “socialist art” approved by the SED. Ministry officials 
were to undertake an “ideological offensive” in order to implement these “social-
ist cultural policies.”286 Prominent figures from the musical world such as Eber-
hard Rebling talked of overcoming the “fluctuations” and “bourgeois tendencies” 
some composers had been manifesting since the Twentieth Party Congress in the 
Soviet Union.287 By the 1960 Congress, the union further revised its constitution 
by reaffirming socialist realism as its goal while linking compositional activity 
explicitly to the party’s political goals.288
Thus by late 1957, two pillars of the East German music scene had been 
established. Officials pressed for adherence to socialist realism, but in a consid-
erably less rigid form that allowed for more musical experimentation. Compos-
ers had negotiated for greater artistic autonomy and could use different stylistic 
methods in their compositions, as long as the work was judged somehow socialist 
and linked to both people and party. The judiciously altered policy of the SED 
and its musical allies to expand the definition of socialist realism while maintain-
ing the basic integrity of the concept had been a success.
The Party and State Engage the Music World
As we have seen, cultural officials in both countries played key roles in the de-
velopment of the musical world in the stalinist decade. Administrators working 
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in an impressive array of party and state organizations attempted to shape the 
socialist-realist music described here, and then sought to propagate the resulting 
compositions throughout society. They were arguably the most powerful actors 
in the music world, and an understanding their function is essential.289 These in-
dividuals showered composers with attention, both wanted and unwanted, and 
provided musicians and ordinary citizens an extensive number of music-related 
opportunities. The actions and decisions of cultural officials, and their interac-
tions with musical elites, further demonstrate the negotiated nature of the stalin-
ist musical world. Even at the height of their power in 1950-52, the parties in 
both countries compromised with composers, and these compromises were only 
catalyzed by the thaw beginning in 1953. The SED in particular proved adept at 
making limited concessions that secured the continued loyalty of musical elites, 
while initially the Polish party retreated too slowly and clumsily, and then quickly 
lost any vestiges of support from most composers.
The PZPR and SED believed music had a particular ability to communicate 
their political goals, and officials therefore invested considerable resources in 
shaping its production in the framework of socialist realism. The party organs 
occupied themselves with broader policy issues and worked to influence musi-
cal elites, while officials in the state institutions took a much more hands-on 
approach with respect to composers, musical ensembles, and audiences. Despite 
the importance accorded music, these party and state bodies could not fulfill the 
desired goal of total control due to frequent and chaotic bureaucratic reshufflings, 
staffing problems, broader political turbulence, and not least the resistance and 
input from the general music world.
Official Belief in the Political Power of Music
Cultural officials in both countries accorded music an exceptional power to shape 
people, and this conviction made music of great importance for the parties’ po-
litical aims. Party members in East Germany were motivated by the belief that 
“music is an important factor in the formation of man’s consciousness. Music 
can affect man’s character in an ennobling, but also brutalizing manner.”290 A 
provincial functionary attempted to explain how music accomplished this: “Mu-
sic creates people’s character in that it expresses their inner world, depicts their 
emotional state, and reveals their experiences . . . it shows the natural logic of 
the development of life.”291 Though the exact workings of music on human con-
sciousness were of course not completely clear to them, cultural officials did 
frequently assert its great importance in influencing worldviews.
A desire to capture and deploy this allegedly special power permeates SED 
policy statements during the early 1950s. In the minds of East German officials, 
music should “strengthen the ideological consciousness of the people” and serve 
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as “a means to move the masses and shape consciousness for the building of so-
cialism.”292 Musical festivals, for instance, were to “develop people’s conscious-
ness in a progressive sense” and “affect the consciousness and feelings of millions 
of people and make a decisive contribution to the re-shaping of our world.”293 The 
music played should help the party “give millions of patriotic Germans optimism 
and strength released through the emotional effects of music in order to fight 
for the democratic reunification of Germany and the preservation of peace.”294 
The composer, through his musical works, was to “resolve the fight between the 
people and reaction and death-bringing, people-hating attacks . . . and lead our 
people to new, bright heights of societal progress and love of life.”295 With this 
focus on tapping into people’s minds, East German officials quite clearly desired 
to use music’s putative power to help them achieve their political goals.
Polish officials made similarly exalted claims. Deputy Culture Minister 
Włodzimierz Sokorski and musicologist Zofia Lissa filled their programmatic 
speeches to composers with exhortations to “shape life,” and “educate the new 
person.”296 As stated in 1950 in an official communication of the Polish Com-
posers’ Union, the main goal for composers was “to make contact with the new 
listener, to gain insight into his needs, to awaken his musical interests, and to 
educate him . . . if a person is emotionally mobilized at a concert, his artistic ex-
perience will become a condition for an ideological experience.”297 Such fulsome 
testimonials to the power of music were perhaps a bit less frequent in the Polish 
context, likely due to a somewhat less important role for music in the Polish 
cultural firmament.
Animated by these beliefs, the parties in both countries directed considerable 
energies towards the music world through both party and state administrative 
bodies. East German and Polish cultural officials shared the same broad aim of 
building socialism, and while both parties emphasized the importance of foster-
ing a progressive, humanistic national identity, as they of course defined it, the 
SED also had a significant focus on national reunification. Both parties also ac-
corded great importance to the dissemination or popularization of music to the 
broader citizenry. The PZPR’s vitriol against the West was a bit more diffuse than 
that in the GDR, likely due to its geopolitical position a bit further away from the 
front lines of the Cold War. The cultural officials of both countries intended music 
to help in achieving more general Cold War aims, including the fight for peace 
and against the perceived military threat from the West, the fostering of a spirit of 
friendship towards the USSR and other People’s Democracies, and especially the 
creation of a new socialist culture, based on progressive works and artists of the 
past, which should inculcate a healthy patriotism in the citizens of the GDR and 
Poland. Officials also expected music to combat the negative influences from the 
West, both musical and otherwise. These party and state institutions thus charted 
an ambitious program for the music of the new socialist era.
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The Party Culture Departments and Broad Policy
The Culture Departments of the Central Committees of the PZPR and SED set 
the ideological course for culture generally and music specifically, and as a result, 
helped to direct the whole of musical life in each country. Engaged with policy, 
these party organs formulated the party’s overarching cultural program, such as 
the ongoing push to bring culture to both workers and the countryside and the 
propagation of socialist realism in the arts. The departments developed the theo-
retical and logistical basis of these initiatives, and then largely relied upon the 
Ministry of Culture and other state bodies, as well as the musical institutions 
and individual composers and musicians themselves, to do much of the practical 
work. Artists who were party members became key links in helping officials to 
influence cultural production and transmit party aims. All these overlapping lay-
ers blurred distinctions between state and society. In general, department officials 
tried to control from the top, with the expectation that goals would trickle down 
as directives were communicated all over the country. However, these expressed 
aims met contradictory goals and even resistance as they spread throughout soci-
ety, and were often diverted and altered.
The central Culture Department of the PZPR, quite small in size, continu-
ally pleaded for more personnel so as to better fulfill its mission.298 In 1949, the 
department had but six members in addition to its director. By late 1955, this 
number had increased to 19, and the department asked for still more so as to carry 
out its tasks more effectively.299 The Culture Department made one “instructor” 
responsible for music in the early years, and eventually set up a Music Sector that 
employed three people at the time of its founding as a separate body in 1954.300 
Each provincial party organization included several officials responsible for cul-
ture, and central officials continually pushed for them to be more active.301
The Culture Department employed a three-pronged strategy for influencing 
and controlling the artistic world. As in Poland more generally, it organized pri-
mary party cells in institutions so that party members could propagate political 
goals coherently. In many musical organizations, party membership was so low 
that these party cells never formed or only functioned fitfully. The Polish Com-
posers’ Union never had one, and when the party began to lose all influence over 
the union in the mid-1950s, the Culture Department responded by calling a meet-
ing of those few union members who held party cards, and proposed finally to 
form a cell in the union—but to no avail.302 In many other institutions, like the 
Warsaw Opera and the Mazowsze song-and-dance ensemble, the party had some 
limited success, especially in 1954-56 when it turned to these party cells in an 
attempt to exert some measure of control at its time of crisis.303
The PZPR Culture Department’s most direct strategy was to send its own 
officials to important meetings so as to influence the proceedings of the artistic 
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unions and other musical institutions. Such interventions generally succeeded 
in the period from 1948 to 1952, with the party at the height of its power and 
musical elites most receptive to its goals. A backlash developed, however, when 
officials seemed too dogmatic, dictatorial, and restrictive of artistic freedom, and 
some organizations, most notably the Composers’ Union, gradually and system-
atically marginalized party influence on them and their members. A final method 
for influencing the musical world often took the form of organizing meetings or 
official councils of party members from the various artistic disciplines, with a 
wide range of invitees. In these contexts, department officials formulated policy 
with experts from the musical world, and attempted to draw influential nonparty 
artists into this process. This method can be seen most clearly in the gathering 
thaw years from 1954 to 1956, when the Culture Department rapidly and cata-
strophically lost both control over musical developments and the allegiance of 
most musical figures.
One of the key figures in the Culture Department was its head in the late 
1940s and again in the mid-1950s, Stefan Żółkiewski. A party member and liter-
ary critic famous for his call for literature to help build socialism at the January 
1949 Polish Writers’ Congress, he was one of the more energetic and competent 
officials involved in the nexus between art and politics. His return as leader of 
the department in the spring of 1955 represented the party’s determination to 
confront and overcome the challenging political situation. He wrote a number of 
theoretical and practical analyses in 1955 and following years that advocated a 
renewed offensive, and he attempted to rejuvenate the party’s cultural program.304 
The department subjected itself to a thoroughgoing evaluation at this time, and 
admitted numerous mistakes, including a too narrow and vulgar definition of so-
cialist realism, the attempt to force acquiescence to party aims through an over-
centralized structure, a bureaucratic manner of operating, abuse of trust, as well 
as a host of other, more general errors like opportunism, thinking too schemati-
cally, dogmatism, and “whitewashing.”305 Żółkiewski particularly lamented the 
heavy-handed actions taken in the musical world, which he felt were especially 
damaging to the development of music.306 His efforts largely came to naught, 
however, as artists resisted party interference in the context of the thaw.
As in Poland, the Culture Department in the SED’s Central Committee helped 
to develop the party’s political program with respect to culture and then transmit 
these goals to artists and ordinary citizens. This organ responsible for culture in 
the SED’s Central Committee went by several different names due to the typical 
transformations and reorganizations that marked the party and state bodies of this 
period.307 A Department for Culture and Education was part of the Central Com-
mittee of the KPD, and then the SED after 1946. After fall 1947, the department 
was renamed the Department of Party Schooling, Culture, and Education; a year 
and a half later, Party Schooling was taken away and became its own department. 
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Further incarnations included the Department for Literature and Art at the end of 
1952, and the Department for Art, Literature, and Cultural Mass Work in early 
1954. Whatever the name, by 1949, the general outlines of this department for 
culture were clear. There were four, at times five, Sectors (Sektoren, until 1950 
Bereiche), which were also fluid, but generally represented: cadre, art and litera-
ture, education, and cultural mass-work. Most issues related to music fell under 
Art and Literature, but the other sectors, especially cultural mass work, also dealt 
with music. In the early 1950s, Margarete Knapp handled musical issues, fol-
lowed by Hermann Lahl. Its heads were Stefan Heymann from 1948 to 1950 and 
then Egon Rentzsch to 1953. After the latter’s ouster, the titular leadership of the 
department remained empty until 1958; this period was unsurprisingly marked 
by less coherent and organized work. On a regional level, the department worked 
with “instructors” responsible for different areas of culture. It similarly worked 
through state bodies such as the Ministry of Culture as well as music-related 
institutions like the Composers’ Union, but also occupied itself more with the 
welfare of individual artists. With the assistance of the very numerous East Ger-
man musical figures who carried party cards, the Culture Department conducted a 
relatively successful fight for the implementation of socialist realism in music. In 
its early years, it tried to do too much with too few people, but nonetheless proved 
able to assert considerable influence through the many committed party members 
in the music world. By the mid-1950s, in response to pushback from many in the 
musical realm, it had scaled back some of its goals and reached an equilibrium 
with most artists through a process of negotiation.
During his time there in the early 1950s, Rentzsch encountered a typical set 
of problems that plagued the department throughout the period. He wanted to 
“rejuvenate ideologically” this party organ, but had major problems filling key 
positions, including that of instructor for music.308 Due in large part to the lack 
of a sufficient number of workers, he found major problems in the department’s 
mode of operation, and had similar troubles with the related organs in the prov-
inces. The officials in the central department made up an odd mix, as older work-
ers educated before the war coexisted uncomfortably with younger workers who 
completed ideological courses in the late 1940s but had little practical training in 
cultural affairs. Another important division was between those officials who saw 
artists as potential enemies to be forced into doing the party’s bidding and those 
who viewed them as partners simply needing some guidance.309
Rentzsch struggled to focus the department on the promotion of socialist 
realism by conducting regular meetings on the subject, and worked “to develop 
more broadly and strengthen the ideological battle . . . and establish socialist re-
alism against formalism, social democracy, and art-hating imperialist views.”310 
Such efforts culminated in the controversies surrounding the commemorations of 
Karl Marx’s 135th birthday in the spring of 1953. SED officials heavily criticized 
72   ♦  Composing the Party Line
the main concert, which included Jean Kurt Forest’s cantata Karl Marx Lived and 
Taught (Karl Marx hat gelebt und gelehrt) and the premiere of a work by Arno 
Babajanian, for its significant ideological and aesthetic problems.311 The text by 
favored poet KuBa allegedly did not capture Marx and his significance, and For-
est’s music was deemed decadent and formalist. Rentzsch accepted responsibility 
for “poor leadership and instructions” and was forced out in May of 1953 in an at-
mosphere of recrimination and back-stabbing.312 The fact that he was not replaced 
for years, combined with the relative thaw starting in 1953, made the department 
less effective in getting the party’s ideological message across.313
The department was to transform the party’s aims into reality by exerting 
control over musical life in the GDR, and as in Poland pursued a multitrack ap-
proach. An important aspect of this process involved directing the State Com-
mission for Artistic Affairs (Stakuko) and its successor institution, the Ministry 
for Culture. The department also took an active role in overseeing all cultural 
institutions throughout the country, and most particularly the Composers’ Union. 
Although the department rarely interacted with individual musical figures, party 
officials put great emphasis on both gaining the support of and exerting control 
over artists. The party thereby hoped to influence the ideological messages com-
municated to the population, supervise the activities of these intellectuals, and 
earn legitimacy as a patron of the arts. Though later in the 1950s the party en-
couraged workers to produce their own art, in this period the party, through the 
Culture Department, focused on existing artists and intellectuals. This aspect of 
the department’s work was stressed much more than in Poland, since the SED had 
to convince artists to stay in the GDR, and indeed attempted to convince others 
from the West to come over.
In both Poland and East Germany, the party’s Culture Department set over-
arching goals and relied largely on party members active in the musical world 
to carry out its program. In the GDR, these party members were more numerous 
and committed than their counterparts in Poland, and thus helped to institute 
much of the party’s program in the cultural realm. The departments’ influence 
over musical production and performance in the early 1950s was great, due both 
to their power and to the willingness of many musical figures to accept their 
goals. The presence of West Germany also forced the SED to make more conces-
sions to keep potentially and actually discontented artists in its zone. A growing 
disenchantment among artists both inside and outside the party forced officials 
to operate in a more conciliatory manner and compromise on aims. In Poland, a 
renewed initiative to regain control after the post-1953 thaw had little concrete 
effect, and it collapsed as a result of the wider transformations of 1956. In the 
GDR, the thaw combined with cadre problems weakened the SED’s control, but 
by 1958 the department had reasserted its authority—in contrast to the situation 
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in Poland, where composers and much of the music world had achieved nearly 
complete autonomy from the influence of party officials.
More Direct Involvement through the State Organs
In both countries, an ambitious state bureaucracy took a more hands-on approach 
to the general goals of attempting to institute totalizing political control in the 
music world and encouraging a new socialist-realist music. In Poland, a min-
isterial body responsible for culture was created soon after the organization of 
the postwar governing authority in 1944.314 This Ministry of Culture and Art 
included a department for music from its first days, and in the second half of 
the 1940s even directly employed communist musicologist Zofia Lissa and also 
the left-leaning composer Witold Rudziński, the controversial president of the 
Composers’ Union in 1950-51.315 During these early years, this Music Depart-
ment focused on bringing music to workers and peasants by organizing amateur 
ensembles and concerts for a broad audience. With the attempt to attain greater 
control of culture in 1948, ministry officials set up another department to influ-
ence artistic production, including a section for music, while a separate state body 
controlled musical institutions. These two functions were then united in 1952 in 
what marked the high-water point of centralized control in Poland, even as the 
ministry began a slow process of giving both composers and musical institutions 
more autonomy as part of the thaw.
Polish Culture Ministry officials had much more direct and practical interac-
tion with artists and artistic institutions than their counterparts in the Culture De-
partment of the PZPR. Composers generally welcomed this support but resented 
what they considered excessive interference, and a process of negotiation of aims 
and outcomes marked the period. The ministry fulfilled four broad functions with 
respect to music: influencing the producers of music and the Composers’ Union; 
managing the opera houses, orchestras, and other musical institutions; overseeing 
amateur organizations; and disseminating and popularizing music to the masses. 
The last goal permeated all aspects of the ministry’s work, and the first three, 
while nominally discrete, often overlapped and produced a confusing ministerial 
structure.
As in Poland, the East German state institutions had much more direct con-
tact with the musical world than the party Culture Department. Soon after the 
war ended, a German Administration for People’s Education was formed under 
Paul Wandel, and had a department for art and literature with a subdepartment 
for music.316 After the founding of the GDR, this administrative body became 
the Ministry for People’s Education, and the department for art and literature 
was spun off, soon to become its own institution, the State Commission for Ar-
tistic Affairs (Staatliche Kommission für Kunstangelegenheiten, or Stakuko).317 
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Modeled on a Soviet institution, the Stakuko officially came into being in the 
summer of 1951, headed by State Secretary Helmut Holtzhauer and his deputy, 
Maria Rentmeister.318 It lasted only until the end of 1953, when the SED set up a 
Ministry of Culture as a response to dissatisfaction from the cultural world, in an 
effort to move away from the period of strict political control of the arts that the 
Stakuko represented. Other key Stakuko officials included Rudolf Hartig and the 
young, reasonably competent, and highly committed Hans-Georg Uszkoreit, as 
well as representatives in the administrative bodies at the regional level.319 Usz-
koreit, an organist born in 1926, was captured by Soviet troops in 1944 and spent 
four years in Soviet camps, time that included two “antifascist courses” that led 
him to socialism and the choice to stay in East Germany.320 He was a typical ex-
ample of the rising generation of young party members, and played a crucial role 
in the musical life of the GDR throughout the 1950s, as he consistently sought to 
represent and implement the party line.321
The Stakuko sought to control the entirety of cultural life, but in theory 
through the means of exhortation and education and with a minimum of coercion; 
composers, however, frequently found these actions intrusive and began increas-
ingly to resist its incursions. It worked to enact the larger goals of the SED, and 
was especially linked to the renewed attempt in the early 1950s to propagate the 
ideology of socialist realism in the arts.322 The Stakuko helped the SED’s Culture 
Department to formulate policy, but bore more responsibility for the actual imple-
mentation of these directives. The Stakuko was imbued with the idea that the arts 
had a concrete effect on people and could educate them in a socialist manner. Of-
ficials believed that this could all be logically carried out, and the Music Depart-
ment of the Stakuko had several-stage plans for mastering the musical realm. Its 
officials believed that the percentage of a “socialist” musical culture would gradu-
ally increase and overcome the vestiges of bourgeois culture and the encroach-
ment of Western cultural influence. These goals were only partially achieved, as 
the Music Department faced growing dissatisfaction from the music world, as well 
as the more basic problem of a lack of adequate, qualified personnel.
To most composers and musicians, the Stakuko’s efforts seemed heavy-
handed, meddlesome, and insensitive to their concerns. Criticism increased 
throughout 1952, and by the spring of 1953, the Stakuko in response began to 
pursue a somewhat more conciliatory policy, as for instance allowing orchestras 
to decide on their own concert programs without approval from Stakuko officials. 
After the Uprising of June 17, 1953, the Stakuko retreated even further from an 
“administrative” and “overcentralized” approach to controlling culture in favor 
of permitting composers and musical institutions more freedom and autonomy; 
the Stakuko then proposed to influence the musical world through less coercive 
means, by convincing rather than commanding.323 Dissatisfaction among com-
posers, as well as the artistic world more generally, nonetheless continued to 
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grow. In response, the SED made a shrewd political move. Unlike in Poland, 
where the ministerial official most associated with the “errors and deviations” 
of the earlier era, Włodzimierz Sokorski, stayed in place for years and attempted 
unsuccessfully to mollify and compromise, in the GDR the Stakuko was dis-
banded and Secretary Holtzhauer removed. The well-regarded and popular poet 
Johannes R. Becher became head of a newly formed Ministry of Culture, replac-
ing the Stakuko, an act symbolic of the granting of more autonomy and respect 
to artists.324 Like his Polish counterpart Sokorski, Becher had spent the war years 
in the Soviet Union, and played a crucial role as the head of the Kulturbund, an 
influential arts organization, as well as many other politically and culturally im-
portant positions in the Soviet Occupation Zone and early GDR.
The ministry came into being in early January 1954, and was to put a new 
face on efforts to achieve the same goals. The change proved somewhat cos-
metic, as nearly identical personnel pursued a very similar political program, 
though now with different leadership and slightly modified methods. And after 
a few short years, SED leaders relieved Minister Becher of all but the nominal 
functions of the ministry, which were taken over by State Secretary Alexander 
Abusch.325 The accomplished harpsichordist and multitalented cultural official 
Hans Pischner moved from the state radio to become head of the Music Depart-
ment through 1956, when he then became deputy minister and was replaced by 
Uszkoreit.326 Prior to his promotion to head, former Stakuko hand Uszkoreit led 
the first of two subdepartments, Contemporary and Classical Music.327 The sec-
ond, Musical Performances, was directed by former Stakuko music head Rudolf 
Hartig. The new ministry continued the efforts of the Stakuko and sought to influ-
ence all areas of musical life in the country. Ministry cultural officials pursued 
similar goals, but through somewhat modified means: “Bureaucratic, dogmatic, 
and uncomprehending administration should be replaced by persuasion and self-
determination.”328 Composers were to be consulted more frequently, and the au-
thority to give contracts was largely delegated to the Composers’ Union, though 
the Music Department continued to try to influence these decisions.
Throughout this period, state officials in both countries sought to enlist the 
arts in the realization of the party’s vision of a socialist society. In the years 
around 1950, state institutions grew ever larger and expanded their reach ever 
deeper into the musical life of the two countries. During these years of its great-
est power, they attempted to control every aspect of the musical world, from the 
composer’s studio, through the opera house and concert hall, to the rural house of 
culture. And for a time, it was indeed quite successful, as composers created po-
liticized music and party-approved music more generally dominated concert rep-
ertoires. Growing resentment and resistance by an increasing number of musical 
figures produced a backlash, however, and state officials were forced to moderate 
methods and scale back aims.
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Both the PZPR and SED created a significant and ambitious apparatus within 
both the party and state bureaucracy in an attempt to oversee every note com-
posed and performed. These cultural officials sought to appropriate music for 
the realization of the party’s vision of a socialist society. The party departments 
responsible for music set broad policy, sought to realize general ideological aims 
by working closely with musical figures who carried party cards, and directed the 
practical activities of the Ministries of Culture. The music-related bodies in the 
ministries carried out this program of influencing the musical world through ex-
tensive interaction with composers, oversight with respect to musical ensembles 
and institutions, and involvement with amateur musical groups. Cultural offi-
cials made their presence felt in all areas of musical life, but the extent of this 
influence was a product of negotiation with composers and the musical world 
more broadly. In contrast to Poland, where composers achieved nearly complete 
compositional freedom and musicians near-total autonomy in the mid-1950s, the 
state bureaucracy in the GDR maintained a significant amount of influence over 
the musical world. Although the heavy, interventionist hand of the Stakuko was 
replaced by a Culture Ministry that sought to employ a lighter touch, the underly-
ing goals remained similar, as did much of the personnel employed to implement 
them. East German officials modified their approach in 1953 due to growing 
frustration among musical artists, and produced a reasonably successful synthesis 
of significant influence combined with generalized and widespread acceptance of 
their somewhat less intrusive oversight.
Conclusion
A totalizing project of absolute control and ideological conformity was thus never 
achieved in either country, even at the peak of party power in the early 1950s. 
Save for the two-year caesura in the late 1940s and consequent time lag, the 
initial encounter among cultural officials, composers, and socialist realism in the 
GDR closely resembled that in Poland. In both countries, several years of debate 
produced a negotiated concept of socialist realism as well as a large number of so-
cialist-realist works by composers who broadly agreed with the party’s political-
aesthetic goals. Although a narrow and prescriptive form was propagated around 
1950, socialist realism was not simply a rigid straitjacket imposed from above, 
but rather a framework that guided and also inspired creative work. Soon after, 
however, East German and Polish cultural officials, aided by sympathetic com-
posers and musicologists, overreached themselves in an increasingly dogmatic 
advocacy of a more restrictive socialist-realist paradigm, and began to alienate 
and frustrate some composers. Many in the music world increasingly expressed 
their discontent with these actions and forced cultural officials to compromise 
their goals. Indeed, composers and other musical elites had particular power vis-
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à-vis the party, as officials were considerably dependent on them to cooperate in 
the creation of the new socialist culture. In Poland, Culture Minister Sokorski and 
other hardliners too slowly granted concessions to demands from composers and 
society, and a growing assertiveness from below combined with major disarray 
in party ranks caused a near-catastrophic loss in state and party control vis-à-vis 
music. A growing number of composers simply resisted the dwindling number 
of proponents of socialist-realist music. Sokorski’s ouster in 1956 symbolized 
the end of the era of attempted dirigisme from above, and socialist realism lay 
abandoned.
In the GDR, it was perhaps the shock of June 17, 1953 that truly catalyzed 
the hardliners to allow greater leeway to musical elites, symbolized most obvi-
ously in the replacement of the dogmatic, interfering Stakuko by the Ministry 
of Culture. The SED made significant concessions more broadly to artistic and 
musical autonomy at this time, thus appeasing many demands from the music 
world, but nonetheless maintained a considerable baseline of control on which it 
could rely in subsequent years. These prudent moves by the SED and its allies in 
turn secured the loyalty of East German composers already more predisposed to 
follow official policy than their Polish counterparts. While East German officials 
never again achieved the intensity of control attained in the early 1950s, they con-
tinued successfully to exert far more influence than their counterparts in Poland 
in the years after 1956-57. In the GDR, socialist realism in weakened and hence 
more acceptable form lived on well past the late 1950s.
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The Composers’ Unions between Party 
Aims and Professional Autonomy
From the mediocre to the truly genius, the compositional creativity of Poland and 
the GDR concentrated itself in the Composers’ Unions. All the leading figures 
joined, and aspiring composers of diverse backgrounds desired to do so. Union 
membership conferred prestige and status, as well as access to more practical 
resources like funding, and thus was crucial to the livelihood and self-conception 
of composers. As advocate and self-regulatory body, the unions represented com-
posers by helping to secure money and performances, and lobbied on their behalf 
with respect to both state and society. The unions also served as a tool for the 
political control of musical production by the parties, which sought to use these 
organizations as a transmission belt for political aims. In an attempt to gain sup-
port and cooperation, the state funneled considerable sums through the unions to 
encourage composition and performance.
The Composers’ Union in each country was thus the most important institu-
tion for the creators of new music as well as for the cultural officials who desired 
to influence composers and their musical production. In Poland and the GDR, 
the unions functioned as complex sites of negotiation among five fluctuating, 
often overlapping interest groups that bridged the political and musical spheres: 
cultural officials who sought compliance and support, the union leadership, com-
posers and musicologists who were party members, the broad mass of composers 
willing to work for the party’s aims but who also desired a fair amount of creative 
and professional autonomy, and a minority of composers who were lukewarm or 
even opposed to the parties. This chapter describes the structure and function of 
the unions, and explores the interaction among these various groups in such cru-
cial areas as propagating the new ideology of socialist realism, determining union 
membership, and organizing performances. Through these issues, the overarch-
ing theme of negotiation among composers, their leaders, and cultural officials 
continues to be explored, as is the nature of the parties’ efforts to influence both 
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composers and society through political oversight of musical production. Over 
the course of the stalinist decade, both Polish and East German composers as-
serted professional control over each union’s activities and thereby reduced overt 
political incursions. In the GDR, as we have seen, this process unfolded with the 
continued political loyalty of the union leadership intact, and hence SED policy 
remained largely in force, a major contrast with the situation in Poland.
The equivalent institution in the Soviet Union provided a less than ideal 
model for the satellite countries since it did not become a fully functioning en-
tity until the late 1940s. After all artistic societies disbanded in a large-scale re-
organization in 1932, local and regional composers’ unions formed throughout 
the USSR.1 Initially welcomed by a majority of composers as liberation from 
the dominance of the militant communist musical group RAPM, these unions 
came to serve as an effective conduit of state power and provided a means to 
enforce conformity in its early years.2 A nation-wide organizational committee 
first formed in 1939, and its first national congress took place only in 1948 in con-
junction with Zhdanov’s campaign against formalism.3 Important organizational 
reforms were not undertaken until after the Second World War, and thus the union 
in the USSR was still coalescing at the time the Polish union formed in 1945, and 
was also quite new at the time of the GDR union’s founding in 1951. The 1948 
Congress elected a 51-member directorate, from which a six-person presidium 
was selected, thus providing the model largely emulated in the GDR, while the 
Executive Committee in Poland was considerably smaller.4
This Union of Soviet Composers directly influenced its sister organizations 
in Poland and the GDR, as emissaries traveled to both countries and dispensed 
advice. Of course the concept of socialist realism had been more fully articulated 
in the USSR in both theory and in practice, and that combined with its role as 
hegemon meant that the Soviet perspective carried great weight. As referenced 
above, Soviet representatives often attended the major union meetings, as for 
example when Polish composers greeted the president of the Soviet Composers’ 
Union Tikhon Khrennikov with thunderous applause at the June 1950 Congress 
in Warsaw.5 Khrennikov also traveled to the Founding Congress of the East Ger-
man Union in April of 1951, and other Soviet representatives attended the first 
two regular Congresses in 1952 and 1954; at the former, Ukrainian composer 
Andrei Shtogarenko gave a strongly ideological speech that also praised Stalin, 
prompting “the Congress participants to rise from their seats and give lively ap-
plause.”6 In both countries, these Soviet emissaries participated actively at the 
congresses, gave lectures about the links between music and politics, and even 
went so far as to approve or disparage individual compositions. Works and articles 
by Soviet composers and musicologists appeared in the main musical journals for 
consideration by Polish and East German composers. With minor differences, the 
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Composers’ Unions in both countries appeared to have undergone sovietization, 
but the underlying reality would prove rather different.
Związek Kompozytorów Polskich (ZKP): Formation and 
Structure
The prewar Association of Polish Composers (Stowarzyszenie Kompozytorów 
Polskich) had maintained a fragile, ghostlike existence during the war, and dis-
solved into the Union of Polish Composers (Związek Kompozytorów Polskich, 
or ZKP) at the latter’s first, founding congress, organized largely on composer 
initiative, in late August 1945.7 The prior existence of an analogous organiza-
tion, plus the initial formation of the new body largely outside of party control, 
were important factors both in maintaining some independence from political 
constraints during the most politically charged years around 1950 and in assert-
ing almost complete autonomy thereafter. The ZKP had 50 members in 1945, a 
number that was to rise steadily to 131 by 1957.8 Although a large number of 
composers sympathized generally with the party’s aims, especially in the early 
years, the Polish union had but a little more than a dozen party members in its 
ranks.9 It also did not have the primary party cell typical of most such institutions; 
in the Writers’ Union, for instance, the cell was crucial in asserting party control 
and introducing socialist realism.10
The high points of union life took place at a General Congress, which met 
every year or so, and was attended by roughly half of the ZKP’s members.11 
Most of these meetings began with an ideological speech by (Deputy) Culture 
Minister Włodzimierz Sokorski, followed by another politicized presentation by 
a union official, often composer Zygmunt Mycielski. At the congresses, the mem-
bers discussed both the political and organizational issues of the day. They also 
elected members to the Executive Committee, of nine to twelve members, with a 
handful making up the Prezydium, consisting of the president, one to three vice-
presidents, one or two secretaries, and a treasurer. The Prezydium met regularly, 
even as much as once a week at some periods, to conduct the pressing business of 
running the union. Plenary sessions of the entire Executive Committee took place 
every few months, and sometimes expanded to include other ZKP members, min-
istry officials, or other invited guests.
Several other committees, each with a handful of members, also attended to 
union affairs and included the Inspection Committee, the Arbitration Board, and 
the important Qualification Committee (Komisja Kwalifikacyjna). Until 1952, 
a Commissions and Purchases Committee was part of the union and made im-
portant decisions about which composers would receive money for composing 
certain works.12 The union also helped promote and manage many aspects of 
composers’ professional lives, including sponsoring contests, organizing concerts 
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both at home and abroad, publishing works, and assisting in the education of 
younger composers through its Youth Circle. The union was highly centralized 
and almost all significant meetings took place in Warsaw. Groups of composers in 
the other major cities, however, did meet informally and also organized concerts. 
These groupings became formal entities in 1953 as Regional Circles in Kraków, 
Łódź, Poznań, and Katowice.13
The Polish Composers’ Union had a great deal of independence immediately 
after the war, followed by a period of close cooperation with the party from 1948 
to 1951, after which it gradually achieved ever greater autonomy. Through the 
use of the carrot, in the form of funding and an emphasis on shared aims, the 
PZPR succeeded in influencing considerably the activities of the union and by 
extension the works composed by its members. The stick, however, exemplified 
by dogmatic prescriptions and an intolerance of compositional experimentation, 
slowly alienated the majority of composers. Beginning in 1951-52, they started a 
gradual process of emancipating themselves from party control through an asser-
tion of professional autonomy that served to reduce political interference.
Verband deutscher Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler 
(VDK): Party-Directed Development
Composers in Germany had become accustomed to membership in a common or-
ganization in the first half of the twentieth century. A Society of German Compos-
ers (Genossenschaft deutscher Tonsetzer) was founded in 1903 and concentrated 
on copyright laws. With the Nazi Gleichschaltung in 1933, a Professional Estate 
of German Composers (Berufsstand der deutschen Komponisten) was formed and 
incorporated into the Reich Chamber of Music (Reichsmusikkammer) later that 
year, and enjoyed significant support from composers for its welcome regulation 
and support of their professional lives.14 With the end of the war came a fragmen-
tation of organizations, and composers in the Soviet Zone of occupied Germany 
had membership in several different institutions. East German composers only 
came together in a centralized union at the behest of the party, but in the context 
of many prior years of such a situation.15 After the founding of the GDR in the 
fall of 1949, the SED took the initiative in grouping artists together in unions so 
as to more effectively influence their activities—a situation very different from 
that in Poland, where the composers in effect reconstituted a prewar organization 
by themselves. The founding conference of the Union of German Composers and 
Musicologists (Verband deutscher Komponisten und Musikwissenschaftler, or 
VDK) took place from April 3-6, 1951. Originally part of the broad Kulturbund, 
the VDK became a fully independent organization one year later. Throughout that 
year, regional union bodies formed as well, for a total membership of about 250, 
a number that had reached 339 by early 1957.16 Of these, 86 were SED members, 
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many of whom held leading positions in the union. With over a quarter of VDK 
members in the party, the SED mustered about six times the absolute number and 
twice the proportional strength of its counterpart in Poland.17
At the First Congress of the German Composers’ Union in early October 1952. Union 
President Ottmar Gerster sits in the center, with black glasses, and to his left is First Secretary 
Nathan Notowicz. The slogan above is from Walter Ulbricht and reads: “The new person, the 
hero of the construction of socialism, must be the focus of artistic production” (SLUB Dresden 
/ Abt. Deutsche Fotothek, Abraham Pisarek).
The organizational structure of the VDK resembled that of its Polish (and 
Soviet) sister institution, except that power was even more centralized, as Berlin-
based members closely linked to the party exerted considerable influence—to 
the frustration of many provincial composers. A central congress of many union 
members convened roughly every three years starting in 1952. It elected an 
Executive Committee of 30-40 members, which also included the heads of the 
regional unions, and met every two to three months. Executive Committee mem-
bers elected a president, first secretary, five further secretaries, and the heads of 
genre commissions from its ranks. The president to 1968 was composer Ottmar 
Gerster and the first secretary to 1961 was the functionary Nathan Notowicz; 
their long tenures provided continuity and stability at the top, a situation very dif-
ferent from the frequent changes at the head of the Polish union.18 A further key 
difference with the Polish ZKP can be seen in the figure of Notowicz, who was 
not a practicing composer or musicologist, but rather a party-approved cultural 
official. The secretaries made up the Sekretariat, the effective locus of power in 
the union that was extremely close to the party; it met weekly in its normal form, 
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and monthly in expanded configuration with the heads of the regional unions.19 
Other important committees were the Admissions Commission and the Contract 
Commission, both discussed below.
Throughout the period, a constant struggle took place between center and 
periphery, and pitted composers from the regional union bodies against the VDK 
leadership and well-known composers in Berlin. While mostly about allocating 
resources, these disputes also had a political cast as many composers in the capital 
sympathized strongly with the SED, while some provincial composers pushed for 
more creative autonomy. At the First Union Congress in 1952, Dresden composer 
Johannes Paul Thilman used the term “Olympians” to describe the Berlin com-
posers allegedly favored with performances and patronage, a sentiment echoed 
by Iwan Schönebaum, both of whom channeled this frustration among provincial 
union members.20 Two years later a group of Leipzig composers made similar 
feelings known, as they pushed for increased decision-making powers for the re-
gional union bodies and away from the centralized Executive Committee in Ber-
lin.21 At the Second Union Congress in the fall of 1954, heated discussions took 
place between union leaders and provincial composers. General Secretary Noto-
wicz defended the center’s desire for more power and a harder ideological line 
against the demands for decentralization and compositional freedom by a num-
ber of composers, especially young Siegfried Köhler from Leipzig, and accused 
them of falsely interpreting the party’s New Course.22 These struggles continued, 
and in 1957 union leaders, allied with Hans Pischner from the Ministry’s Music 
Department, tried to pass a resolution that would have allowed the Executive 
Committee to include prominent figures of their choosing on the committee—
thus strengthening the party-linked center further with respect to rank-and-file 
composers—but the VDK membership voted it down despite two attempts.23
In the GDR, these conflicts within the union took on the character of regional 
groups of composers defending their interests against the central leadership. The 
former, especially composers from Leipzig and Dresden, resented what they per-
ceived as excessive interference from the center, and well as an unfair privileging 
of the well-known and party-linked composers based in Berlin. In Poland, there 
was only one other dissenting regional power locus in Kraków, which was simply 
too small, and the ZKP too centralized in Warsaw, to allow for a serious challenge 
to the central union authorities around 1950. In Poland, it would take the grow-
ing dissatisfaction of a majority of members from across the country to achieve 
autonomy from the PZPR’s influence.
Both the Polish and East German unions had structures similar to their Soviet 
model, but each manifested significant differences in actual functioning, as Pol-
ish composers achieved more creative and professional autonomy. Higher party 
membership among VDK members, as well as a central leadership consistently 
supportive of party aims, helped the SED to realize its goals more effectively 
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in the music world. In Poland, independent-minded composers occupied major 
union positions except for the years immediately around 1950. As will be dis-
cussed below, the musicologists in both countries were extremely important in 
carrying out the party’s wishes, but the East German musicologists had far more 
influence on the union’s activities than their counterparts in Poland. Through 
these members, and due to the SED’s major role in organizing the VDK, the 
composers in the GDR came under more political influence, and for a longer 
time, than their counterparts in Poland.
The Unions Confront Ideology and the Party
As seen in the previous chapter, by 1950-51 a musical world significantly shaped 
by party aims confronted composers in both unions. In the organizational life of 
the unions, the discourse of socialist realism seemed to entrench itself, and the 
party ideological goals dominated union meetings, musical journals, and edu-
cational symposia. More directly, cultural officials took an interventionist hand 
in the affairs of both the ZKP and VDK. These initiatives show the importance 
accorded music as well as the parties’ reliance on the unions to help realize their 
program. But composers, in their professional bodies, were always—though 
sometimes to a greater extent, sometimes to a lesser—able to influence outcomes.
A significant site for contact with party ideas was through so-called ideologi-
cal courses. In Poland, officials in the PZPR considered such courses particularly 
important after the 1949 Łagów conference as a means to continue the process of 
introducing the tenets of socialist realism in particular and Marxism in general. 
The first took place in 1950 and involved thirty composers; a second was held in 
August and September of 1951.24 The latter involved ten ZKP members as well 
as seventeen younger composers, and provided an opportunity for participants 
to learn about Marxist aesthetics as explained by communist musicologist Zo-
fia Lissa, to hear and discuss new works, and to undertake general ideological 
schooling with assistants of the noted Marxist theoretician, Adam Schaff.25 In 
the spring of 1952, the ZKP conducted a two-part course in the provincial union 
circles that included lectures on Stalin’s theory of superstructure and base, and 
the transformation of the Polish nation into a socialist one.26
Later in 1952, the union organized a three-day course that included lectures 
on folklore, as well as on Marxism in literature and sculpture.27 The workshop 
included two concerts of Hungarian and Czech music, and attendees listened to 
and discussed recordings of music by Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturian, and 
Dmitri Kabalevsky, as well as Béla Bartok, Arthur Honegger, Benjamin Brit-
ten, and Paul Hindemith. Real and open engagement with ideological issues took 
place here. Witold Lutosławski, for example, had an extended exchange with one 
of the presenters on the subject of Marxist aesthetic theory, the meaning of the 
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arts and a class society, and the nature of formalism and socialist realism, and he 
made a plea for the use of modernist musical techniques: “Despite the reaction-
ary ideology of a work, its purely formal qualities can be useful if they are not 
closely connected to the reactionary nature of that ideology.” His colleague Zyg-
munt Mycielski grappled with the more general difficulty of applying socialist-
realist theory to music, but was certain that a “new creative language must be 
found, which can embrace most fully the new, young listeners.”28 Composers 
spoke openly about their interest in and reservations with the party’s aims, and 
advocated for their own creative approach. Although planning for more courses 
was announced, it seems that very little if any further schooling was organized, a 
fact that indicated the growing independence of Polish composers from a weak-
ening party.
The SED put together an even more ambitious program of ideological school-
ing in the GDR. The regional union organizations coordinated political lectures 
and discussion of specific works in the early 1950s, and weekend-long symposia 
on stalinist linguistic theory as well as Marx’s writings on culture were planned 
for 1953.29 A centrally organized, ten-day course took place in October of that 
year, featuring ideologically themed lectures by musicologist Georg Knepler and 
Union First Secretary Notowicz, and including long politicized discussions. Par-
ticipants attended daily concerts of music by leading contemporary composers 
from the GDR, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Democracies; lengthy analy-
sis and discussion then followed the performance.30 Cultural officials planned 
this colloquium as a model for future courses in each region.31 In these contexts, 
composers and musicologists from both countries frequently encountered the lan-
guage and ideas supported by the party, and often took part in open debate in an 
engaged manner.
Another particularly auspicious opportunity to introduce party-approved ide-
ology occurred during union congresses, which a high percentage of composers 
attended. In Poland, Deputy Minister for Culture Włodzimierz Sokorski gave 
strongly ideological speeches at each of these congresses, and also played a key 
role at the 1949 Łagów conference, where composers first discussed the concepts 
of realism and formalism in depth. The communist musicologist and party mem-
ber Zofia Lissa similarly presented highly politicized lectures at every congress, 
and her involvement and influence also extended to the everyday matters taken up 
by the ZKP leadership. Zygmunt Mycielski also delivered an ideological speech 
at most congresses. Through these presentations, composers were surrounded by 
politicized language at their important annual meetings.
In the GDR, high-ranking cultural officials also made significant political 
pronouncements at the main congresses. SED officials directed the planning of 
the 1951 Founding Conference in considerable detail, down to the content of 
speeches and the final published resolution.32 There, Kulturbund president and 
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later Minister of Culture Johannes R. Becher called for a realistic art and con-
demned “American cultural barbarism.”33 At the 1952 Congress, Stakuko head 
Helmut Holtzhauer gave an opening speech that pushed composers to fight 
for socialist realism and help with the building of socialism.34 Two years later, 
Deputy Minister of Culture Fritz Apelt presented a similarly ideological talk that 
stressed socialist realism.35 At all these congresses, VDK leaders, important com-
posers, and (especially) musicologists gave ideology-filled speeches like those by 
Lissa and Mycielski of the Polish union. Thus, as in Poland, both cultural officials 
and party-linked musical producers took an active part in the union’s major con-
gresses, and advocated the party goals to be followed.
Less visibly, cultural officials in both countries also attempted to influence 
union activities more generally. Representatives from the Ministries of Culture 
intervened directly in union administration in an effort to control composers and 
their production. In Poland, the Ministry of Culture began increasing pressure on 
the Composers’ Union to follow its ideological program and embrace socialist re-
alism.36 For the Fourth Congress in November of 1948, ministry officials prepared 
ideologically appropriate materials to influence the discussion, and planned politi-
cized content for both the speeches and discussions at the Fifth Congress in June 
1950.37 The ministry largely coordinated the key conference for promoting social-
ist realism at Łagów, and in general considered the union its “prime instrument of 
cultural policy with respect to music” and prepared a six-year plan for it.38 Around 
1950, at the height of their power, ministry officials also attended meetings of the 
ZKP’s Executive Committee, helped to decide on candidates for the union lead-
ership, and attended concerts where new works were discussed.39 Influence over 
the union was considered the main responsibility of the ministry’s Music Depart-
ment in the early 1950s.40 Due to cultural officials’ ever-increasing dogmatism 
and hardline policies, however, a growing number of Polish composers began at-
tempting to minimize party and ministry influence in the union’s affairs starting in 
1951, with incremental success beginning the next year. These composers chafed 
at the limitations imposed, and sought to carve out more autonomy from cultural 
officials. The ministry nonetheless continued to attempt to promote cooperation, 
influence the ZKP with respect to deepening the “ideological level of the compos-
ers,” and control the choice of the union’s executive committee, but found itself 
increasingly frustrated.41 By late 1954, party and ministry officials, as well as com-
posers and musicologists sympathetic to the party, lamented the independence the 
ZKP had achieved from outside control.42 Cultural officials proposed a renewed 
offensive to establish their influence in the union through a party cell within it, 
but achieved no concrete success.43 Officials from the Music Sector of the Central 
Committee’s Culture Department claimed the ZKP exercised “dictatorial authority 
in all areas of musical life” and that it had an “apolitical, isolationist attitude” that 
needed to change.44 However, the opposite occurred as the union became increas-
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ingly assertive of its autonomy vis-à-vis the ministry, and by the Ninth Congress 
in March of 1957, composers openly criticized ministry officials, who had lost all 
but the most basic of control over the union.45
In the GDR, the influence of the party and ministry over the union endured 
longer. Unlike in Poland, where the ZKP organized itself already in the summer of 
1945 on the model of a prewar organization, party officials tightly orchestrated the 
creation of the East German union in 1951. The SED’s Culture Department went 
so far as to make changes to the Founding Congress program and suggest themes 
for the speeches, which were strongly oriented towards the fight for socialist real-
ism.46 The heavy-handed Stakuko took over the planning of the next congress in 
1952 by influencing the discussion in a party-approved ideological direction.47 
Stakuko officials were closely involved with the VDK’s activities in general, as it 
sent representatives to the union’s important meetings and helped coordinate its 
plans. As noted above, the union leadership was usually only too happy to follow 
instructions from the Stakuko. Most of the Sekretariat and many of the leading 
composers in the union were SED members, and they exerted considerable influ-
ence over the workings of the union.48 To further strengthen the party’s position, in 
1953 its Culture Department ordered these party members to organize themselves 
formally in a party organization so as to better influence the VDK and conduct the 
fight for socialist realism.49 In the fall of 1954, the Culture Department urged this 
organization to increase its efforts to mobilize the union for the goals of the SED.50 
The party was trying to reassert its influence after a temporary thaw subsequent to 
the June 17 uprising, but perhaps equally important was the need to exert control 
in a manner differently than that of the heavy-handed Stakuko. The Ministry of 
Culture had been founded in early 1954, and although it pursued largely the same 
goals as its predecessor, it was to do so in a less onerous and interfering manner. 
The use of such party cells was a way to influence the unions less obviously from 
the inside. Meetings of these cells took place relatively regularly and coincided 
with important events; at the seminal Kulturkonferenz in late 1957, Abusch called 
on them yet again to work harder to influence the VDK.51
For much of the period, the language and aims propagated by both the PZPR 
and especially the SED confronted composers in both unions. Official publica-
tions, schooling, and direct intervention by party officials in union affairs served 
to surround composers with party-approved ideology often supplemented by So-
viet materials and visits. In the GDR, this influence was pervasive throughout the 
period, while in Poland increased independence was attained.
Contesting Membership
Membership in the union was of crucial importance to composers in both coun-
tries. The ZKP and the VDK received large subsidies from their respective gov-
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ernments, and used this money to promote member-composers and their music. 
Control of union membership thus became a critical point of contention among 
shifting groups. In both countries, some composers desired and worked for a 
more exclusive, professionalized union made up of technically competent mem-
bers who favored serious music. In a telling and crucial difference, however, the 
push for a smaller Polish union served to limit the party’s influence, as the major-
ity of composers desiring autonomy took over the initiative for a more exclusive 
union to meet their own goals; here, the drive for compositional freedom from 
political interference overlapped with the desire for a smaller, more professional 
union. In the GDR, the push for a smaller VDK helped to maintain the dominance 
of the SED in union life as the politically reliable leadership successfully created 
and headed an institution both highly professional and ideologically loyal.
ZKP: A Smaller Union Reduces Party Influence
In Poland in the late 1940s, cultural officials successfully secured union member-
ship for composers who sympathized with their aims, although starting in 1952 a 
number of composers resisted such attempts. ZKP membership nearly tripled from 
1945 to 1957, but a much greater number desired to partake of the benefits and 
prestige of the union. The struggles over the nature of union membership were one 
of the major flashpoints of the ZKP’s first decade, as ever more composers sought 
to preserve a union of technically proficient individuals whose primary oeuvre was 
serious rather than lighter entertainment music. This push for a more professional 
union dovetailed with a growing desire among many composers to achieve more au-
tonomy from a party attempting for its part to increase its influence over the union.
In 1945, the members of the new ZKP had held membership in the prewar 
Stowarzyszenie Kompozytorów Polskich, and nine, mostly younger composers 
joined at the First Congress in 1945.52 The new union leadership set up a six-
person Qualification Committee (Komisja Kwalifikacyjna, or KK) at this inau-
gural ZKP Congress to decide who would subsequently be allowed to join the 
union.53 The procedures for accepting new members were not completely formal-
ized during the first few years of the union’s existence. The KK requested materi-
als from prospective candidates and then met, infrequently, to make decisions.54 
This procedure resulted in a very slow confirmation of new members, and start-
ing in 1949, the committee assembled on a more regular basis, several times a 
year. If approved, prospective members became regular (zwyczajny) members, or 
candidate members if those on the commission did not consider the applicant suf-
ficiently qualified. A further category of extraordinary (nadzwyczajny) was also 
available for those composers not quite qualified or developed enough to join.55
Questions surrounding who had the ultimate authority to accept or reject 
candidates also flared up on numerous occasions. In theory and usually in prac-
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tice, the KK’s recommendations were binding on the union leadership.56 The KK 
was, however, often controlled by more independent-minded composers who at 
times clashed with the more politically engaged Executive Committee in the late 
1940s and especially during Rudziński’s strongly party-line tenure as ZKP Presi-
dent in 1950-51. Union Secretary and PZPR member Alfred Gradstein asserted 
in 1949 that the union leadership had ultimate authority, and the Prezydium under 
Rudziński on at least one occasion changed the decision of the KK.57
During the height of party influence from 1949-51, Deputy Minister Sokor-
ski pushed to have a number of left-leaning composers of light entertainment 
music become members of the union.58 The KK’s members quickly assented to 
some, most notably Tadeusz Sygietyński, a prodigious writer of mass songs and 
the director of the renowned folk-music ensemble Mazowsze, and Władysław 
Szpilman, both of whom were well respected and considered technically profi-
cient.59 The committee accepted PZPR member and composer of light music Wi-
told Elektorowicz shortly thereafter, a decision that would soon prove divisive.60 
The Prezydium under Rudziński also actively added composers of popular music, 
as for example the young composer of mass songs Edward Olearczyk (PZPR 
member, born in 1915), who was made a member outside the usual KK proce-
dures.61 In late 1951, a number of party-friendly composers suggested a requali-
fication process for union membership, which sounded like a potential purge of 
those resisting the party, as the former also proposed looking at the potentially 
politically suspect wartime activities of all composers.62
These moves provoked a minor rebellion among a segment of the more inde-
pendent composers who desired a professional institution focused more on seri-
ous music and who also wanted to limit the party’s influence in union activities. 
As the winds began to shift in early 1952, the new members of the KK, headed by 
Lutosławski and Kazimierz Sikorski, indeed undertook the requalification pro-
cess, but managed to turn it against the party in a drive to create a more profes-
sionalized union liberated from party influence.63 This attempt was similar to the 
contemporaneous Soviet situation, but there an effort led by Shostakovich and 
Aram Khachaturian failed when political authorities overturned the union’s deci-
sions.64 In the Polish case, Lutosławski, secretary of the KK and later its powerful 
head from 1954 to 1967, pressed a successful drive for a smaller, technically ac-
complished union focused more on serious music.
Though ostensibly this review of the membership focused on compositional 
skill, the recently accepted composers of politicized light music bore the brunt 
of this process, and in particular two party members and composers of political 
mass songs, Edward Olearczyk and Witold Elektorowicz. Olearczyk studied at 
the Warsaw Conservatory in the late 1930s and lived in the Soviet Union from 
1939-1945. He turned his efforts to composing dozens of popular mass songs 
and was winner of several state prizes for work that included Our Party (Nasza 
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Partia), Millions of Hands (Miliony rąk), on the building of People’s Poland, 
and Song in Praise of Comrade Bierut (Pieśń na cześć towarzysza Bieruta). Ele-
ktorowicz had received a 1952 Ministry of Culture award for songs composed 
for young stakhanovite workers. A focus on these two composers celebrated by 
the political authorities was thus a powerful statement of composer autonomy. 
Rudziński protested and condemned the requalification as a politically motivated 
action against those composers sympathetic to the party.65 Early in 1952, the KK 
sent out questionnaires to all members; the fifty-eight most experienced had sim-
ply to fill these out, while fifteen other composers had to send in one representa-
tive work and a further forty-one of the most questionable cases were asked to 
submit three.66 By the fall, most of the KK’s recommendations had been made, 
with the great majority of composers confirmed in their membership; however, 
several regular members, including Olearczyk, were to be demoted to candidate 
membership, and a further six, including Elektorowicz, were to be kicked out of 
the union altogether due to “insufficient artistic qualifications.”67
At an expanded meeting of the union’s board in December of 1952, compos-
ers discussed the KK’s recommendations acrimoniously and at length. Zofia Lissa 
strongly criticized a number of the decisions, including a proposal to allow com-
posers living abroad to remain members, as she claimed that many of them were 
anticommunist and the union should represent those composers who worked with 
the party; her proposal went nowhere, as by this time the independent composers 
were gaining strength. She also argued that Olearczyk should remain a regu-
lar member due to his political activity and his many well-known mass songs.68 
Lutosławski defended the KK’s decisions with the assertion that commission 
members largely considered compositional ability, and that the recommendation 
to demote Olearczyk to candidate status should prove only temporary, until he 
had more time to develop his compositional skills.69 After seeing more of Ole-
arczyk’s work in early 1953, the KK reaffirmed its recommendation of candidate 
status, and pushed Olearczyk to take a series of lessons on harmony.70 The KK 
remained unsatisfied with his progress in early 1954, and recommended yet more 
study before they would permit his status as a regular member.71
Composers took up these issues again and at length during the Seventh Con-
gress of the ZKP in April 1954, and here the debate largely surrounded the fate 
of Witold Elektorowicz, recommended for expulsion by the KK. Several union 
members argued that he should remain in the ZKP, and the union membership 
passed a motion that allowed him to submit more works to the newly elected 
KK, now headed by Lutosławski.72 At its first subsequent meeting in May, KK 
members again decided that Electorowicz’s works did not meet a high enough 
standard, and they removed him from the union. The focus on the compositional 
ability of Olearczyk and Elektorowicz was surely an important factor in the KK’s 
decision, but the circumstantial evidence and comments of Lissa and Rudziński 
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indicate that the requalification was also linked to a struggle to diminish the par-
ty’s influence in the union.
After the requalification upheaval from 1952 to 1954, the KK continued its 
assigned task of deciding upon applications from aspiring composers, and save 
for some complaints about it being too restrictive in accepting new members, 
the era of controversy had come to an end.73 The party’s idea of an ideologically 
engaged membership that included more composers of politicized and popular 
music had been defeated. The Lutosławskian vision of a smaller union comprised 
of technically qualified members, from both inside the country and abroad, and 
which did not afford special consideration of political factors such as composing 
party-approved light music, won out. The party and its supporters in the union 
enjoyed some important successes in influencing membership around 1950, as a 
handful of party sympathizers secured a place in the ZKP. Soon after, however, 
these members were marginalized as part of a general push by a majority of 
composers for more independence and a more exclusive and professional union 
membership.
VDK: Restricted Membership Preserves Party Influence
A similar cleavage between visions for a smaller or larger union existed in the 
GDR, and in both countries the proponents of a smaller union desired a more 
professionalized, technically accomplished membership. An interesting reversal 
of meaning emerged, however, with respect to political influence over the union. 
Whereas in Poland some composers promoted a more exclusive union so as to 
keep out party-linked composers, in the GDR union leaders pushed a more re-
strictive membership policy to preserve party dominance. Opposed to the small-
union policy were the regional East German union bodies, which desired greater 
membership irrespective both of political loyalty and even of high standards of 
compositional skill, with the goal of assuring a more vibrant and inclusive re-
gional musical life. As in many other areas, the powerful, party-linked central 
VDK authorities largely won this struggle.
Leading East German musical figures, as well as the government and party 
authorities responsible for music, decided upon the invitations for prominent 
composers to the Founding Conference of the Composers’ Union in 1951. Al-
though the members of the new VDK called for the formation of an Admissions 
Commission at this first conference, such a commission did not constitute itself 
until the fall of 1952, and was dominated by Berlin-based composers linked to the 
party.74 Instead, during the first year and a half of the union’s existence, its Execu-
tive Committee, in consultation with the regional unions, made the admissions 
decisions, thus giving key power to the union leadership. From the Admissions 
Commission’s formation in 1952 until 1957, prospective members were to apply 
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to their regional union, whose leaders then evaluated the application and passed 
their recommendation on to this central Admissions Commission, which made 
the ultimate decision, if necessary in consultation with the regional union. Pro-
spective members were expected to have technical competence as well as declare 
themselves willing to work for a “progressive German music,” but these general 
criteria left much room for interpretation.75
More often than not, the Admissions Commission turned down the requests 
for membership, usually on the basis of a lack of technical competence.76 These 
negative decisions produced considerable frustration and anger among those re-
jected, as well as among provincial union leaders, who particularly disliked the 
often terse refusal of their recommended candidates. They often knew the ap-
plicants personally, and furthermore wanted increased membership so as to have 
more participation in their regional union’s activities. The central Admissions 
Committee nonetheless generally retained a hard line and insisted upon consider-
able compositional ability. A typical example was Hans-Werner Haase, whom the 
Halle Union desired as a member because of his engagement with union activities 
and the belief that his compositional ability would improve through contact with 
the union.77 Two assessments of Haase’s submitted works heavily criticized his 
compositional ability, and the Admissions Commission also rejected his applica-
tion.78 The genre commission for symphonies was called upon for its opinion and 
supported his application, but the Admissions Commission nonetheless contin-
ued to reject his candidacy.79
Political considerations were only infrequently taken into explicit account. 
One such case, however, was that of Werner Engelhardt, whom the Leipzig 
Union recommended as a promising composer of dance music.80 The Admissions 
Commission judged his compositions as of a “negative cultural-political kind,” 
seemingly because his style resembled western popular music, and his candidacy 
was postponed.81 In the semipolitical case of Otto-Ludwig Wüstinger in 1955, 
the Chamber Music Commission confirmed the Admissions Commission’s deci-
sion to reject his application, claiming that his music had “no connection to our 
time” despite the recommendations of the Halle VDK.82 In general, however, the 
commission based the vast majority of rejections on lack of ability, “technical 
failings,” “dilettantism,” or other deficiencies in professional competence.83
Many composers complained that the guidelines were not clear, and felt par-
ticularly frustrated by the Admissions Commission’s decisions. Further confu-
sion resulted from the basis for evaluation; sometimes the commission demanded 
five works in order to decide, but at other times not, and it was also unclear 
how to evaluate musicologists.84 VDK members therefore discussed these issues 
at length during the 1954 Congress, with sharply different proposals floated by 
the union leaders and by a group of Leipzig composers. The union’s Executive 
Committee would have done away with the Admissions Commission and given 
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itself more power, with the regional unions and genre commissions simply there 
to make recommendations on prospective members.85 The more independent 
Leipzig composers, typically, wanted to reduce the influence of the Executive 
Committee in Berlin, and proposed categories and criteria that would automati-
cally guarantee acceptance, but this proposal went nowhere.86 In the absence of 
agreement, the Admissions Commission continued its activities largely as before, 
although it confirmed that five works, including two composed after the war, had 
to be submitted by composers for consideration.87
At this 1954 Congress, as in Poland two years earlier, talk of a requalifi-
cation of members was in the air. Anticipating a potential politicization of the 
process, the Leipzig composers wanted to ensure that only “technical” qualifica-
tions would be considered.88 Just after the congress, the Executive Committee 
put this requalification process into motion, appointing committee members and 
setting a completion date of March 31, 1955.89 But unlike in Poland, it would 
seem as if political considerations were absent in a narrow sense, and indeed 
only compositional competence was ultimately considered.90 The VDK leader-
ship desired a reduced membership in order to have a union made up of the best 
qualified composers, with a secondary focus on limiting numbers to thus preserve 
its—and the party’s—dominance. The bulk of rank-and-file composers wanted 
relaxed standards so as to have more vibrant local union activities. The results of 
the requalification process were largely inconclusive, as only a small number of 
composers had their membership revoked.
Frustration among regional composers with the admissions process contin-
ued, and thus exact guidelines were still being discussed at the February 1957 
Congress.91 Many provincial union members attempted again to reduce the influ-
ence of the Executive Committee and the Berlin-based union members who made 
up the Admissions Commission. As a compromise, the Admissions Commission 
was enlarged to include the heads of the regional union bodies in a concession to 
the disgruntled composers in the provinces, and the full meetings of members at 
the congresses were also given a voice in the process.92 Despite the compromise, 
the central union authorities still maintained considerable control over this pro-
cess through their strong representation on the Admissions Commission.
The Stakes and Meaning of Including Performers
A further intractable problem and frequent point of contention in both countries 
was the question of admitting performers to the unions. The Composers’ Union in 
the USSR had faced a similar dilemma, and after significant debate, its leadership 
narrowly voted against inclusion in the mid-1940s.93 In Poland in a situation very 
similar to the question of accepting more composers, party authorities attempted 
to secure membership for selected musicians sympathetic to the PZPR, who 
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would then presumably exert favorable ideological influence on the ZKP. A more 
complex situation existed in the GDR, with the terms of the preceding question 
reversed: there, the central union leaders tried to include prominent performers 
so as to influence them ideologically and thereby increase the SED’s reach more 
generally. Regional composers often resisted such moves, since they wanted to 
preserve the VDK as a body of musical producers.
The VDK’s Executive Committee in Berlin repeatedly and consistently pushed 
to allow more performers into the union. In a practical sense, VDK leaders felt 
that including musicians would help composers get their works performed more 
frequently; a further benefit seemed to be that the union leadership’s ideological 
program would, through these performer-members, exert more influence in the 
wider musical world.94 Early Executive Committee guidelines set a maximum of 
30 percent of total union membership for performers, but this was reduced to 20 
percent when discussed at the 1954 Congress.95 A long, difficult debate on the 
matter took place at that congress, as a large number of composers, including 
the Leipzig Union members, wanted only composers and musicologists in the 
union.96 Some composers desired a limited proposal of allowing performers to be 
“extraordinary” members without voting rights.97 The influential composer and 
Academy of the Arts member Max Butting also strongly opposed their inclusion, 
as he wanted the union reserved for creative artists.98 Nonetheless, after great 
effort and pressure, the union leaders, helped by ministry official Hans Pischner, 
convinced composers to accept performers into the union.
The debate remained somewhat unresolved as late as 1959, as union Secre-
tary Notowicz continued to push the VDK membership to accept yet more per-
formers.99 The efforts of the Executive Committee seem largely to have been in 
vain—in 1960 only 24 performers had joined in a total union membership of 
374.100 The majority of East German composers seemed to feel that their organi-
zation should be a restricted, professional institution of fellow musical produc-
ers, and largely succeeded in maintaining this state of affairs. Cultural officials 
and the union leadership wanted to bring in more performers so as to influence 
them politically, but achieved negligible results. The central union and ministry 
authorities proved able to exclude composers they did not approve of, but had a 
much harder time actively including those performers they desired.
Adding performers to the Polish union was proposed on numerous occasions 
from at least 1947.101 Many in and sympathetic to the PZPR seemed to believe 
that select musicians could have positive political effects on the union; this situa-
tion was a reversal from that in the GDR, where the SED hoped the ideologically 
sound union would spread its influence. Deputy Minister Sokorski, for example, 
pushed in 1950 for the inclusion of performers in the ZKP so as to have a joint 
effort in the fight for socialist realism in music.102 Union President Rudziński 
proposed a Circle of Virtuosos or Performers within the ZKP in late 1950, but 
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this never got off the ground due to a lack of interest by the performers as well as 
fears among composers that it would change the nature of their union.103 Officials 
made further attempts in 1952 and 1953, but these foundered again on a lack of 
support from the performers themselves, surely combined with the lack of inter-
est by composers as well.104
As the ZKP as an institution grew increasingly resistant to party influence 
after 1952, cultural officials finally abandoned attempts to have performers 
included in the Composers’ Union, and instead mobilized the organization of 
performers into their own union.105 This Association of Polish Musical Artists 
(Stowarzyszenie Polskich Artystów Muzyków) was to serve as a counterweight 
to the less politically friendly ZKP in the musical life of Poland, and would help 
to educate musicians in the ideological program of the party, as well as to bring 
party-approved music to audiences all over the country.106 Throughout 1955, the 
Culture Department of the Central Committee, as well as a number of party-
member musicians, worked on the organization of this association, modeled 
largely on the ZKP.107 The main bone of contention was the association’s size, 
as some of the leading soloists wanted an elite organization to represent their 
interests, while the party and its musical allies desired a broad-based organization 
that would have wide influence and the numerical strength to counter the ZKP.108 
The latter vision prevailed, and while the projected 2000 to 2500 members never 
became reality, the association did include roughly 1300 members by 1964.109 It 
was dominated by musicians sympathetic to the party, but ultimately had little 
effect on composers or their work.
In both countries, a contentious fight for the ideological and professional na-
ture of the Composers’ Unions stretched across the stalinist period. In Poland, the 
PZPR and its allies in the union tried but failed to include performers, but initially 
did succeed in expanding membership to include more composers who were 
sympathetic to party goals. After 1952, however, a majority of Polish composers 
pushed for a smaller union made up of more technically proficient, independent-
minded composers in order to fulfill the overlapping goals of a more professional 
institution and diminished party influence. In the GDR, the advocates of a more 
exclusive membership of accomplished composers were the central union lead-
ers, who also desired a more professional body, but in order to maintain the influ-
ence of leading composers linked to the SED. Regional East German composers 
wanted to increase membership so as to assure an active union life out in the 
provinces, and found their aims often frustrated. In both countries, interestingly, 
the unions conducted a requalification, a process very similar to the contempo-
raneous examination and purges by the PZPR and SED of their respective party 
memberships. These efforts helped to create a more professional institution with 
fewer less-accomplished composers. In the GDR, this procedure also cemented 
the control of the union leadership and hence party influence, while the compos-
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ers in Poland turned the requalification back on the party, in effect manipulating 
it to purge the union of some sympathetic to the party’s aims. The effective use 
of this process after 1952 demonstrates how the majority of Polish composers 
had become disillusioned with the party’s program, and thus sought to secure 
their compositional autonomy by asserting their dominance in the union. In the 
East German union, the SED had broader support, and proved able to maintain its 
influence on the more narrow and professionalized VDK membership throughout 
the 1950s. The SED and its allies in the union leadership were only marginally 
successful in their attempt to use the tool of union membership to spread its in-
fluence among performers, however, and only had limited success in the face of 
opposition from the majority of union members. A professional organization con-
sisting overwhelmingly of composers, with a smaller number of musicologists, 
pertained in both countries.
The Ambiguous Role of Musicologists
It is a striking fact that nearly all major musicologists in both countries were 
closely linked to the parties and played central and indeed indispensable roles 
in asserting political and ideological influence over composers. Though more 
influential in the GDR, musicologists in both countries saw themselves as the 
prophets of the new doctrine of socialist realism, and were greeted by their com-
poser colleagues with initial acceptance followed by growing resentment due to 
their perceived dogmatism. Zofia Lissa in Poland and Ernst Hermann Meyer in 
the GDR were only the most prominent of the musicological supporters of both 
socialist realism and the parties’ political program for music. In the USSR, the 
Composers’ Union included both musicologists and composers in an effort to 
create an atmosphere of “creative stimulation,” which proved only partially suc-
cessful, and musicologists played a less prominent role overall there.110
ZKP: Significant Impact Gradually Reduced
A particularly contentious relationship developed between the musicologists and 
composers in Poland. An early, somewhat grudging acceptance by composers 
turned gradually to deepening frustration, and led to the eventual marginalization 
of party-linked musicologists within the ZKP. The prewar Association of Polish 
Composers had not included musicologists, and none were in fact at the founding 
congress of the new Composers’ Union in 1945. Zofia Lissa began agitating for 
their acceptance in 1947 and met with the ZKP’s Executive Committee to discuss 
this proposal, referring to the models of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 
both of which combined the two professions in one union.111 The Polish Ministry 
of Culture also advocated including musicologists, convinced that party ideo-
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logical goals would thus be advanced more effectively.112 These initiatives met 
some resistance, as composers feared the nature of their union would be altered 
by accepting noncomposers.113 ZKP leaders nonetheless agreed to introduce a 
resolution at the November 1948 Congress that would admit the musicologists, 
in light of the creative nature of both professions and of a need to have more 
people take part in the administration of the ZKP.114 A “gentleman’s agreement” 
was struck whereby it was understood that a musicologist would never become 
union president, but would rather occupy one of the vice-presidential positions.115 
Both President Piotr Perkowski and Executive Committee member Kazimierz 
Sikorski spoke on behalf of the proposal, but the anticommunist composer Ste-
fan Kisielewski demanded a secret ballot. Several other composers criticized 
Kisielewski for his potentially divisive request, but the anonymous vote went 
forward, with seventeen in favor, and the perhaps surprising number of seven 
against; this not inconsiderable resistance prefigured battles to come. The musi-
cologists, led by Lissa, consistently found themselves among the most ideologi-
cally engaged, and thus the naysayers were surely trying to keep these hardliners 
out of the union.
Indeed, the musicologists, and especially Zofia Lissa, formed the vanguard 
of the 1948-49 push for socialist realism and for more ideological engagement. In 
her speech at the Fifth Congress in June of 1950, she harshly criticized compos-
ers for not achieving sufficient ideological progress. In particular, she blamed the 
musicologists and especially herself for not making sufficiently clear the ideolog-
ical demands of the new socialist age.116 Deputy Minister Sokorski also criticized 
musicologists for not doing more to expose the “formalist, modernist language 
and cosmopolitan tendencies that have burdened our musical creations for many 
years.”117 He demanded that the musicologists do more to show composers the 
correct path. Rudziński took over the presidency of the ZKP at this congress, and 
an important plank of his ambitious ideological program was that musicologists 
should provide “great help, especially ideological.”118
Lissa led the efforts in the early 1950s to advance the program of socialist 
realism, and fought fiercely to push composers to take her advice. As noted above, 
by 1954 she began to soften aspects of her hard line, but this was not nearly enough 
to satisfy composers like Zbigniew Turski and Piotr Perkowski, who accused her 
of having instituted the hegemony of musicologists over composers and of being 
dictatorial and dogmatic.119 Perkowski also attacked her musicological colleague 
Mieczysław Drobner, who had demanded that composers not be allowed to exper-
iment with new compositional techniques, but should rather continue to compose 
in a socialist-realist style.120 Later in 1954, in a position piece written for the party 
where she excoriated composers for their reactionary tendencies, Lissa reported 
a “smear campaign” against herself and claimed that composers were specifically 
attacking the group of Warsaw musicologists she led.121
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Vitriol directed against the musicologists only increased at the Eighth Con-
gress of June 1955. Kazimierz Serocki, Grupa ’49 member and once committed to 
socialist realism, claimed to speak for many of his colleagues in saying that rela-
tions between composers and musicologists had hit a nadir. He accused all musi-
cologists, and especially Stefan Jarociński, of dogmatism, a lack of quality writing, 
and unclear advice with respect to composers’ work.122 Both Jarociński and Lissa 
attempted to defend themselves, but in a conciliatory manner, and Lissa even con-
ceded that their arrogance in prior years must have irritated composers.123 Several 
composers openly supported Serocki’s criticism, and even Sikorski, who stated 
that he had been one of the few advocates of including the musicologists in the 
ZKP in the first place, condemned Lissa and her colleagues for empty sloganeer-
ing and ideological demagoguery.124 Lissa’s weakened position seems to have had 
physical effects, as she suffered inflammation of the lungs in the winter of 1956-57, 
and recuperated in the friendlier atmosphere of the GDR the following summer.125
Tension rose up yet again at the Ninth Congress in early 1957. Turski in-
troduced a motion to allow for the potential separation of composers from their 
musicological colleagues into different unions.126 Sikorski opposed the proposal, 
but on the grounds that now no one felt threatened by the musicologists and thus 
it was unnecessary.127 Serocki echoed this opinion with the view that the days had 
passed when musicologists formed a court that rendered judgments against which 
composers could not defend themselves had passed.128 In view of the changed po-
litical circumstances and vastly increased autonomy of composers, he defended 
the right of musicologists to remain in the union and freely criticize its members, 
and the motion was not passed. Thus was the alleged hegemony of the musicolo-
gists over. After many years of attempted ideological domination by musicolo-
gists, composers felt themselves free to write largely as they wished.
VDK: Crucial and Enduring Influence
In the GDR, musicologists played a similar and even more influential role in the 
affairs of the Composers’ Union. Already before the VDK was founded in 1951, 
musicologists occupied a key position in the organization of musical life in the 
Soviet Zone; at one of the earliest meetings of party members involved in the 
musical world in late 1948, Ernst Hermann Meyer gave the main speech. Indeed, 
no discussion took place as to the appropriateness of including musicologists 
in the East German union; all seemed to feel it natural to have composers and 
musicologists under one roof, and indeed Meyer, as both musicologist and com-
poser, embodied the close links seen between the two professions. Meyer, Georg 
Knepler, Harry Goldschmidt, and Eberhard Rebling were only the most active 
of a group of ideologically engaged musicologists who held important positions 
within the VDK and took an active role in discussions on music and politics. But 
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as in Poland, a significant and growing number of composers opposed the politi-
cal and aesthetic dominance of the musicologists in the course of the 1950s.
Meyer, especially, saw himself and was seen as the voice of communist musi-
cology in the GDR. His book Musik im Zeitgeschehen (Music in Current Events, 
1952) laid the foundations for socialist realism in music, and he gave important 
lectures at each congress that sought both to formulate the concept and to encour-
age composers to work in this style. In his perhaps most (in)famous proclama-
tion, at the First Congress in 1952, he claimed the role of “a guide, a lighthouse” 
in helping composers to find the proper path to create an art that would “develop 
a new, socialist, and democratic consciousness in [the] people.”129 Fellow musi-
cologists Knepler, Rebling, and Goldschmidt made lengthy contributions to the 
congress discussions, and each criticized many of the contemporary works per-
formed at the related concerts. Some leading composers like Hanns Eisler and 
Paul Dessau reacted negatively to this criticism, but at this point most composers 
viewed the musicologists as a useful source of information on the new aesthetic 
paradigm of socialist realism.130 Union leaders supported this role for the musi-
cologists, and encouraged them to focus their scholarly activity on contemporary 
music in order to ideologically influence composers.131
Georg Knepler giving a speech entitled “The example of the Soviet Union with respect to the 
critical treatment and development of cultural heritage in the realm of music” at the House 
of Soviet Culture in Berlin on the occasion of the Month of German-Soviet Friendship on 
November 3, 1951 (BArch 183-12439-0031 / photographer: Hans-Günter Quaschinsky).
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A significant number of composers increasingly opposed such a role for the 
musicologists, and these differing opinions came into open conflict during the 
1954 Congress. Meyer, Knepler, and Goldschmidt dominated the first few days 
of the meeting, which reached a climax at the end of day three with a long speech 
about socialist realism given by Goldschmidt, followed by Meyer recapitulating 
his ideas in fourteen theses on socialist realism. The next day, composer Wilhelm 
Neef vigorously opposed this dominant role for the musicologists, as he fiercely 
attacked Goldschmidt’s claim that the musicologists had superior knowledge, 
and also rejected Meyer’s idea that the musicologists should guide composers. 
He received strong applause from a section of the congress participants.132 First, 
Secretary Notowicz tried to finesse the issue by claiming that both composers and 
musicologists should critique the development of contemporary music.133 Max 
Butting rejected the idea of having musicologists in the VDK at all, as he felt they 
had not helped composers.134 Nonetheless, in 1955 the musicologists planned to 
continue to develop the aesthetic postulates of socialist realism, and vowed to 
“support our composer colleagues in every way in creating a new realistic mu-
sic.”135 Meyer and Goldschmidt continued to press their claim for a leadership 
role with respect to aesthetic guidance by pushing the socialist-realist line against 
a growing desire for experimentation, expressed especially in the statements of 
younger composers like Neef and Siegfried Köhler.136
The tension between some composers and these musicologists reached a 
high point in early 1956, and the musicologists chose to moderate their position. 
Composers Kurt Schwaen, Paul Dessau, and Gerhard Wohlgemuth criticized mu-
sicologists, and especially Meyer, for trying to restrict their compositional free-
dom.137 Meyer apologized for his past intolerance, and fellow musicologist Georg 
Knepler also claimed that musicologists had never been “against” composers, but 
had rather attempted to guide them while still allowing autonomy.138 Knepler also 
admitted mistakes, but defended himself by saying he had owned up to them, and 
that he was being critical in a way that all should have been. Though the leading 
musicologists planned to take a greater role at the 1957 Congress in an attempt 
to influence the debate in favor of a harder line, their voices remained generally 
muted. A tacit compromise seems to have been reached, as henceforth musicolo-
gists continued to advise, though now less dogmatically and intrusively.
Though more influential in the GDR, musicologists in both countries played 
crucial roles as messengers of the parties’ goals with respect to the composition 
of new music. These musicologists saw themselves in the quasi-messianic posi-
tion of bringing the vision of socialist-realist music to their composer colleagues. 
They represent another important and compelling stratum in the music world, 
straddling the worlds of party activists, creators of new culture, and shapers of 
the new society. Most composers were willing to engage this new ideology in the 
early postwar years and looked to musicologists for some measure of guidance, 
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but soon grew increasingly frustrated by their strident dogmatism, and pushed for 
a reduction in their influence so as to have more space for compositional freedom.
Audition Concerts
Another key flashpoint in union life proved to be concerts that premiered new 
works. From the perspective of their members, perhaps the most important func-
tion of the Polish and East German Composers’ Unions consisted of helping get 
new music performed. The parties, and their close allies among the union leaders, 
naturally also took a great interest in promoting those composers who embraced 
the parties’ program. The professional goal of premiering new compositions at 
times clashed with the political aim of a party-controlled music. In general, com-
posers simply wanted their works performed as quickly and frequently as pos-
sible, while the parties attempted to exert political influence over the production 
and performance of new music. The union bodies that dealt with this crucial issue 
provide a fascinating site for an examination of the tension between the union’s 
role as a representative of the collective interests of its members and its function 
as a transmission belt for party directives. The genre sections and commissions in 
both countries discussed and promoted new works, and were loosely modeled on 
the Soviet template. There, for most of the union’s existence, composers perceived 
them as professional bodies essential to the creative process. Some of these Soviet 
composers, notably Shostakovich, resented this peer review, but others were en-
thusiastic and most were willing to participate.139 In Poland, they became powerful 
and controversial sites for forging and disseminating the music of the era.
ZKP: Performance Becomes Depoliticized
In Poland, the ZKP made diverse efforts to have new works performed, most 
directly by organizing occasional concerts as well as attempting to influence or-
chestra directors.140 Beginning in late 1949, the ministry pushed the union to co-
ordinate other concerts to present the newer, party-approved works and discuss 
their socialist-realist and antiformalist merits with composers.141 In this spirit, 
union president Rudziński attempted in 1950 to institute a politicized system for 
performing and reviewing new works in conjunction with the first Festival of 
Polish Music, as he set up eleven sections organized by musical genre.142 Across 
the country, section meetings took place to help educate composers in the proper 
style of socialist realism through discussion of recent music open to the public.143 
Rudziński saw the resulting audition concerts (przesłuchania): “as a direct site 
for the fight for socialist realism, as an expression of our times, as an instrument 
for the education of the masses, [and] as a ‘factory of joy,’ based on a progressive, 
classical musical tradition.”144 He complained, however, that many of the leading 
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composers, especially his prominent colleagues on the ZKP Executive Commit-
tee, declined to participate. Newspaper articles from the time describe mixed suc-
cess at best, since many of the audition concerts lacked satisfactory discussion, 
allegedly due to the absence of workers and other engaged listeners.145 Starting in 
January 1951, only some of these audition concerts remained open to the public, 
while others were restricted to composers.146
After the first festival preparations and Rudziński’s ignominious resignation 
as union president in summer 1951, and combined with the considerable lack of 
interest among composers, this system of audition concerts became somewhat 
reduced and less systematized. The union Prezydium attempted to reactivate the 
sections on several occasions, but to little avail; the relatively small number of 
roughly 40 works appeared annually in both open and closed audition concerts 
in 1952 and 1953.147 The ZKP organized a large number of concerts in 1954-55 
in preparation for the second Festival of Polish Music, especially with respect 
to light and dance music.148 At this time, the new, more independent Prezydium 
elected in 1954 abandoned the practice of public audition concerts, but did at-
tempt to institute a system whereby all new works would be performed and 
discussed in closed sessions with other composers in advance of a public perfor-
mance.149 This practice was not always followed, and was rejected completely 
with respect to symphonic works in June 1955, as the ZKP Executive Committee 
claimed such “discussion auditions” benefited no one and were “nothing short 
of a holdover from the time when higher-ups attempted to suggest the direction 
in which composers should develop their works.”150 Audition concerts of other 
kinds of music disappeared by 1956 as well, since composers generally regarded 
them as tainted by an earlier era of dogmatism.151
The ZKP, however, continued to organize regular concerts for the new works 
of its members, especially with respect to the Warsaw Autumn festival beginning 
in 1956. There was a crucial difference, however, in that new works immediately 
premiered for public consumption rather than being subjected first to potentially 
politicized audition concerts. After early attempts by the party and its allies in the 
union produced some marginal successes, by the mid-1950s political interference 
through the medium of audition concerts had ended, largely due to a weakened 
party and lack of composer participation.
VDK: Hierarchical Structure Promotes Party Control
The East German union, with its larger membership and more elaborate bureau-
cratic structure, developed a more complex and thorough system for performing 
and discussing newly composed works. At the regional level, and similar to the 
practice nationally in Poland, composers organized themselves into sections de-
voted to the various genres of music.152 Not every genre was represented in each 
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region, as a sufficient number of union members simply did not exist throughout 
the country.153 During genre section meetings, members discussed and evaluated 
new works by fellow section members performed on the piano, played by a local 
orchestra, or heard on tape. They also talked about related works from the USSR 
and other people’s democracies, and had ideological discussions based on materi-
als sent by the Stakuko.
The preliminary evaluations of new works were then sent from the genre 
sections on to national genre commissions for consideration. These commis-
sions comprised one member from each region, and met roughly every month to 
make decisions that had considerable impact on fellow composers. As with the 
sections, the genre commissions evaluated works by looking at scores, playing 
excerpts on the piano, listening to recordings, and organizing discussion con-
certs, sometimes with the participation of workers.154 The commissions were to 
influence the development of music in their particular genre by choosing works 
for inclusion at festivals as well as those to be recommended for publication and 
recording and were thus extremely important for determining the nature of the 
music promoted and performed in the GDR.155 The party-linked VDK Executive 
Committee particularly pushed this aspect of the commissions’ work, as it wanted 
them to be leading bodies in the education of union members through the use of 
both positive and negative examples.156
In practice, these genre commissions became a site of constant controversy 
and ill feeling among the rank-and-file union members. Composers complained 
that they operated too slowly and that months would elapse before the relevant 
genre commission would approve a particular work for publication or perfor-
mance.157 In a rare instance of discord between union leaders and cultural offi-
cials, Stakuko representative Uszkoreit pressed the union to do more to improve 
the functioning of the commissions. He was furious at the cavalier treatment of 
some composers he thought worthy, and even threatened to take his complaints 
public to show how poorly he felt the union supported some of its members.158
More contentious, however, was the general power of the genre commissions 
to promote or reject works. In a common criticism, the Leipzig union blasted the 
commissions for evaluating works in a random, overly subjective, and schematic 
manner and for judging the overwhelming majority of works negatively.159 It as-
serted that the genre commissions left composers with only two options: either 
to do exactly what the commissions wanted, which it claimed would lead to mu-
sical life becoming stultifyingly uniform, or simply to leave the union. These 
Leipzig composers advocated giving the regional genre sections more autonomy 
and authority with respect to the commissions and abandoning the dual system 
of evaluation, by both sections and commissions, which created an alleged stu-
dent-teacher relationship. First Secretary Notowicz addressed these criticisms at 
the Second Congress in 1954 by attempting to beat back the challenge from the 
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Leipzig composers. He granted that the commissions should take their work more 
seriously and include the relevant individual composers during discussions of 
their compositions but asserted that regional composers enjoyed effective rep-
resentation since each genre commission had a member from every region. Fur-
thermore, he maintained that the commissions were the most qualified bodies 
to undertake evaluations, since their membership consisted of specialists in that 
particular genre from across the country.160 Siegfried Köhler, the president of the 
Leipzig union, reiterated earlier claims that the sections should have more power 
since they had more time to evaluate individual works, while the commissions 
met less frequently and gave more superficial judgments. He railed against the 
idea that the genre commissions were somehow more qualified, and advocated 
a division of responsibility where the sections would evaluate works while the 
commissions attempted to get them performed and published.161 Despite “lively 
applause” after Köhler’s speech, Notowicz gave little ground and simply asserted 
that the commissions should be strengthened.162
As seen in other areas, many composers felt the union leadership contributed 
to problems in this process. Max Butting thought the union’s central authorities 
had too much power over the genre commissions, and he advocated that com-
mission leaders should be chosen by each commission’s members rather than the 
VDK’s Executive Committee.163 A number of composers at the Third Congress in 
1957 complained bitterly about how the union leadership ignored decisions made 
by the commissions in deciding upon a program for the second all-German music 
festival in 1956, a situation that had happened before. Siegfried Kurz, Wolfgang 
Hohensee, and Fred Lohse demanded that the genre commissions have more 
authority with respect to the Sekretariat, but Notowicz adroitly deflected these 
demands.164 And thus typically, despite the pressures of a significant number of 
composers, the influence of the union leadership—and hence the party—per-
sisted.
Both the ZKP and VDK had bodies that possessed important powers to eval-
uate and promote the works of their members. And the Polish sections as well 
as East German commissions tried to propagate the party’s vision of acceptably 
political music. In Poland, the more independent composers asserted ever more 
control and abolished the use of genre sections as well as the related audition 
concerts for political purposes. In the GDR, the party-linked Union Executive 
proved able to maintain its influence over the work of the genre commissions 
despite often furious complaints from a significant number of union members.
Conclusion
In their dual role representing composer interests and also transmitting the direc-
tives and wishes of cultural officials, the Composers’ Unions constitute one of the 
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main focal points of this study as sites where the overlapping aims of the ruling 
party met those of musical elites. Here, the new socialist culture was forged col-
laboratively. The diverse array of composers and musicologists who made up the 
unions had considerable autonomy and significant influence in deciding on most 
aspects of their professional lives. These composers engaged in complex negotia-
tions with each other, their union leadership, and cultural officials in myriad areas 
relating to the composition and performance of new music.
Important disparities between the countries existed, however, largely due to 
differing relative strengths of these various shifting, overlapping interest groups. 
In Poland, cultural officials began trying to influence the ZKP in earnest only in 
1948, after the union had been operating largely autonomously for several years. 
Composers initially welcomed this added attention, accompanied as it was by 
increased funding for composition and performances, and were also attracted to 
the PZPR’s goal of spreading music throughout the country. Party control peaked 
in 1950-51 when one of its sympathizers, Witold Rudziński, was elected ZKP 
president, even while party members like the musicologist Zofia Lissa exerted 
considerable influence over union life. The initial enthusiasm for the party’s pro-
gram among many composers began to ebb and increasingly turn sour as control 
became ever more invasive and officials pushed composers to write in a more 
dogmatic socialist-realist manner that reduced autonomy and creativity. A grow-
ing majority of Polish composers then began actively to resist the party’s goals, 
in part through an assertion of professional oversight and norms. The influence of 
both the hardline musicologists and composers with party membership receded, 
as did the PZPR’s interventions into union affairs. By the mid-1950s, more inde-
pendent-minded composers had effectively taken over the leadership of the ZKP, 
and succeeded in marginalizing both party sympathizers and ideological influ-
ence more generally. Save for the most basic expressions of fealty, the Compos-
ers’ Union in Poland had emancipated itself from the political control of the party.
The situation in the GDR differed considerably. The VDK organized itself 
on the initiative of the party, thus undercutting potential independence, and its 
leadership strongly supported SED aims while a significant number of its mem-
bers held party cards. Occasional challenges to the ruling consensus emanated 
from provincial centers, especially Leipzig, but were effectively staved off with 
only minor concessions. Most composers broadly agreed with the SED’s aims 
in the political realm, and accepted its influence. The party, through its allies on 
the VDK Executive Committee, largely retained the ability to shape union policy 
and to regulate the membership base of the union in its favor. Cultural officials 
maintained significant political control and ideological influence over composers 
through and beyond 1957.
In the first decade after the war, the PZPR and SED invested enormous politi-
cal and monetary capital in establishing influence over the Composers’ Unions. In 
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the early years in Poland, and for much of the period in East Germany, composers 
actively cooperated in propagating the parties’ vision of a new socialist society. 
A complicated negotiating process was always present, and composers in both 
countries proved able to modify and shape political directives. In Poland, com-
posers eventually achieved nearly full autonomy, while their GDR counterparts 
obtained a more limited compositional freedom even as they continued to support 
the party more generally. In both countries, a more professionalized Composers’ 
Union emerged, but the only the SED proved able to deploy these developments 
effectively to its advantage, while Polish composers used it to emancipate them-
selves from political influence. A specific area where this dynamic is displayed is 
in the area of commissioning works, explored in detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Struggle over Commissions
During the stalinist era, the creative process met political aims in a drama both 
public and private. Cultural officials and composers contested and negotiated the 
crucial artistic decision to undertake a new musical work. The parties in both 
Poland and the GDR sought to claim this moment for political ends, both to as-
sert control over composers and to influence the music and its messages that then 
percolated through society. As we have seen, composers often proved willing to 
create ideological works but also successfully preserved a measure of creative 
autonomy. The commissioning of works was thus a flashpoint for the relationship 
between power and creative production.
The money made available by the state for commissions was of great im-
portance for securing composers’ material existence. Under a system where the 
party dominated the concert hall, radio, and music publishing, composers had 
limited options to support their creative efforts. Although most held steady jobs 
at conservatories and universities or as directors and conductors of musical en-
sembles, state-directed funding for their compositions meant a more comfortable 
existence as well as the related prestige of a commission, and these factors held 
a considerable attraction for composers. The SED and PZPR provided generous 
sums for new contemporary works, but tried to commission music that fit their 
political aims. The majority of composers found enough common ground so that 
they composed the kind of music the party desired and they also deemed worthy. 
In both Poland and the GDR, a continual and at times fraught struggle for control 
of the initial funding decision through the composition process to final approval 
took place among fluctuating groups within and among ministry and party of-
ficials, the union leadership, and individual composers.
Commissions came from a number of different sources during this period, 
in a strikingly different and more basic system than the USSR’s Muzfond, which 
supplied a vast infrastructure to support Soviet composers’ material and pro-
fessional needs.1 In both Poland and the GDR, the committee responsible for 
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contracts and commissions was the most prominent coordinating body, and it de-
pended upon funding from various state institutions. This committee consisted of 
composers and cultural officials, and was a site of contestation and negotiation, as 
well as the focus of both composer and party dissatisfaction. In Poland for a short 
period around 1950, another important source of commissions was a generous 
stipend system that supported compositions for the first Festival of Polish Music. 
A final major type of commission was that of contests, which the state used as a 
means to solicit the kinds of works it desired.
All these forms of commissioning reveal a fluid, contested process in both 
countries throughout the early Cold War years. Composers initially garnered 
commissions through a decentralized and somewhat random process, from a va-
riety of state sources. A committee responsible for commissions then emerged in 
both countries to coordinate funding, and thereby standardized this procedure. 
Although state and party officials attempted to maintain influence over this com-
mittee, the Polish and East German Composers’ Unions successfully asserted 
a claim to professional oversight over the commissioning process, which had 
largely borne fruit by the mid-1950s, when contracting and evaluating works 
rested largely in the hands of the unions. The practical outcome of these de-
velopments proved to be quite different, however. In Poland, as with respect to 
union affairs more generally, composer control combined with frustration over 
dogmatic party interference resulted in full autonomy from political influence. In 
the GDR, a politically loyal union leadership fused a professionalization of the 
commissioning process with significant political loyalty and thus helped to en-
sure that contracts with an ideological thrust continued to be granted and fulfilled.
Cooperation, then Composer Autonomy in Poland
Contrary to the retrospective claims of many composers, nearly all Polish com-
posers eagerly accepted commissions to create socialist-realist works during this 
period. Especially around 1950, they willingly composed the kinds of music the 
party desired, as they took part in politicized song contests, proposed ideological 
works to commemorate Stalin’s 70th birthday, accepted stipends for the politically 
inflected first Festival of Polish Music, and more generally vied for funding of 
their compositional activity. Increasingly, however, they grew reluctant to follow 
the PZPR’s drive to push through a rigid program of commissioning works that 
fit a narrowly defined socialist-realist paradigm. By the mid-1950s, a large major-
ity of Polish composers wanted increased compositional freedom and the right 
to experiment, and succeeded in taking control over the commissioning process 
by asserting their professional demands and authority against a weakening party.
Especially in the late 1940s, party officials frequently employed the inge-
nious but unreliable method of contests as a way to solicit large numbers of de-
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sired works from composers. This strategy was particularly favored in the case of 
mass songs, which the party prized for their supposed ideological effects on the 
broader population. The ministry helped to organize a first major contest in 1948 
and offered sizeable prize money, attracting over 400 entries but producing less 
than impressive results.2 Some contests had a more subtle message, as in the case 
of one in 1949 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of Alexander Pushkin’s 
birth and thereby promote a positive view of Russians and Russian culture. First 
place went to Alfred Gradstein with A Winter Evening (Wieczór zimowy) and sec-
ond to Witold Lutosławski for Avalanche (Lawina). Most contests, however, had 
more explicitly political themes.
A particularly ideological example involved the commemoration of the De-
cember 1948 unification of the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Workers’ 
Party into the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), a key development in the 
formation of the stalinist political system. Leading composer Andrzej Panufnik 
won the first prize and the large sum of 70,000 złoty for his Song of the United 
Party.3 In his English-language autobiography written in the late 1980s, Panufnik 
tries to explain away his involvement, as he does in so many other areas of his 
artistic and political life during this period. In this case, he relates that musicolo-
gist and party member Zofia Lissa blackmailed him into producing the song, and 
that she made the unlikely threat that the Composers’ Union would lose state 
support without his participation. He writes that he cannily plotted to compose a 
song to show involvement in an unavoidable situation, but with a submission of 
such substandard quality that he would surely not win.4
In reality, the circumstances were quite different, and show Panufnik’s eager-
ness to involve himself—as did many composers in this and other similar situa-
tions—in this competition with highly ideological implications. Culture Ministry 
officials invited 20 or so composers to take part, but only 15 did so, indicating 
that participation was not mandatory.5 Some composers on the original list of in-
vitees did not submit any songs, while others not on the original list, such as cel-
ebrated contemporary Grażyna Bacewicz, did take part—a somewhat surprising 
event, as it has long been thought that she wrote no explicitly politicized works 
or mass songs. Her song was not one of the nine finalists, thus indicating that a 
prestigious name was not a guarantee of success.6
Strikingly, Panufnik was one of only six composers to write music for each of 
the three texts, by well-known poets, that the competition organizers suggested. 
His winning song was Song of the United Party (Pieśń Zjednoczonej Partii) to 
a text by Leopold Lewin; the other texts were Song of Unity (Pieśń Jedności) 
with text by Stanisław Wygodzki, and Onward, Working People (Naprzód ludu 
roboczy) by Leon Pasternak.7 Panufnik’s choice to compose three songs hardly 
represents the efforts of someone trying to lose, and is certainly not consistent 
with the autobiography’s claim that he “composed a song ‘on my knee,’ literally 
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in a few minutes.”8 His winning entry was indeed simple but not uninteresting, 
and rather typical for the mass songs of the day. Furthermore, Panufnik modified 
some of the lyrics to accommodate better his compositional scheme, which fur-
ther demonstrates that he took the project seriously. Alfred Gradstein won second 
place in a contest that set a template for others to come.
Unlike the occasional contests, the most reliable stream of commissions came 
from a number of state-affiliated sources and were subject to some influence from 
the Composers’ Union. Already in 1945 the Ministry of Culture gave 200,000 
złoty to the ZKP’s short-lived precursor to commission works from composers.9 
The first centralized dispensing of state money to support and promote composi-
tional activity, however, did not get underway until late 1947, when the Council 
of State decided to make one million złoty available for the “dissemination and 
popularization of quality popular music.”10 Nearly all well-known composers re-
ceived money to compose one or more songs or short instrumental works.11
This initial ad hoc committee then became a more regular Commissions 
and Purchases Committee made up of composers, musicologists, and ministry 
officials, and thus represented a mix of interests that made for a deliberative 
body with a fair amount of autonomy.12 It gave out another 420,000 złoty over 
the next two years for a total of 216 new works from 62 different composers, 
followed by another 1.07 million złoty for another nearly 300 works before the 
end of the committee’s first incarnation in December 1951.13 For the last phase, 
this works out to a monthly subsidy of at least 1200 złoty per composer, and 
that would of course be in addition to other state funding, royalty payments, 
performance fees, or money from the pedagogical or conducting jobs that most 
composers had.14 When the average industrial worker was earning 480 złoty per 
month and the engineer 810 złoty at this time, composers lived comparatively 
well indeed.15
Although the Commissions Committee was placed under the authority of the 
ZKP, the ministry maintained great influence on its activities; it was referred to 
as a “country within a country” to emphasize its relative autonomy with respect 
to the union.16 The committee reserved the right to propose the kind of works 
composers should produce, and its members from the ministry at times pushed 
for composers to write works in certain favored genres.17 During its first year of 
activity in 1948, most composers agreed that the committee should have consid-
erable influence over commissioning decisions, in acknowledgment of the fact 
that the state provided the funds.18
Zygmunt Mycielski, who at this time served in leadership positions of the 
Composers’ Union, provided continuity in the commissioning process through-
out the entire period.19 As one of the main figures on the committee, he played a 
key role in granting commissions, and worked for many years to help realize the 
party’s goal of a politically inflected contemporary music. But he also tried to 
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take his fellow composers’ wishes into account, and as disillusionment with the 
party’s aims became increasingly apparent, he helped to assert greater composer 
autonomy over the commissioning process.
The Stalin 70th Birthday Campaign
In the aftermath of the August 1949 Łagów conference, which had called on 
composers to engage creatively with socialist realism and envisioned a large-
scale festival to feature such works, the Commissions Committee undertook a 
massive campaign to fulfill the new cultural-political aims. At the curiously late 
dates of December 11 and 16, 1949, an expanded meeting of the committee 
decided to solicit musical works in honor of Stalin’s 70th birthday, coming but a 
very short time later on December 22.20 Union president and committee member 
Zygmunt Mycielski sent a letter to all union members, asking them to write large 
or small vocal works to texts from a book of collected verse, Strofy o Stalinie 
(Poems on Stalin), about to be published.21 Most composers expressed their will-
ingness to participate, and Mycielski put out a press release that 60 composers 
had indeed done so—including many of the most well-known composers like 
Lutosławski, who wrote a letter expressing his willingness to write a piece with 
a text on Stalin.22
While typical of composer activity at the time, Lutosławski’s personal in-
volvement here is particularly striking given that the composer claimed non-in-
volvement in stalinist politics, maintaining in his later years: “The very thought 
that many people believed me to have collaborated with the regime is bitterly pain-
ful to me . . . I’ve never been disposed to make a compromise.”23 Such an asser-
tion is surely untenable given Lutosławski’s many political mass songs described 
in the first chapter.24 More compromising still is the short, three-movement work 
July Garland (Lipcowy wieniec), written earlier in 1949 to commemorate the 
fifth anniversary of the manifesto of July 22, 1944, when Moscow-backed Polish 
communists and their allies announced plans for a liberated Poland, and which 
Poles celebrated during the communist era as the national holiday.25 Consonant 
with these contemporary activities, Lutoskławski wrote in a handwritten letter 
dated December 14: “In response to the letter of December 12, 1949, I announce 
my participation in the ZKP’s action for the celebration of Joseph Stalin’s 70th 
birthday through the composition of a work based on one of the texts mentioned 
in the letter.”26
The next Commissions Committee meeting in late March discussed 
Lutosławski’s proposal and granted him 6000 zł for a cantata, a sum signifi-
cantly above the range suggested in the December meeting.27 The fate of this 
proposed work is unclear, although several possibilities exist. One, of course, 
is that Lutoskławski simply changed his mind and chose not to write it. Such a 
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decision would mesh with an anecdote Lutosławski related in his later years, in 
which he claims to have refused Deputy Minister Sokorski’s wish that he write 
a political cantata—a rather incongruous refusal given the recent July Garland 
as well as this letter indicating his willingness.28 But perhaps he did indeed com-
pose this cantata, and the work simply disappeared in the intervening decades; 
a confusing anecdote gives some credence to this hypothesis. During a series of 
interviews around 1990, Lutosławski related an episode from the early 1980s, 
when an actress alleged that he had written, some years before, a cantata about 
Stalin. He explained this away by referring to a series of events decades earlier 
linked to a supposed mass song “O broni pancernoj (sic)” (About the Armor), for 
which he claimed a substitute text on Stalin had been submitted. This supposed 
mass song is likely the third movement of the aforementioned July Garland, but 
it is also possible that the actress was in fact referring to a piece about Stalin that 
Lutosławski indeed indicated he was willing to write—though it does seem un-
likely that it was in fact composed, since no concrete trace of the work has been 
found.29 A final possibility is that this cantata is the same as the recently discov-
ered short cantata Glory to Warsaw! (Warszawie-sława!).30
While officials and the ZKP leadership strongly encouraged composers to 
take part in the Stalin birthday campaign, such participation was by no means 
compulsory.31 Some composers, like Feliks Wróbel, simply claimed they were 
too busy, while others received funding at this time for works unrelated to the 
Stalin campaign, as in the case of Grażyna Bacewicz, who was granted 3900 zł 
for a cycle of Polish dances.32 It would seem that most composers were willing, 
and many indeed eager, to support the party’s drive to create a socialist-realist 
music in praise of Stalin.
Commissioning a Socialist-Realist Festival Program
The commissioning for the Stalin birthday campaign merged with an astonish-
ingly complex and generous initiative to fund works related to the sprawling 1951 
first Festival of Polish Music.33 This and other music festivals will be treated in 
the next chapter, but a discussion of the commissioning process for this important 
festival appears here. The Ministry of Culture spearheaded the immense 1950 
campaign to commission for the Festival, and kept close control over the process. 
Deputy Minister Sokorski encouraged the composition of socialist-realist music 
among musical elites quite open to doing so. Polish composers responded by 
producing over 300 new works, a staggering number for a union with under a 
hundred members.34
Cultural officials viewed the first Festival of Polish Music as the instantiation 
of the aesthetic tenets laid down at the 1949 Łagów conference, where socialist 
realism was strongly encouraged as the preferred form of musical expression.35 
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The politically engaged union President Witołd Rudziński called the festival an 
opportunity “to see how far composers had pushed themselves ahead in their 
battle for socialist realism.”36 Officials conceptualized the festival as “the next 
step in the fight for a new music along a socialist-realist line,” and calls for so-
cialist-realist works were one of the constant themes during the preparation for 
and reaction to the festival.37 Deputy Minister Sokorski formulated the party’s 
plan for the festival thus:
We desire to create an environment in which composers search and fight for 
simplicity in their works, for new emotion, and for new means of expres-
sion. This atmosphere of battle is essential, and we will not be afraid if this 
battle intensifies during the festival, for this is exactly what it is all about. 
If composers have the ambition to move forward, the festival will certainly 
aid them in breaking with an outdated musical language and in defeating 
formalist accretions . . . it is about making the jump to the new standard of a 
socialist-realist music.38
The party saw the festival as an ideal opportunity to make progress towards the 
goal of encouraging composers to produce the music it wanted. Officials con-
ceived of the festival as a pedagogical process for composers, a kind of crucible 
through which they would reinvent themselves as artists in the nascent socialist 
reality. These aggressive metaphors abounded at the time, but their striking appli-
cation to the musical world demonstrates both the party’s ambitions for the cre-
ation of a socialist society as well as the importance of music in its formation. The 
PZPR desired principally vocal works like cantatas and mass songs with ideolog-
ical content linked to current issues, such as the struggle for peace, the Six-Year 
Plan, friendship between the People’s Democracies and the Soviet Union, the 
showpiece industrial town of Nowa Huta, and the “new” countryside.39 Almost 
without exception, composers answered the party’s calls for a “new standard” of 
music to be showcased at the festival.40
The festival commissioning process proved to be highly unusual in the 
nearly absolute control Sokorski exercised, as well as in its use of several-month 
stipends rather than lump sums for an agreed-upon work. The Deputy Minister 
discussed this system of stipends and vacation time for festival commissions with 
the union leaders in early 1950.41 Soon after, union president Zygmunt Mycielski 
sent out a letter to composers querying both the works they planned to compose 
for the festival and their potential requests for support.42 He noted that these sti-
pends were not the only source of funding for festival works, and indeed, the 
Commissions Committee continued separately to contract for works, including 
some supposedly already covered by the ministry stipends.43 The stipends were 
in monthly amounts of 600, 900, or 1200 zł, and totaled the considerable sum of 
206,939 zł.44 Deputy Minister Sokorski made sole, unilateral decisions on the 
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amount and length of the monthly stipends through handwritten notes on the pro-
posals.45 In total, 48 composers—an overwhelming majority that included almost 
every composer of any significance—received monetary stipends for periods of 
two months to a year.46 Astonishingly, Sokorski turned down not a single com-
poser nor requested an alternate proposal for any reason, political or otherwise.47 
Save for a small amount of favoritism for several composers who composed 
highly ideological works, Sokorski’s decisions were fair minded and generally 
linked to the prestige and competence of the composer rather than the theme of 
the composition—meaning that those composers who chose politicized themes 
did so on their own, with party encouragement but without coercion.
The situation of Stefan Kisielewski provides further evidence that compos-
ers were not forced to align themselves with the ideological program of the party. 
Kisielewski, a Catholic intellectual from Kraków and one of the PZPR’s most 
outspoken opponents both within and beyond the musical world, was the only 
notable absence in this stipend system, but even he received a commission for 
a Symphonic Scherzo from the Commissions Committee at this time. Discus-
sions had taken place about whether he should get the funding, but the com-
mittee “[took] the view that it is not necessary to stop the further development 
of Kisielewski’s compositional production through withholding commissions.”48 
Although the party did punish his intransigence by shutting down his influential 
music journal Ruch Muzyczny at the end of 1949, his colleagues and the union 
leadership consistently intervened successfully on his behalf to protect his ability 
to compose.
In his decisions on stipend allocation, Sokorski generally gave the least-
known composers the lowest monthly amount, and the most prominent the high-
est, of 1200 zł per month. The most numerous group, that consisting of either 
younger or lesser-known senior composers, received stipends of 600, or usually 
900 zł, per month. For example, Karol Rund Zdenko received 900 zł for several 
short works, Walerian Gniot 1800 zł over two months for some folk and regional 
songs and an overture, Jerzy Młodziejowski 1800 zł for a cantata To Work (Do ro-
boty) and Hey, young man! (Hejze młody), and Władysław Walentynowicz 1800 
zł for at least four choral and orchestral works thematically linked to the Gdańsk 
region.49
The surprising presence in this less prestigious grouping of some prominent 
younger composers, especially the Grupa ’49 advocates of socialist realism, was 
later mitigated by subsequent funding. In addition to his original three months 
at 900 zł per month for a wind quartet and suite of nocturnes, Jan Krenz was 
given another 2400 zł, which likely represented two extra months at the top rate.50 
He also received the exceedingly generous amount of 9000 zł from the union’s 
Commissions Committee at this time for his monumental cantata for two large 
choirs representing Warsaw and Moscow, Conversation of Two Cities (Rozmowa 
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Dwóch Miast), for a grand total of 14,100 zł for his festival efforts.51 Kazimierz 
Serocki received a long stipend of six months for a piano concerto, a cantata on 
the Warsaw region, Mazowsze, and Symphonic Images (Obrazy symfoniczne).52 
Slated also to acquire a union commission for a cantata on peace, Serocki saw 
this cancelled due the lack of a text from the poet Władysław Broniewski.53 That 
unfulfilled commission may have been replaced with his cantata Warsaw Brick-
layer (Murarz warszawski), which won a festival prize.54
Perhaps the best known of the Grupa ‘49 composers, Tadeusz Baird, received 
10,500 zł total for his festival works. This amount represented an additional 1800 
zł on top of his original, three-month grant of 2700 zł for a symphony in C-major, 
a suite of four dances from the Radom region, and a suite for string orchestra.55 
As part of the Stalin birthday campaign, he had expressed his willingness to write 
a large choral work on the suggested texts, and he was granted a further 6000 zł 
by the union’s Commissions Committee for a cantata Song about Stalin (Pieśń o 
Stalinie) in September 1950, which almost certainly became the cantata Song of 
Revolution (Pieśń o Rewolucji) and premiered in the summer of 1951.56 Despite 
its promising content, it was heavily criticized at an audition concert in the fall; 
the communist musicologists Lissa and Łobaczewska considered the music too 
tragic and dark, and it seems to have been rarely performed thereafter.57
Fellow young composer and future world-renowned conductor Stanisław 
Skrowaczewski received a three-month stipend to work on a string symphony 
and some songs, as well as a cantata A Word on Stalin (Słowo o Stalinie).58 The 
latter grew out of the Stalin birthday commissions as well, and was to be remu-
nerated with 4500 zł, later raised to 6000 zł by the Commissions Committee.59 
This work almost certainly developed into the Cantata on Peace (Kantata o po-
koju), based still on the Broniewski poem about Stalin, which premiered after 
the festival in May 1952, and won a prestigious state prize (third level) in early 
1953. The first section portrays the nineteenth-century working class movement, 
and the second the 1905 revolution, the events of 1917, and the battle of Stalin-
grad. In the third movement, a solo soprano sings in a folkloric style about the 
nation affected by war, but now rebuilding, and the cantata concludes with a 
fugue celebrating peace.60 These younger composers answered the party’s call for 
socialist-realist music linked to the Festival and received considerable compensa-
tion for their efforts.
Their better-known elders also embraced the festival’s ideological aims, and 
received even richer rewards. As befitting his status as leading composer, com-
bined with his willingness to support the party’s program, Andrzej Panufnik was 
the most generously supported composer by a wide margin—significantly ahead 
of his closest colleagues and ten to twenty times more than the least fortunate. 
For the one symphony he produced, he received a total of 13,800 zł from the min-
istry,61 as well as a contract by the union’s Commissions Committee for another 
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9000 zł.62 In March 1950, Panufnik proposed a Symfonia Rewolucyjna—the title 
probably alludes to the October Revolution in Russia. The ZKP’s Commissions 
Committee accepted the proposal and generously paid out the first two-thirds of 
the very large 9000 złoty payment at the end of that month, in personally advanta-
geous violation of the usual rules where only half was released initially.63 Panuf-
nik restated his intent to write this symphony in an April 21, 1950 letter to union 
president Zygmunt Mycielski on the occasion of commissioning works for the 
upcoming Festival of Polish Music.64 This original idea of a Symfonia Rewolu-
cyjna, likely originating in the context of the Stalin 70th birthday campaign in the 
winter of 1949-50, almost certainly became the politically timely Symphony of 
Peace (Symfonia pokoju) in the summer of 1950.65 Although Panufnik later pre-
sented the decision to compose this work as the product of political pressure and 
manipulation, his initial proposal of the even more politicized theme of revolu-
tion, as well as subsequent generous and multiple subsidies and his pre-existing, 
active engagement in the politicized peace movement, make it certain that he 
willingly composed the Symfonia pokoju.66
Cultural officials and Panufnik’s colleagues considered it one of the major 
accomplishments of the stalinist era. Indeed, save for several highly ideological 
cantatas by other composers, it is perhaps the prime example of socialist-realist 
music in Poland, with an accessible style and politicized text by Jarosław Iwasz-
kiewicz, one of the contemporary writers celebrated by the party.67 Commu-
nist officials constantly referenced the theme of peace, and used it to legitimate 
themselves in the eyes of a population with recent memories of a terrible war. 
Moreover, Panufnik employed a simplified, tonal, and accessible musical lan-
guage, and the composer clearly felt he had made no compromises in this area, 
as he reused much of the music with only minor changes—largely consistent 
with criticism received from his Polish colleagues—for his Sinfonia Elegiaca, 
published several years later after he left Poland for England.68 The press of 
the day praised the work, which even received the stamp of approval, albeit 
characteristically seasoned with some criticism, from communist musicologist 
Zofia Lissa and other music critics of the time; in particular, many were frus-
trated with the lack of a convincing climax in the final movement.69 Panufnik 
conducted the premiere in May 1951 with the Warsaw Philharmonic, and it was 
also included as part of the showpiece final concert of the first Festival of Polish 
Music later that year.70 The other two composers on the program of this fes-
tive closing concert were Stanisław Moniuszko and Karol Szymanowski, thus 
symbolically elevating Panufnik to the pantheon of these Polish musical greats. 
Cultural officials were very pleased, if not fully—Panufnik garnered “only” the 
second-highest state prize for the year because of the piece’s alleged gothic and 
religious elements—but this was not out of the ordinary, as the party always 
pushed for more compliance.
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A handful of other leading composers got generous stipends in the high four 
figures. Lutosławski received 8400 zł for a planned “folk suite” that surely be-
came the subtly folk-inspired, three-part Silesian Triptych (Tryptyk Śląski) for 
soprano and orchestra, premiered during the last stage of the festival in Decem-
ber 1951, and recognized with a national prize the following year.71 He had also 
proposed that his recently composed short cantata July Garland be included in 
the festival, and cultural officials listed it as linked to the festival preparations.72 
Party member and ideological stalwart Alfred Gradstein contributed a cantata A 
Word on Stalin (Słowo o Stalinie) and eight mass songs, for which he received 
9000 zł.73 Grażyna Bacewicz was granted 7200 zł to work on cello concerto and a 
ballet entitled Polonez na Czorsztynie.74 Although he had been heavily criticized 
at the recent Łagów conference, Zbigniew Turski received a total of 7200 zł for 
six months to write the ballet Warsaw Legend (Legenda warszawska) as well as 
a violin concerto and several mass songs.75
There are several noteworthy elements in this commissioning process. The 
ministry made a very large sum of money available, and the overwhelming ma-
jority of eligible union members applied for and received a part of it—and, again, 
not one proposal was denied. Deputy Minister Sokorski generally distributed the 
money based on prestige and ability, and perhaps most surprisingly, largely ir-
respective of the ideological nature of the work. Contrary to the previous year or 
two, Lutosławski’s contributions stayed away from overtly ideological themes; 
other leading composers like Bacewicz and Mycielski also did not compose ob-
viously political works, although the folkloric subject matter and tonal musical 
language chosen by all three fit comfortably within the bounds of socialist real-
ism. Turski also chose not to write an ideological work, and despite the recent 
criticism of his second, Olympic Symphony, he received a large sum. One can 
only conclude that composers were generally free to choose both subject matter 
and genre, and thus Panufnik’s choice of a “Revolutionary”—later “Peace”—
symphony, as well as the highly ideological works by the younger composers, 
appear all the more striking.
A considerable degree of compositional freedom did not, however, mean that 
complying more fully with party desires would go unrewarded. Panufnik’s astro-
nomical sums were surely due in part to his choice of subject matter, and perhaps 
this is indeed at least part of the reason he selected such ideological themes. Jerzy 
Sokorski contributed numerous political mass songs and ideological cantatas and 
received the handsome amount of 5100 zł; his party membership also surely did 
not count against him.76 The young Stanisław Prószyński (b. 1927) was given 
4500 zł for a Peace Symphony, a Kantata o Stalinie, and several other shorter 
works.77 Perhaps the most arresting in this respect is the little-known Stanisław 
Popiel, who received a sum seemingly disproportionate to his ability and renown. 
The 5400 zł granted him can probably best be explained by his proposal of a can-
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tata The Deed of Łagów (Czyn Łagowa, relating to the conference where socialist 
realism was discussed in 1949), and another cantata Day of Liberation (Dzień 
Wyzwolenia, probably linked to the Red Army’s march into Poland in summer 
1944), as well as several ideological mass songs.78 These were, however, excep-
tions, as grants were otherwise based on prestige and ability, and irrespective of 
theme. In the aftermath of the festival, however, composers increasingly pushed 
for more input in determining how funds were disbursed.
Party Influence Continues
The stipend gold rush during the first Festival of Polish Music proved to be a 
one-time event, a result of the intersection of a party at the height of its power 
with composers still open to its vision. The concurrent, standard funding process 
through the Commissions Committee also continued to produce a large number 
of socialist-realist works in the early 1950s. Although the committee was sup-
posed to operate autonomously, the Prezydium of the ZKP did review, confirm, 
and even alter the committee’s decisions and activities through 1951. Addition-
ally, through the composers and musicologists on the committee, regular union 
members also exerted some influence over the commissioning process. At this 
point, most composers continued to be broadly willing to work for the party’s 
goals, and composed numerous ideologically tinged works through this standard 
commissioning procedure. Furthermore, this period coincided with Mycielski’s 
politically reliable tenure as union head, followed by Rudziński’s highly politi-
cized year as president, and thus the ZKP as an institution and the committee as 
an organ both generally respected and propagated the party’s aims.
Through the Commissions Committee around 1950, cultural officials and 
influential figures like musicologist Zofia Lissa pushed for a greater number of 
accessible works intended for a mass audience, and the ministry continued to 
demand works that conformed to the emerging doctrine of socialist realism.79 
The report given at the Fourth Union Congress in June 1950 called for the Com-
missions Committee to conduct, “in the spirit of the most pressing needs of the 
moment . . . a consistent cultural policy” that would achieve the ideological aims 
of the party.80 In the summer of 1950, new union president Rudziński proposed 
a reorganization of the committee, so as to have it become a “principled instru-
ment of the fight for the new face of Polish music.”81 As president, he claimed 
ultimate power over the decisions made by the committee, and he took an active 
role in supervising its activities.82 He centralized the process of commissioning 
works by insisting the ZKP should control all music requested by the mass orga-
nizations, and by reaffirming that the Prezydium had the ultimate right to reject 
or accept commissioned works upon completion. In the fall of 1950, he repeat-
edly proposed the formation of a committee to evaluate completed commissioned 
Chapter Three   ♦   143
works, but this appears not to have materialized. In response, it seems he arro-
gated this power to the Prezydium, with the help of reviewers.83 His resignation 
in the summer of 1951 meant that the union leadership’s increased control over 
commissioning would, from the party’s perspective, fall into less politically reli-
able hands.
Surely not coincidentally, in early 1952 the Ministry of Culture instituted 
major changes in the commissioning process in order to augment its political in-
fluence.84 Over the objections of the new ZKP Prezydium, it took the committee 
away from the union and placed it directly under the aegis of the ministry itself.85 
The ZKP, however, did still have a significant voice on the now seven-person 
committee, as five members came from the union, joined by a representative 
from the ministry and another from Polish Radio.86 Although part of a larger, 
country-wide move by the party to take direct control of the disbursement of 
state funds in the early 1950s, this change also coincided with a time when some 
ZKP members seemed to be trying to transition away from the hard ideological 
line of the Rudziński presidency—and thus this move appeared to be an attempt 
by the ministry to assert more control over an increasingly oppositional union. 
Nevertheless, many composers still felt it justified that the ministry have control 
over the commissioning process. In a letter written just after the transfer of the 
committee to the ministry, Grażyna Bacewicz praised the commissioning process 
to her brother, claiming that composers could write generally as they wished, and 
that colleagues in the West were jealous of this privilege and support.87
A growing number, however, felt otherwise. Zbigniew Turski, as so often in 
similar debates, gave voice to those composers dissatisfied with this move, and 
he repeatedly agitated to bring the committee back to the ZKP.88 These composers 
complained that the committee’s move to the ministry had slowed the entire pro-
cess considerably, and that it had become in general less felicitous for compos-
ers.89 The union Prezydium attempted both to speed this process by doing some 
of the organizational work for the committee, and to influence decision making in 
a less politicized manner.90 This growing assertion of professional authority, de-
spite continuing party attempts to influence the commissioning process, marked 
the following years.
The newly reorganized 1952 committee entertained proposals for 
commissions from composers and also coordinated requests from mass 
organizations. It had an initial budget of the considerable sum of 500,000 zł, of 
which slightly more than half would be used for remaining payments on prior 
commissions, and 135,000 zł for new commissions; in 1953 the committee had 
431,000 zł at its disposition and in 1954, 600,000, all of which provided for 
commissions from 75 composers.91 In 1952, the committee allocated roughly 
100,000 zł for a new “premium” system, whereby both noncommissioned and 
commissioned works could be given money at the discretion of the committee. 
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This innovation was surely designed to encourage composers, on their own 
initiative, to create works the party desired.92 A lively discussion took place at 
the end of 1952 on the issue of whether the money designated for premiums 
should be distributed evenly among all composers who successfully fulfilled 
commissions in the past year, but ministry official Jasieński persevered and 
preserved the mandated procedure, in which the greatest “achievements” of the 
last twelve months would be rewarded.93 The GDR instituted a similar premium 
system in 1955, but the ministry and union leaders there used it much more 
effectively to solicit socialist-realist works.
Early in 1952, the committee continued to commission works from a large 
number of composers, but gradually shifted its focus to ordering a smaller num-
ber of works from more well-known composers, who would produce “vital and 
valuable” music.94 The committee tried to limit commissions in the composer-
preferred genres like symphonies and concertos to such works only from leading 
composers, and to instead order cantatas and other vocal works, a prioritized 
ranking to which it claimed the composers themselves had agreed at previous 
congresses.95 From its position of increased power and control over the com-
mittee, the ministry in 1952 renewed efforts to commission politicized music to 
its liking, as it pushed for more choral works that had an ideological character, 
including music that would celebrate the tenth anniversary of the founding of 
the PRL, and more works about Stalin.96 One early commission was Song about 
Bierut (Pieśń o Bierucie) by Borys Lomani, about the president of Poland, which 
was initially rejected because the melody was considered too cheerful and light 
with respect to the text and content.97 Composers less friendly to the party had 
more trouble receiving full compensation at this point, as in the case of Stefan 
Kisielewski, but his colleagues again intervened on his behalf.98 Once again, at 
the height of stalinism, even those hostile to the state received money from it.
The Union Asserts Professional Control
In practice, the lines of authority between the ministry and ZKP were not com-
pletely clear after the Commission Committee’s reorganization in 1952, and the 
union in fact maintained a significant amount of control over the commission-
ing process, not least because nearly all of the five or six union members on the 
committee simultaneously held positions on the ZKP’s Executive Committee. 
Although the actual commissioning was now officially out of its hands, the union 
Prezydium retained considerable sway over the evaluation of the completed com-
missioned works, and hence the disbursement of much of the money. The post-
1952 regulations mandated 25 percent of the total payment upon the signing of 
the contract, with the next quarter paid when the composer showed progress. 
The crucial final half was paid out only if the composer had the completed work 
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positively evaluated.99 The ZKP leadership continued to coordinate an evalua-
tion system developed in 1951 whereby two fellow composers anonymously re-
viewed submitted works, with a third used in case of conflicting opinions.100 In 
general, older and more experienced composers like Mycielski and Lutosławski 
conducted the evaluations, though the young Tadeusz Baird perhaps undertook 
the most. Dozens of composers took part, including even the politically suspect 
Stefan Kisielewski. The assessments were almost wholly devoid of ideological 
considerations, save for rare and passing mentions, as for example Zofia Lissa 
calling the young Kazimierz Serocki’s Second Symphony, Symphony of Songs, 
an “ideological achievement.”101 Rather, composers often harshly criticized a 
work’s technical qualities, and at times gave personal reactions. Even highly ide-
ological works, like Henryk Swolkień’s cantata Letter to Stalin (List do Stalina), 
were simply treated like any other work and judged (harshly, in Swolkień’s case) 
on the compositional merits.102 Many composers criticized this procedure as too 
open to unfair criticism and a potential cause of rancor between composers, and 
pushed for a more transparent system.103 Lutosławski backed a new, more sim-
plified system that supplied a basic form that asked reviewers whether the work 
fulfilled the commission and was appropriate for public or private performance, 
and that also gave space for a few comments.104
In a further move toward professional autonomy, cultural officials in 1954 
formally permitted a “two-track” system, where both the Commissions Commit-
tee and the increasingly politically independent union Prezydium had the right to 
evaluate and approve payment for commissioned works.105 The ZKP thus contin-
ued to gain control over the activities of the committee and attempted to exercise 
yet more influence through its members there in 1955.106 The Prezydium further 
tried to extend its authority over both commissions and evaluations by demand-
ing copies of all committee protocols as well as all evaluations.107 For its part, the 
ministry consistently attempted to assert influence over the committee through 
the mid-1950s, as it tried to convince composers to produce works with a politi-
cal program or for a broader audience.108 Such attempts proved largely useless as 
the union leaders increasingly took over control of the production of new music, 
claiming professional authority over any politicized interference from cultural 
officials.
A last, very limited success for the PZPR occurred in 1953-54 during the 
preparations for the second Festival of Polish Music. Unlike the complicated 
commissioning process through stipends linked to the first festival, the second 
drew upon works already composed or newer pieces ordered through the Com-
missions Committee. As had happened three years earlier with the first festival, 
ministry officials tried to solicit politicized works, now linked to the tenth anni-
versary of People’s Poland, but most of the leading composers declined to com-
pose overtly ideological works in this moment of emerging destalinization and 
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decreased party credibility. Minister Sokorski softened the line considerably in 
this context, talking about a need for the festival to show “a wide range of in-
dividuality and possibility.”109 Composers did produce several cantatas, though 
on less explicitly political themes.110 Tadeusz Baird agreed to write the simple 
and accessible one-movement cantata Ballad of the Soldier’s Cup (Ballada o 
żołnierskim kubku, 1954), about friendship between Polish and Soviet soldiers, 
for 10,800 zł, and Turski wrote a Cantata about the Vistula River (Kantata o 
Wiśle) to a Broniewski text for 10,800.111 Also, a final attempt to commission 
mass songs was linked to the decennial of People’s Poland, the festival, and the 
Second Party Congress. A large portion of the money set aside for commissions 
in 1954 was devoted to soliciting mass songs in praise of the PZPR’s Second 
Congress in the spring of that year. A number of composers responded, including 
Andrzej Panufnik with A New Era (Nowy czas) celebrating the accomplishments 
of the last ten years, as well as a handful of others such as Witold Rudziński and 
Edward Olearczyk with songs in praise of the party.112
All composers took part in the second festival, but most composed nonpo-
litical, often instrumental works of their choosing. Lutosławski was particularly 
encouraged to compose a cantata, but he first claimed no texts were inspiring, 
then said he was thinking of doing a short overture on the model of Prokofiev’s 
Russian Overture, before finally agreeing to undertake a number of short instru-
mental works: two dance preludes for clarinet and piano (for 4000 zł) and ten 
pedagogical pieces for violin and piano (5000 zł), and later eight small works for 
nonprofessionals (2000 zł). While not the large, political works ministry officials 
wanted, they did fulfill official requests for easier music for amateur groups.113 
Most other composers also submitted proposals for music that only marginally 
fulfilled the party’s wishes, as for example on folk themes as with Serocki’s pro-
posal for a song suite for choir to a folk text, or Bacewicz’s Fifth Violin Con-
certo.114 The ability of the party and ministry to attract composer support for 
political aims and more generally to influence the commissioning process had 
been significantly reduced, and would wither away in the years following. Com-
posers, too, simply showed far less interest in following the party line, and largely 
ignored the weakened political offensive.
A somewhat desperate, clumsy attempt by the ministry to circumvent the 
Commissions Committee entirely and directly commission (PZPR member) 
Jerzy Sokorski’s opera Marynka in late 1956 resulted in the committee’s com-
poser-members strenuously protesting and questioning the very raison d’être of 
the committee—an blunt assertion of professional autonomy unthinkable in its 
directness a few years earlier.115 Although the committee was surely defending 
its—and the union’s—rights and prerogatives against encroachment by the state, 
it also certainly aimed to defend artistic standards, as the second act of the opera 
had received a devastating internal evaluation by Kazimierz Sikorski: “this is not 
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music.”116 By this time, union control over the commissioning and evaluating 
process was nearly total.
A continual point of contention was the precise amount of money paid to 
composers for their work. At the crucial conference at Łagów in 1949, compos-
ers discussed the idea of a pension system that would provide enough income for 
composers to work full-time on their compositions.117 Earlier in 1949, ministry 
officials instituted a Committee of Stipends, Grants, and Subsidies for Literature, 
Music, and the Arts, and it gave out several-month stipends for leading compos-
ers, especially those willing to compose the kinds of works the party desired.118 
As we have seen, this stipend model reached its apogee during 1950-51, when 
composers received large sums of money to compose ideologically tinged works 
for the first Festival of Polish Music in 1951.119 Such subsidies seem to have been 
reduced after this point, and when composers brought up the issue at their Sixth 
Congress in 1954, Minister Sokorski dismissed the notion that a large number of 
composers should live from state pensions.120 His ministry nonetheless continued 
to give out a limited number of stipends and grants in the mid-1950s, perhaps 
surprising at a time when cultural officials complained bitterly about the union’s 
lack of support for their political program.121
The money received for typical commissions, therefore, provided an essen-
tial part of the income of all ZKP members. The “price list” for the different 
forms of composition became an issue for composers by at least early 1952. A 
price list did not yet exist, and most composers felt the amount paid for the vari-
ous genres of musical works was too modest and poorly calculated. Starting in 
1952, the ZKP began to negotiate with and pressure the ministry to regulate these 
amounts, and after more than two years of unstinting and often frustrating efforts, 
the union finally achieved its goal. In August 1954, the composers obtained a 
regulated price list that insured better and more stable payments.122 This seem-
ing success, however, provoked more controversy among composers, as the total 
budget for commissions remained static and thus these higher payments meant 
fewer commissions. The committee tried to finesse this by increasing the number 
of cases where the final 50 percent of the payment was not disbursed due to a 
work’s perceived technical weakness, but this made the affected composers un-
derstandably unhappy.123
By the mid-1950s, the commissioning process had become standardized, 
considerably depoliticized, and clearly under the control of composers for their 
own professional needs. Composers sent in proposals to a Commissions Com-
mittee largely controlled by their colleagues, and most were accepted. Although 
the full payment was not always granted, the reasons depended on compositional 
competence, and the leading composers almost never encountered a rejection. 
Politically themed works had nearly vanished, and even light and dance music, 
previously pushed by the party, was removed from consideration and committee 
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funding.124 Lutosławski introduced this motion, which favored serious music less 
subject to politicization. His actions with respect to commissioning new works 
are representative for the broad majority of composers over the period. Initially, 
he expressed interest in accepting commissions for socialist-realist music, but 
gradually pushed for increased composer autonomy. With his many like-minded 
colleagues, he succeeded in setting professional standards in the face of political 
interference in the creative process.
Around 1950, however, a majority of the commissioning funds were used to 
solicit works on Stalin or for other politicized pieces meant for the first Festival 
of Polish Music. Composers more open to socialist realism found it easier to 
get a commission, but funding was available to all. The Composers’ Union first 
controlled the Commissions Committee, which proved politically reliable due 
to its staffing by ministry officials and union members generally sympathetic 
to the party’s program. By placing it under ministry authority in 1952, cultural 
officials increased their influence over the committee, and hence the kinds of 
works commissioned. As a concession to composers at this time, it gave five of 
the seven seats to union members, which proved to be a Trojan horse soon after. 
These composers, plus an increasingly independent ZKP Prezydium that took 
over many administrative functions from a gradually weakening ministry, helped 
give the union de facto control of the commissioning process as part of a broader 
process of asserting professional autonomy. Throughout the period, although 
socialist-realist works were favored, composers were able to obtain funding for 
a range of compositions, and here as well a collaborative approach was evident.
Continued Party Influence in East Germany
In the GDR, highly ideological works continued to be commissioned through and 
beyond the postwar decade. The procedure for granting contracts to composers 
was also not settled there until the mid-1950s, but unlike in Poland, the SED and 
its allies in the East German Composers’ Union (VDK) maintained significant 
control the entire time. In the early 1950s, however, the process exhibited con-
siderable fluidity and jockeying for influence among cultural officials, the VDK 
leadership, and various groups of rank-and-file composers. Cultural officials tried 
to influence the awarding of contracts to promote socialist realism, and were 
generally helped by the loyal union leaders, while many composers pushed for 
more creative freedom and regional autonomy in the commissioning process. 
The central cultural officials usually won out, since they invested considerable 
political capital in encouraging desired works, and of course largely controlled 
the purse strings.
The granting of contracts for new music became gradually more system-
atized and centralized over the stalinist period, though not without producing a 
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fair measure of acrimony. Before 1951, composers in the Soviet Zone and then 
GDR received commissions on an ad-hoc and decentralized basis from state 
funds and mass organizations.125 With the formation of the Composers’ Union 
in the spring of 1951, the regional VDK bodies began to push for and influence 
the granting of contracts to composers in their areas.126 Then in January 1952, the 
Music Department of the newly formed Stakuko (State Arts Commission), true 
to its totalizing mandate, stepped in to try to exert full control over the commis-
sioning process. It called a meeting of regional cultural officials, radio employ-
ees, and the union leadership to standardize and centralize the system by which 
composers would receive contracts. All agreed that commissions would only be 
given for certain genres of music deemed “necessary,” including works that ful-
filled one of the main aims of socialist realism: “to reflect societal events.”127 
Mass organizations, factory cultural directors, regional arts officials, and cultural 
institutions were to make recommendations on what works they desired, and then 
pass along such requests to the Composers’ Union for assignment. Funding could 
come from the central government, regional governments, or other organizations 
and institutions.128 Somewhat less frequently than in Poland, contests served as a 
catalyst, as with an early 1952 competition on “Work and Culture” organized by 
the Free German Trade Union Federation.129 East German Radio played a signifi-
cant role in the production and dissemination of new mass songs and other genres 
of “lighter” music, as especially younger composers like André Asriel and Günter 
Kochan found fruitful employment there.130 To coordinate this process, a central-
ized, national Contract Commission with representatives from the Stakuko, the 
VDK, the Kulturbund, the Academy of the Arts, and relevant mass organizations 
was proposed, but if formed at this point in 1952, had little effect.131
Instead, in 1952 and into 1953, the commissioning of new works proceeded 
in rather small-scale if highly politicized fashion, dominated by the heavy hand 
of the Stakuko. At times a Stakuko official negotiated directly with individual 
composers, while at others the Executive Committee of the union made propos-
als to the Stakuko.132 By the summer of 1952, these cultural officials had given 
out only about a dozen contracts, almost all of them to well-known, Berlin-based 
composers like Hanns Eisler and Max Butting, as well as three from West Berlin, 
presumably in an attempt to garner the sympathy and support of non-GDR com-
posers. Most works had some sort of political association, such as Ernst Hermann 
Meyer’s Call (Aufruf), which would “mobilize the masses and call them to fight 
for unification and freedom.” Union president Ottmar Gerster received a 1000 
DM contract for a single-movement symphonic work Departure (Aufbruch) that 
would mobilize listeners for the patriotic struggle for freedom and also a second 
proposed 4800 DM contract for a Kantate der Republik, while Johannes Paul 
Thilman garnered 1800 DM for a War and Peace (Krieg und Frieden) Symphony. 
Planned themes for works to be contracted later that year included a Cantata of 
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Defense, a Symphony of Friendship, and an opera The Patriots (Die Patrioten) 
with music by Jean Kurt Forest and libretto by KuBa (Kurt Bartel).133 As seen in 
the subject matter of these compositions, as well as in the content of discussions 
within the Stakuko in late 1952, it is clear that cultural officials had ambitious 
plans to shape the nature of musical composition through the policy of commis-
sioning works.134
Hans-Georg Uszkoreit from the Stakuko emphasized yet further the preroga-
tives and plans of the Music Department during discussions in the spring of 1953. 
He stressed that not every composition should receive a contract, but only the 
best composers should be awarded these “moral” honors, in the sense of receiv-
ing funding for working with the party and for its aims.135 He insisted that the 
Stakuko would not only decide on the musical genres for which contracts would 
be given, but also reserved the right to determine the themes of the works.136 
Uszkoreit’s ambitious plans would be somewhat tempered by the events of June 
1953.
A Standardized and Politicized Process
Under the influence of the New Course starting in the late spring of 1953, cul-
tural officials granted the Composers’ Union more say in the commissioning 
process. While many composers welcomed this seeming concession, in prac-
tical terms the effects were minimal, as the politically reliable union leaders 
largely exercised this input. Since at least its First Congress in the fall of 1952, 
the union had made it an official priority to increase its influence in this area 
through the proposed organization of a limited, music-focused Contract Com-
mission, and had tried to make more connections with the mass organizations 
so as to get contracts from them.137 This Contract Commission, closely linked to 
the VDK, was finally formed in June 1953, and included union representatives 
from each region, Fritz Möller from the union Secretariat, and Uszkoreit from 
the Stakuko.138 The party-linked Executive Committee of the union in Berlin 
had great say as well, as it signed off on the proposals from the Contract Com-
mission, and monitored the process in general.139 The union had thus achieved 
significant oversight with respect to commissioning new works by late 1953, 
although Uszkoreit and his colleagues exerted considerable control through 
representation on the commission as well as less formal influence through the 
sympathetic union leadership.140 The Stakuko conceded “mutual agreement on 
the choice of theme” later in the fall, but Uszkoreit continued to press for politi-
cized subject matter.141 
Throughout 1953, the first large-scale process of commissioning works got 
going under the new commissioning guidelines. The regional union organiza-
tions sent in recommendations on composers and their works. Unsurprisingly, 
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the regional unions proposed too many composers, and not all received con-
tracts due to limited funds. The selection process provoked some confusion and 
anger from rank-and-file regional composers who felt they deserved commis-
sions.142 After receiving these proposals, the Contract Commission then decided 
upon a list of composers, works, and dates of completion for late 1953 and 
1954, and 93 composers received contracts, which represented 26 “centrally 
contracted works” and 67 “regional contracts.”143 This number grew to 155 by 
the summer of 1955, with funding coming from the state Kulturfonds, as well 
as from the culture departments of the local governments. At this point, 65,000 
Marks had been disbursed by the Stakuko/ministry and 85,650 by local govern-
ments, and an additional 93,000 had been given out by both for operas, operet-
tas, and ballets.144
Composers received payment in thirds: the first at signing, the second when 
the work was delivered, and the last upon approval.145 As in Poland, this final 
installment became a point of contention, since it was sometimes withheld if the 
work was not deemed acceptable, provoking rancor among the affected compos-
ers who felt they should be paid in full for composing the best work possible.146 In 
the early 1950s, union officials organized the assessment of completed contracted 
works in an ad hoc manner. They called upon outside experts, Academy of the 
Arts members, or VDK members to conduct evaluations, using a form with vari-
ous categories.147 The process went through further refinement in late 1953, in the 
spirit of the New Course, in an effort to decentralize this task and as a conces-
sion to regional composers who desired more autonomy. Henceforth, the relevant 
genre section of the regional union bodies assessed works commissioned in each 
region, after which they would undergo consideration by one of the central genre 
commissions. Those works centrally commissioned would be directly evaluated 
by the relevant central genre commission. Overall, then, the central genre com-
missions exercised greater influence on the evaluation process than the sections, 
and since the former were generally made up of composers more sympathetic 
to the SED’s aims, they helped to preserve a large measure of centralized, party 
control.148 In both cases, it was the composer-members who judged their peers, 
but the actual functioning produced many complaints as to the nature of the as-
sessments as well as the time it took.149
The majority of these evaluations focused on technical aspects of the com-
position, but judgments based on politicized and socialist-realist criteria were 
present to a greater extent than in Poland. The genre commission for mass songs 
gave Helmut Gerhard Schmidt’s Stalin Will Be Our Friend for Eternity (Sta-
lin bleibt uns Freund für Allezeit) a negative assessment due to its text. Despite 
the promising title, or indeed perhaps because of it—they were encountering the 
song well into the thaw in late 1954—the reviewers judged the song politically 
unacceptable and advised: “to be completely rejected based on its ideology.”150 
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The Commission for Light Music similarly refused to recommend Kurt Driesch’s 
orchestral suite A Summer Day (Ein Sommertag), because “it does not do justice 
to today’s reality,” code for ideological errors.151 These cases were nonetheless 
more the exception than the rule, as nonideological, technique-based consider-
ations dominated the evaluations, as in the case of Georg Theuer’s symphonic 
poem on the Peasants’ Revolt of 1525, judged “conventional and uninteresting” 
despite its politically appropriate theme, and thus not sufficiently worthy of its 
final payment.152 Similarly, Willi Hera’s Cantata for our Thälmann Pioneers 
(Kantate für unsere Thälmann-Pioniere), on the communist youth organization, 
although approved by its regional genre section, was evaluated by Kurt Schwaen 
as primitive, oversimplified, and unworthy of performance.153 The overwhelming 
majority of evaluations noted weaknesses and qualities that could be improved 
upon, but approved the works, and thus composers received full payment for 
their commissions. Leading composers Max Butting and Ottmar Gerster urged 
the union leaders to stop the infrequent practice of withholding the final payment, 
since they felt full compensation should be granted if the composer had tried his 
or her best. By late 1954, the denial of the final disbursement would seem to have 
largely ended.154
Direct Union Control and Continued Party Influence
Many composers felt dissatisfied with what in practice was a highly centralized 
and top-down evaluation process, as well as with the more general decision-
making procedure for commissions. In particular, many felt that a small num-
ber of favored composers unfairly received a greater number of contracts, and 
that the contracts given to rank-and-file composers were arbitrarily disbursed.155 
In response to this growing displeasure, the system of granting contracts under-
went further revision throughout 1954 and into 1955. With the replacement of 
the Stakuko by the Ministry for Culture in early 1954, the responsibility for com-
missioning passed fully and officially to the Composers’ Union, thus continuing 
the decentralizing thrust of the New Course.156 Throughout 1954, regional union 
and district cultural officials had the ability to give out a number of commissions, 
although the central Contract Commission and union leaders still had to sign off 
on these contracts and organize the subsequent evaluation.157 The central VDK 
leadership, in consultation with ministry officials, curbed this nascent regional 
autonomy after about a year, however. In 1955, then, the central union leadership 
distributed the bulk of the contracts, and tightened control over the process.158 
Proposals for contracts still originated on the local level, but now needed approval 
from the relevant genre commission, with the final confirmation in the hands of 
the union Secretariat.159 The Contract Commission (which had included regional 
union representatives) was thus deemed unnecessary after only two years in exis-
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tence. Although this looked like a move in the direction of composer autonomy, 
in reality yet more power accrued to the Berlin-based, party-linked union leaders.
As Ulbricht and SED cultural officials reconsolidated their power throughout 
1954-55, the ministry again became more aggressive in its attempts to influence 
commissioned works despite ceding official control to the union. Cultural of-
ficials instituted this latter policy as a concession to composers’ wishes, but as 
has been noted, the political loyalty of the VDK leaders to the party line made 
any benefits to the average composer slight, and thus the changes largely super-
ficial. The number of contracts given directly by the ministry was set at only two 
or three per year, and it “based its decision primarily on the recommendations 
of the union.”160 For all commissions, however, the ministry continued to try to 
influence the awarding of contracts indirectly. For example, officials called for 
fewer instrumental works in favor of text-based compositions understandable to 
workers.161
More specifically, the ministry’s Music Department in early 1955 took a 
more active and explicit role in suggesting what kinds of works should be com-
missioned. In a letter to the union, Uszkoreit stated that “the decisive factor in 
granting a contract is the fulfillment of a cultural-political and societal need,” and 
he suggested specific themes for each genre of music. With respect to operet-
tas, Uszkoreit desired materials that would critique Western “Affenkultur” (ape 
culture)—a crude, racist description of American-inspired popular culture. He 
also suggested ballets with revolutionary themes from the recent past. Orchestral 
and chamber music should be more optimistic, with the latter more accessible 
to less sophisticated audiences. He additionally pushed for “lyrically patriotic 
and fiercely revolutionary” mass songs on political themes like discouraging the 
hoarding of food or not meeting economic goals.162 A year later, he upgraded 
the issue of influencing the granting of contracts to one of the main goals of the 
Music Department.163 Thus while the Composers’ Union had official control of 
the process, the ministry continued to exert significant pressure in the following 
years. In a difference indicative of the post-Stalin divergences between the two 
countries, this East German dynamic was a nearly exact inversion of the situation 
in Poland, where the party had official control but the union made the real deci-
sion, usually against party interests.
East German cultural officials instituted another important change in 1955, 
one designed to encourage composers to write works that fulfilled these “cultural-
political needs” desired by the party. Leaders of the regional unions and heads 
of the genre commissions were encouraged to suggest such politically-themed 
works to their fellow composers, who would then receive compensation upon 
completion as if it were a contract; other works composed without a contract 
could be given a “premium” if judged particularly successful.164 For ministry 
officials, this change in the commissioning process called for a reduction in the 
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practice of giving a large number of contracts, and meant that they would sug-
gest themes and genres, and then give rewards to those composers who complied 
with the party’s program.165 The union leaders generally carried out the ministry’s 
wishes in this respect, and the GDR’s premium system was far more effective 
than its equivalent attempted a few years earlier in Poland.
Throughout the period under consideration, the commissioning process in 
the GDR resulted in remarkably similar outcomes, regardless of who was in fact 
the granter of the contract. While the union achieved more direct influence over 
the process through a Contract Commission and coordination of evaluations, this 
professionalization remained closely tied to the party’s goal of socialist-realist 
music. Cultural officials maintained considerable control—in the early 1950s di-
rectly, and through the politically reliable union leaders thereafter—and proved 
able to direct the production of music towards socialist realism. The loyal union 
leadership had great and growing influence, and aided cultural officials in real-
izing the aim of commissioning music that supported the party’s aims. Some 
composers pressed for greater independence from party control, but concessions 
in this direction were largely superficial. Well-known composers, especially 
those based in Berlin, had the easiest time receiving a contract. For rank-and-file 
composers, obtaining a commission was more difficult. An appropriately politi-
cal theme, or a work in one of the preferred vocal genres like the mass song or 
cantata, helped increase the composer’s chances, as did technical proficiency. Fi-
nally, a connection to the union leadership in Berlin, the favor of a regional union 
head, or the approval of the head of the relevant genre commission also increased 
the probability of a contract.
Conclusion
The commissioning process was an arena where political power intersected with 
individual creative choice, and a fair degree of compromise marked the emergence 
of the music of the new era. In both countries, the negotiations among cultural 
officials, the union leadership, and composers over the commissioning process 
were often intense and fraught, as the stakes over what, whether, and from whom 
to commission were high. The parties sought to create a new, ideological music 
to fill the aural space with politically appropriate sound. Both the PZPR and SED 
succeeded in doing so for a number of years, but only the latter proved able to 
sustain this success into and through the thaw years. The union leaders in both 
countries occupied an intermediary role, often representing the party’s wishes but 
also responsive to their memberships. The writers of music were of course essen-
tial to this project of dominating symbols and themes in the realm of music, and 
Polish and East German composers—almost without exception—took part in the 
creation of a large and fascinating body of socialist-realist music commissioned 
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by the state. Individual composers faced a complex decision linked to political 
conviction, opportunism, creative impulse, and a desire for financial support. And 
in Poland especially, they proved able to secure commissions for the music they 
desired to compose, even as what that meant evolved over time.
In both Poland and the GDR, the means of commissioning works followed a 
similar trajectory and appeared on the surface largely identical. A decentralized 
process gave way to heightened state control in the early 1950s. Soon after, how-
ever, the Composers’ Unions in each country took over most responsibility for 
commissions, thus sharing a trend towards professionalization and also decision 
making increasingly shielded from direct political interference by cultural offi-
cials. In the GDR, however, the loyal union leadership as well as a large number 
of East German composers continued to support party goals, and thus assured 
that politicized works were commissioned through and beyond 1956. In Poland, 
precisely the opposite occurred: union control meant the practical end of overtly 
ideological musical compositions by mid-decade, as the overwhelming major-
ity of Polish composers and their union leaders had grown disillusioned with 
party aims and desired more artistic autonomy. Here a growing process of profes-
sionalization meant that decisions about music would lead to emancipation from 
political interference. Polish composers, after several years of ideological com-
missions, pushed for and achieved greater creative autonomy in the commission-
ing process, while their East German counterparts accepted considerably less.
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The Music Festival as Pedagogical 
Experience
Music festivals exploded in size and number across Central Europe in the decade 
after 1945. Many hundreds of thousands of people took part through both pro-
fessional and amateur choirs and other musical ensembles, while millions more 
encountered party-approved music by attending concerts. Cultural officials made 
significant and ongoing attempts to include amateur groups in these festivals and 
also to bring in audience members from all population groups. Musicians and 
conductors appreciated the festivals, as they heightened audience interest and 
attracted attention to ensemble activities. For contemporary composers, the fes-
tivals provided very welcome and indeed essential opportunities to have their 
works performed before audiences. The festivals received significant state sup-
port, and the parties of the region invested considerable resources and energy in 
their preparation and staging. Cultural officials utilized festivals as an incentive 
for composers to create socialist-realist music, and then worked to introduce the 
wider population to this music in a fun and festive environment. Both Poland and 
the GDR featured a wide range of festivals with music as their focus, including 
high-profile events, those in smaller towns and rural areas, and others devoted to 
amateur musical groups. Some festivals consisted of a few concerts extending 
over a long weekend, while others featured hundreds of events and lasted months. 
Composers and cultural officials heatedly debated and negotiated the content of 
these festivals, but they generally included a mixture of ideologically accept-
able works by past masters as well as socialist-realist works from contemporary 
composers.
This study has focused on music as an essential element in the parties’ use 
of “softer” forms of control, in opposition to the “harder” forms of coercion and 
repression often emphasized in the historical literature. In this sense, these music 
festivals provided key tools in constructing and maintaining a legitimizing politi-
cal-cultural paradigm that was progressive, national, and socialist—as defined by 
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the parties and against the conception emanating from the West. The inclusion in 
the festivals of carefully screened works by great German or Polish composers 
of the past served to strengthen the parties’ claim to be the true heirs of a positive 
national tradition, one they would carry into the socialist future. More concretely, 
both the PZPR and the SED viewed music festivals as a particularly effective 
means of propagating their ideas and values among the population, with the goal 
of influencing worldviews and beliefs. Workers and peasants were to attend con-
certs and even take part in some festivals through involvement in amateur musi-
cal groups, and thus to not only come into contact with the ideas and aims of the 
parties, but in fact participate in their enactment. Individuals chose to attend or 
stay away and in some cases gave direct feedback, and thus affected the nature 
of these festivals, as did local festival organizers and ensemble directors, who 
also gave input or made demands. These music festivals illuminate the interplay 
between the goals of worker education and cultural-ideological formation on one 
hand, and the more pragmatic desire to control and dominate the population on 
the other.
The complex interaction between cultural officials and composers greatly 
shaped the organization of festivals. The parties considered the festivals an ef-
fective way to influence composers through attempts to control programming, 
and thus officials encouraged and pressured them to compose in a socialist-realist 
style, and in general to support approved political goals. Composers responded 
to this pressure in varying ways, and this chapter will also examine their dealings 
with party authorities, as well as their opportunities for negotiation—which were 
considerable, given the parties’ dependence on their expertise. The participation 
of these musical producers was a political imperative, as their creative work in 
the service of the party was key to the project of controlling and changing society 
by creating the symbols that reinforced party legitimacy and power. The parties 
in both countries therefore attempted to mobilize, shape, and control their artistic 
elites as well as the population at large through the medium of music festivals.
Festival culture has of course been a key aspect of human experience for 
millennia, and the communists unsurprisingly sought to harness it for their aims. 
Since at least the ancient Greeks, people have come together to celebrate and 
affirm common values through ritual and art. In the modern era, as for example 
during the French Revolution, festivals were organized extensively to connect 
the body politic and help inculcate the values of the new social order.1 Richard 
Wagner pushed this idea further, as he envisioned festivals as a site where artists 
would merge with the people in a (national) union of shared values. The Salzburg 
Festival was but one manifestation of the Wagnerian idea, as it came into being in 
1920 and played a key role in creating an Austrian identity by forging a link with 
the past so as to transmit a set of conservative and Catholic values to contempo-
rary audiences.2 In Germany especially, there was a rich working-class tradition 
Chapter Four   ♦   169
of festivals, as Social Democratic activists in the late Imperial and Weimar peri-
ods organized festivals that functioned as political rituals and involved thousands 
of singers and spectators, and the National Socialists recast and expanded Ger-
man festival tradition.3 And unsurprisingly, the most immediate model for Poland 
and the GDR was that of the Soviet Union, which used festivals and mass spec-
tacles to project legitimizing myths, especially with respect to the October Revo-
lution.4 The Bolsheviks believed that festivals could transform the consciousness 
of the masses, and organized numerous events to this end.5 The SED and PZPR 
drew inspiration from the experiences of the Soviet Union, but also used aspects 
of their own national traditions to create festivals that would present the parties 
as the logical heirs and protectors of a progressive national musical culture, and 
that would serve to influence their own populations. Composers, ensemble direc-
tors, performers, and audiences all confronted festive events that bore a strong 
political coloring.
The Showpiece Socialist-Realist Festival
In both Poland and the GDR, musical figures and cultural officials organized a 
small number of prominent festivals during this period. These major festivals 
received considerable funding and attention from party and ministry authorities, 
who took great care in commissioning and promoting relevant music and man-
aging the programs. Composers responded with enthusiasm to these opportuni-
ties to have their works performed, but often chafed at the political constraints 
imposed by officials, and as a result, a complex interaction over programming 
took place. Audiences also reacted to this new festival music with excitement, 
boredom, and frustration, and forced the political and cultural elites to modify 
their aims. In Poland, such major festivals were enormous undertakings, as they 
featured hundreds of concerts that took place all across the country over a period 
of months. The PZPR, lacking a longstanding festival tradition, organized a hand-
ful of lengthy, country-wide festivals from the center in order to reach as many 
citizens as possible. The GDR’s main festivals were smaller in scale, probably 
due to a preexisting, well-established culture of festivals organized in cities and 
towns, but proved equally important in the attention they received from the SED, 
composers, and audiences.
The Festivals of Polish Music
In Poland, several elaborate series of events extended across months, with con-
certs all over Poland in towns and cities of all sizes. The first Festival of Polish 
Music (Festiwal Muzyki Polskiej) took place in 1951 and the second in 1955; 
the differences between them exemplify the crisis of party authority in Poland 
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after 1953 and its effects in the musical world. The PZPR pursued nearly identi-
cal aims as the more powerful SED, but here as elsewhere experienced increas-
ing resistance from composers after Stalin’s death and the related thaw. The first 
festival in 1951 thus shares many broad similarities with all but one of the GDR 
festivals in its conception, goals, and aims, while the second is interestingly and 
significantly different as composers acted more autonomously.
Cultural officials initiated a precursor to the two Festivals of Polish Music 
in 1949. This Festival of Folk Music (Festiwal Muzyki Ludowej), a less polished 
and less political version of the two later festivals, took place over several weeks 
in May 1949 and featured 3000 musical ensembles in 500 concerts spread all 
over Poland.6 Although this festival focused more on traditional folk music, 55 
composers participated by orchestrating folk songs or creating new folk-based 
compositions.7 The Festival of Folk Music contained the rough outlines of goals 
the party endeavored to attain in the music world: the PZPR presented itself as a 
patron of the arts as well as of the Polish nation, and involved composers, ama-
teur performers, and audience members in the expression of these values.
The first Festival of Polish Music in 1951 came the closest to the PZPR’s 
ideal of a thoroughly politicized musical event. It attempted to engage compos-
ers and much of the population in a party-sanctioned cultural activity that spread 
its values and buttressed its legitimacy.8 This festival was a sprawling, national 
event which started in April 1951 and ended eight months later, and featured 
three distinct phases: the first included a series of concerts by major orchestras 
which began on April 13 and culminated with the May 1 celebrations; the sec-
ond was less concentrated, with intermittent concerts by both professional and 
amateur musical ensembles spanning the months of May to December; the final 
phase took place in the first half of December, and offered a compact schedule of 
the highlights of the past year, as well as the final stage of the competition of over 
2000 amateur groups, where a total of 360,000 people participated. The entire 
festival comprised hundreds of concerts, including music from the past as well as 
the present, with over 300 new works related to the occasion.9
A truly stunning range of concerts greeted Poles all over the country. The 
major orchestras appeared in their usual venues and offered politically themed 
programs such as concerts in Warsaw and Kraków by the Kraków Philharmonic 
Orchestra with renowned soloist Halina Czerny-Stefańska that featured Jan 
Krenz’s Conversation of Two Cities (Rozmowa dwóch miast), about Warsaw and 
Moscow, cheek by jowl with a Chopin piano concerto and Moniuszko opera aria. 
In Bydgoszcz, the orchestras of the Polish Radio and Pomeranian region com-
bined forces with six local choirs to present a Moniuszko overture, Mieczysław 
Karłowicz’s Violin Concerto (1902), Woytowicz’s Kantata in Praise of Work 
(Kantata na pochwałę pracy) and Maklakiwicz’s Silesia works and sings (Śląsk 
pracuje i śpiewa), as well as four well-known mass songs. Numerous amateur en-
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sembles entered those same concert halls to sing dozens of the latest mass songs, 
sometimes in a program that included more traditional vocal works from previous 
decades and centuries.10 Both professional and amateur ensembles performed in 
smaller towns and villages, in a wide variety of venues, from rural public halls to 
factory clubrooms.
Party and state institutions took the leading role in the organization of the 
first festival. The Department of Artistic Production in the Ministry of Culture 
had the main responsibility of organizing and supervising the preparation for the 
festival, and its Musical Council was the site of discussions about strategy and 
planning. Several other departments also contributed to the organization, and a 
special bureau, firmly under the control of the ministry, was set up to manage the 
festival. To decide on the programs of the concerts, Polish officials also formed 
an advisory council made up of representatives close to the party to decide which 
works, both contemporary and from the past, fit the party’s guidelines on social-
ist realism closely enough to be included in the festival. The Composers’ Union 
also actively took part in the organization of the festival, and did have some 
influence on its realization—indeed, it continually tried to gain more—but the 
aforementioned state institutions had the decisive say.11 The dominance of the 
ministry manifested itself most clearly in the selection of the director of the festi-
val bureau. The union had been promised a voice in his selection, but the ministry 
imposed its own candidate without regard to the union’s preference—to the great 
frustration of many composers.12
These various state organizations tailored the goals of the first Festival of 
Polish Music to the party’s wishes. Cultural officials envisioned a “musical 
army” that would better acquaint the population with party-approved music.13 
The party’s primary aim appeared in internal party documents and the official 
literature about the festival in this formulation: “The fundamental goal of the 
festival is to deepen the knowledge of Polish music in society at large, while en-
couraging further compositional work and linking this to the needs of the broad 
masses of People’s Poland.”14 The dual goals of the festival are here neatly laid 
out: to bring music to a wider segment of the population, and to encourage com-
posers to create in a style the party deemed suitable for those very people.15 Dur-
ing an address to composers at a meeting about the festival, Deputy Minister of 
Culture Włodzimierz Sokorski set out his conception of the festival as having 
“didactic significance for both composers as well as the wide mass of listeners 
. . . it will have an ideological-pedagogical character.”16 As seen in the previous 
chapter, composers received generous funding and responded with hundreds of 
socialist-realist compositions. For the PZPR, the festival provided an opportunity 
to propagate a certain kind of music that would school all of society in the ideas 
and values of the party.
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With respect to the masses, the party’s goal for the festival was to mobilize a 
wide section of the population in support of its broader political aims. The great 
majority of composers praised this popular aspect of the festival. Lutosławski, for 
instance, lauded the inclusion of the large number of amateur groups, and Grażyna 
Bacewicz felt the festival an important aspect of “our cultural politics.”17 Com-
poser Henryk Swolkień asserted that the festival showed how his colleagues had 
reached out to the “broad masses of listeners.”18 Cultural officials frequently noted 
their view of music’s role as a political tool with respect to festivals, seeing them 
as “a shaping agent for the fundament of life of millions of people” and as “par-
ticipating in the shaping of man.”19 In the PZPR’s conception of music as essential 
in propagating its conception of a progressive Polish nationalism combined with 
socialist ideology, it sought to deploy musical festivals to influence worldviews 
and win support for its program. The inclusion of thousands of amateur groups in 
this party-sponsored festival was an important means to this end.20
On a more basic level, the party hoped to gain a certain legitimacy both by 
patronizing the arts and by bringing music to a broader section of society; the 
PZPR, like the SED, asserted that it strove for a more just social order where ev-
ery citizen would have access to art previously considered the preserve of elites. 
In official communications, the party stated repeatedly: “The festival is a power-
ful means of disseminating Polish music among the broad masses.”21 In addition 
to contemporary music, concerts also included works by past composers, and 
these works were specifically selected to show how composers like Chopin and 
Szymanowski made up part of a national and realist tradition.
The festival also provided an ideal opportunity to influence professional 
music groups such as orchestras, as well as their directors and conductors. The 
party wanted more generally to change the nature of concert programs, which it 
considered too often conservative and lacking in sufficient and appropriate con-
temporary works. Deputy Minister Sokorski stated: “The festival should be a 
turning point in this crisis situation, in which concert programs presently show a 
banal and mechanical character.”22 In the festival bureau’s official communica-
tions, this issue was also frequently emphasized:
A new detail is the inclusion of mass songs in the concert programs, which 
attests to the breaking with previous conventions and other misguided tradi-
tions in the programs of the orchestras . . . the festival permits the state operas 
and orchestras to undertake an overview of their achievements to this date, 
while at the same time confirming shortcomings and mistakes in their work 
and will therefore result in the development of a new style of their work.23
Similar to their aims vis-à-vis composers, cultural officials viewed the festivals 
as an opportunity for conductors and music directors to transform themselves and 
their worldviews so as to conform to the party’s aims.
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Cultural officials viewed the first Festival of Polish Music as an opportunity 
to mobilize composers, musicians, and society in support of party goals. It sought 
to influence and control both the musical elites and the masses through the prepa-
rations and performances of this massive and wide-ranging undertaking. As the 
president of the Composers’ Union, Tadeusz Szeligowski, put it in the program 
book for the festival’s concluding phase, “We will continue to fight for the most 
expressive content of our musical works, and for a sensibility capable of cooperat-
ing in the creation of contemporary man.”24 The party did obtain enthusiastic par-
ticipation by composers, musicians, amateur groups, and the population at large, 
and proclaimed the festival a success. The second attempt at such a festival a few 
years later, however, was far different and came together in a significantly altered 
form from the first, reflecting the larger political changes occurring at the time 
in Poland. Polish composers and other musical elites had gained a considerable 
amount of autonomy and acted to resist the party’s push for a festival that embod-
ied only official ideology and goals. As we have seen, by 1953 the thaw was setting 
in throughout Polish society, and the party undertook a thoroughgoing review of its 
policies, even as composers pushed for more professional and aesthetic freedom.
Although not in fact realized until 1955, officials had originally planned the 
second Festival of Polish Music for 1953, and early organizational efforts in the 
Ministry of Culture continued to call for the presentation of socialist-realist mu-
sic.25 In December 1953, Minister Sokorski still talked about the next festival as 
a site for “expressing the battle for a new music,” but, much like in the cultural 
world more generally, a softening of the line seemed to be underway as he men-
tioned socialist realism far less frequently.26 Sokorski and composers agreed that 
the festival would feature works from the entire postwar period, which created 
space for music that did not fit a strict definition of socialist realism or of the 
party’s cultural norms.27 By the fall of 1954, even the hardliners in the Culture 
Department of the party’s Central Committee acknowledged that a broad range 
of works could be performed during the festival, including those previously criti-
cized as formalist like Lutosławski’s First Symphony or Turski’s Olympic Sym-
phony.28 During a special council called by the party in late November 1954, 
communist composers and musicologists complained bitterly about the direction 
of the preparations for the festival, including the planned performance of many 
works deemed formalist, but their cautionary words went unheeded.29 The major-
ity of composers were determined to press for compositional freedom, and the 
PZPR was gradually losing control over the cultural realm.
In a significant difference from the overweening party control of the first 
festival in 1951, the Composers’ Union took the responsibility for the planning 
of the second during the course of 1954. The more independent, younger com-
posers Tadeusz Baird and Kazimierz Serocki pushed through a less ideologi-
cally engaged program over the protests of hardliners within the union like the 
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communist musicologist Zofia Lissa.30 Despite occasional interventions by party 
and government figures, the state organs and officials that undertook most of the 
work for the first festival were largely absent from the second; ad hoc committees 
comprised composers and state representatives, but the former held the “decisive 
voice.”31 Even a proposed organizational committee staffed by functionaries in 
the ministry never materialized, allowing composers to plan the festival in a more 
open way, one more consonant with the majority’s less rigidly politicized beliefs 
about music.32 Various party pronouncements nonetheless still echoed the goals 
seen in the first festival of 1951 and showed a continued aspiration to influence 
composers, but the party was simply too disorganized, and lacked sufficient sup-
port in the union, to push through its aims at this time.
The second festival finally began on January 17, 1955 and ran until May 20 
of that year, thus spanning a time period less than half as long as that of the first. 
The festival comprised 250 performances, including 163 symphony orchestra 
concerts, and had a total attendance of 150,000. The program featured roughly 
450 works by 119 composers, with 320 of those works by 80 living compos-
ers.33 The number of contemporary works exceeded that of the first festival, prob-
ably because composers could present a wider range of works, including those 
not fully consonant with the socialist-realist canon. In a significant difference 
from the first festival, concerts focused almost exclusively on these contempo-
rary works, and composers from the past were only lightly programmed. The 
number of concerts was smaller than that of the first festival, due to the fact that 
few amateur groups took part. Festival organizers claimed that these groups were 
preparing at the time for the Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students, which 
took place in Warsaw in the summer of 1955.34 Although certainly true, a not 
unimportant factor was the desire of most composers to have the festival focus 
on the more serious works they preferred to compose, works not appropriate for 
performance by an amateur ensemble.
Composers did not ignore the wider population, however, and discussed the 
audience at many of the planning meetings for the festival. Indeed, in the mid-
1950s, as earlier in the decade, composers kept society in mind during the com-
positional process. But there was a noticeable shift in focus: whereas during the 
first festival the party pressed composers to write for the “masses,” during the 
second composers created more as they desired, and in a sense tried to bring the 
masses to them. In the view of some sympathetic to the party, such efforts proved 
less than successful, as musicologist Stefan Jarociński charged that composers’ 
isolation from society and lack of political engagement had produced indiffer-
ence among potential audiences, and another critic accused composers of not 
reaching out to the population through discussions and meetings.35
Nonetheless, many concerts sold out, and festival organizers estimated the 
overall attendance at 60 to 70 percent of capacity. Baird also noted a fair amount 
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of disagreement about the level of attendance, as some composers felt it had been 
poor. Artur Malawski blamed the weak works selected for some concerts, while Pi-
otr Perkowski felt that more appealing, noncontemporary works should have been 
included in some of the programs. In a more optimistic assessment, Baird noted that 
several foreign guests were quite impressed with the audience size.36
With respect to the conductors and orchestras, the composers and the union 
had a great deal of difficulty getting them to perform the desired works. In the 
fall of 1954, they organized two meetings with conductors and music directors 
to plan which orchestras would perform which new works.37 The composers en-
countered a fair amount of resistance, usually due to the difficulty of the works 
and fears that audience attendance would be low at concerts featuring more de-
manding contemporary music. Ensemble directors and their audiences favored 
more accessible works to the more difficult pieces preferred by composers. As 
the concert dates approached, this problem became even more apparent as many 
conductors unilaterally dropped certain contemporary pieces from the program.38 
Interestingly, the pressure from the party in 1951 produced more effective results 
than the lobbying by composers of their conductor colleagues in 1955.
While the second festival shared some of the characteristics with the first, 
it was much closer to the openness and experimentation of the Warsaw Autumn 
Festival that began just over a year later in 1956. Annually starting in 1958, this 
festival still continues today, and symbolized the final break with socialist real-
ism and an engagement with the modern music of the West. Musical ensembles 
from both West and East performed there, with contemporary music from Polish 
and Soviet-bloc composers, as well as works by Western composers formerly 
condemned as anathema, like Schoenberg, Berg, and Stravinsky.39 By the mid-
1950s, then, the PZPR’s dreams for a didactic festival culture that would create 
a socialist polity lay in ruins. The impressive manifestation of its program and 
vision embodied in the first Festival of Polish Music did not survive. The com-
posers who had embraced the party’s aims in 1951 had grown disillusioned. They 
remade the second iteration of the festival to their own liking, and then launched 
a more exclusive, international festival catering to more serious and modernist 
music. Popular audiences turned towards newer festivals coming to prominence 
that focused on popular song or jazz.40
Major Festivals in East Germany
A handful of significant music festivals also took place across the GDR dur-
ing the first half of the 1950s, the majority of which were marked by strong 
party influence. These major festivals included the 1952 Festtage in Berlin and 
the 1954 Musikfest in Leipzig, both associated with regular congresses of the 
Union of German Composers and Musicologists (VDK), as well as the Festtage 
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neuer Musik (Festival of New Music) in Leipzig in 1955, a festival explicitly 
organized in opposition to the party’s wishes and thus somewhat similar to the 
second Festival of Polish Music. While these East German festivals were not of 
the same length and scale as the festivals in Poland, they fulfilled similar func-
tions of highlighting a certain kind of musical work and of bringing that music to 
a wider audience.
The first major music festival was the Festtage zeitgenössischer Musik 
(Festival of Contemporary Music) in Berlin, held in conjunction with the First 
Congress of the VDK, from September 27 to October 6, 1952. As the festival 
was linked to the newly formed union and thus a showpiece event, both party 
and government officials, as well as the composers themselves, placed great im-
portance on the selection of the pieces to be performed. A dozen or so concerts 
included programs featuring many new works by GDR composers. These were 
organized loosely by genre, and included several of instrumental music and a 
handful devoted to mass songs or cantatas.41 Though not a high priority, attempts 
were made to include workers in the audience. One concert featuring contem-
porary mass songs and cantatas by East German luminaries like Hanns Eisler 
and Paul Dessau and sung by the legendary communist singer Ernst Busch took 
place at the Bergmann-Borsig factory and was eagerly received by the workers 
there.42 A delegation from the factory also came to the union congress itself and 
expressed enthusiasm for the new, socialist-realist music and called for “a good, 
lively light music, a useful music that will help working people to relax after ful-
filling the plan.”43 In general, however, workers did not attend most of the 1952 
festival concerts, a fact remedied at the next festival.44
Cultural officials took a very active role in trying to shape the kinds of works 
that made it onto these festival concert programs. Working with the union leader-
ship, they encouraged composers to create acceptably socialist-realist works, and 
then rewarded those who complied with performances of those works. The push 
by the party to have the Festtage program dominated by its ideological vision led 
to conflicts with composers, especially those who were not party members. Most 
rank-and-file composers sympathized with the party’s goals, but only to a point. 
The Stakuko, however, true to its totalizing mission, wanted every composer to 
share all its aims, and urged the receptive VDK leaders to involve each union mem-
ber in the project of performing and discussing ideologically appropriate works at 
the festival: “the responsibility of the Executive Committee [of the VDK] is to 
develop the broad, comprehensive and active participation of all composers.”45 
The SED made great efforts to win artists to its program, and saw this festival as 
an ideal opportunity to mobilize composers to take part in a party-approved event.
Problems and controversy surrounded the selection of the works for the 1952 
Festtage, however. Proposed works were first examined at the regional level in 
the genre sections, then passed on to the genre commissions, the specialized 
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national committees organized by type of music. These commissions, made up 
of a wide cross-section of composers, analyzed the works and decided which 
they deemed suitable and worthy of performance at the festival. An overarching 
Programmkommission, consisting largely of Berlin VDK Executive Committee 
members closely linked to the party, made the final decisions on the makeup of 
the concerts. It altered or ignored many of the recommendations of the genre 
commissions in the interest of creating a more ideological program with a greater 
number of works by party-linked composers, especially the well-known ones in 
Berlin. Several months before the Festtage, the director of the Music Department 
of the Stakuko, Rudolf Hartig, met with the head of this Programmkommission 
and stressed the party’s hard ideological line: “With respect to the acceptance 
of individual works, one should not proceed by accepting those works that are 
considered tolerable from a so-called purely musical standpoint, but rather one 
should accept works that have truly new musical content and reflect the societal 
reality of our time.”46 The message was clear: only socialist-realist works desired 
by the party should make the cut for the festival program. During the congress 
linked to the Festtage, union president Ottmar Gerster tried to defuse criticism 
about the selection process by claiming simply not enough space in the festi-
val existed, and that the rejected works would receive a performance at another 
time.47 Resentment among ordinary members, especially those from the prov-
inces like Johannes Thilman and Iwan Schönebaum from Dresden, erupted dur-
ing discussions at the congress, but the party’s priority to feature socialist-realist 
works and to pressure composers to create in this style held sway.48
Despite this composer dissatisfaction, in the immediate aftermath cultural of-
ficials maintained a hard line: “The point of the Festtage was to show the state of 
contemporary musical production in the GDR, taking into account the socialist-
realist point of view,” and claimed it was “a success in political, professional, 
and ideological respects.”49 Upon reflection a few months later, however, cultural 
official Uszkoreit qualified this statement: “The Festtage zeitgenössischer Musik 
exhibited . . . a large number of formalist works.”50 Despite, or perhaps because 
of this controversy over the nature of the music selected, the Stakuko reaffirmed 
its commitment to influence festival programs in its plans immediately after the 
Festtage, and the stage was set for clashes at the next major festival linked to a 
Union Congress, in 1954.51 Cultural officials had indeed created a precedent dur-
ing this first festival; they would expend political capital and risk angering some 
composers in the interests both of promoting the ideal of socialist realism and of 
trying to encourage and influence their production. Not all accepted this state of 
affairs without complaint and they pushed back in the future.
That next major festival was the Musikfest des VDK, also connected to a 
Composer’s Union Congress, and took place in Leipzig in late October 1954. The 
Uprising of June 17 the previous year had taken both artists and party officials by 
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surprise, and thus a focus on making contact with the masses was stronger than 
during the previous festival. Officials in the Culture Section of the SED’s Central 
Committee expressed their goals on the eve of the Musikfest: “The point is not to 
present our contemporary musical production in the form of interesting concerts 
that display today’s ‘sound,’ but rather to prove how composers and musicolo-
gists are fulfilling their societal mission as ‘engineers of the human soul.’”52 Party 
officials wanted socialist-realist music, and particularly desired the potential ef-
fects of this music on the rest of the population. During the discussion at the 
congress, the links between music and society were frequently mentioned, as 
when Ernst Hermann Meyer stated in reference to one of the festival concerts: 
“music has an important function in shaping [peoples’] consciousness,” and other 
composers like Cilenšek and Köhler called on their colleagues to compose for 
the masses in order win them over to the SED’s program, as well as to lift their 
cultural level in general.53
The Musikfest organizers from the union made a great effort to invite workers 
to the various concerts, and indeed encouraged composers to meet with ordinary 
audience members after performances, while inviting others to join associated 
discussions. After the concert on October 26, which included Günter Raphael’s 
Sinfonia breve (1949), Rudolf Wagner-Régeny’s Suite from the opera Persische 
Episode (1951), Helmut Riethmüller’s Divertimento for Piano and Horns, and Ott-
mar Gerster’s Second Symphony (Thüringische, 1953), female workers from a 
Leipzig factory found the first two works, “Dreadful! Horrible!,” but were pleased 
by Gerster’s piece, considered one of the model socialist-realist works.54 Most au-
dience members also seemed to enjoy the Gerster, but the other works came under 
heavy criticism. Raphael’s piece sounded to one woman like “children pounding 
on the piano,” and other audience members said “it gave me nothing” or “there 
was no heart and soul in it.”55 The writer Jens Gerlach claimed that many audi-
ence members at the Musikfest concert in fact enjoyed the work, something he 
deplored as he found the work a “distorting mirror” and a “mephistophelean no.”56 
An official from Erfurt claimed that most audience members disliked the works 
and regretted buying tickets.57 Another congress participant criticized all the works 
but Gerster’s, saying they were technically good, but “not from the heart . . . they 
will never appeal to the workers, never!” Yet another noted that a large portion of 
the audience left after the first half.58 The positive reception of Gerster’s clearly 
socialist-realist work motivated cultural officials both to press composers for simi-
lar works and to reach out to a wider audience.
This contact between composers and workers climaxed in the appearance at the 
related VDK Congress of two workers from the Leuna factory “Walter Ulbricht.” 
As referenced in the introduction, composers had traveled the night before to the 
outskirts of Leipzig to attend the concert in the factory clubhouse with the workers 
there. The program consisted of contemporary works by both younger and older 
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GDR composers, including Max Dehnert’s Merry Prelude for Orchestra (Heiteres 
Vorspiel für Orchester, 1949), Paul Kurzbach’s Divertimento for Small Orchestra 
(Divertimento für kleines Orchester, 1954), Dieter Nowka’s Concerto for Oboe and 
Orchestra (Konzert für Oboe und Orchester), three arias from Jean Kurt Forest’s 
opera Patriots (Patrioten, 1951), and Max Butting’s Sixth Symphony (1945/53). 
Otto Schnell communicated his disappointment with the concert in strong words 
and encouraged composers to write music more accessible and enjoyable upon 
initial exposure, like that of Tchaikovsky.59 The evocation of a Russian composer—
a politically savvy reference, to be sure—clearly indicates Schnell’s ears were not 
untutored, and his bluntness impressed those present. Max Dehnert, for example, 
declared that he accepted the criticism and would give it considered thought.60 
Composers took these and similar comments seriously, and discussed how best to 
write for audiences at this and other meetings, and even formed personal relation-
ships with individual factories in order to be in contact with and help musically edu-
cate workers. Max Butting, for instance, had revised his Sixth Symphony—begun 
in 1945, and grappling with the war and the arrival of the Red Army—several times 
through 1953, and tried more generally at this time to write for a wider audience, as 
for example music intended for workplace celebrations.61
A group of workers greets composers assembled for the second German Composers’ Union 
Congress in Leipzig on October 25, 1954. The slogan in the background reads: “The beauty, 
greatness, and depth of our new life should ring out in our music” (Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-
27132-0007 / photographer: Illner).
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Schnell’s colleague Horst Irrgang, choral director at the factory, also spoke, 
and related the lively and lengthy postconcert discussion he had organized among 
workers, musicians, and composers. Irrgang talked about the active musical life 
at the factory, and encouraged composers to write for and make contact with 
these workers. He further called on composers to help explain their new works 
at performances, and even suggested including a hundred or so workers in all 
the aspects of the VDK’s Congresses, in order to expose the workers to musical 
debate, and to have their voices heard during such a discussion.62 Audience mem-
bers embraced the opportunity to give feedback and thereby shape and influence 
the nature of festival concerts.
While the VDK did not follow Irrgang’s suggestion to include workers in 
union discussions, cultural officials and the VDK leadership emphasized these 
contacts between composers and workers and made this a main theme of the 1954 
festival. Their goals were twofold: to encourage composers to assist the party 
in influencing and reaching out to ordinary citizens, and to control the compos-
ers themselves by insisting that they compose in a certain way. Most composers 
shared this broad goal, but a significant minority disagreed with the party’s near-
monopoly over the organization of festivals.
As had been the case in the 1952 festival, controversy at this 1954 Musikfest 
also occurred with respect to the selection process of the works to be performed. 
Party and ministry officials continued their close involvement in the prepara-
tion and conception of the program, once again desiring to influence the kind 
of musical production undertaken by composers by promoting the performance 
of ideologically appropriate works. Yet again, the Executive Committee in Ber-
lin, made up of prominent composers and musicologists closely linked to the 
SED, had the main input into a program the party deemed ideologically suitable; 
and again the VDK leadership made significant changes to what the specialized 
genre commissions had recommended. Resistance came most specifically from 
a group of composers in Leipzig, whom central officials accused of opportunis-
tically using the New Course as a pretext to have their perhaps slightly more 
experimental compositions performed.63 After a rather contentious debate at the 
congress itself, participants decided that only works approved by the relevant 
genre commissions could be included at such festivals—and thus not pieces 
added solely at the discretion of the union leadership—but the ultimate decision 
making remained in the hands of the centralized, party-linked Programmkom-
mission.64 Cultural officials and the Union Executive did make a minor conces-
sion here, but successfully retained ultimate control over the content of these 
centralized festivals in theory and largely in practice.65 The Leipzig composers 
remained frustrated, however, and decided to flout party control one year later 
by organizing their own festival.
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The conflict between state cultural officials and union leaders on the 
one hand, and rank-and-file composers on the other, reached a peak in the 
preparations surrounding this next major festival, the Festival of New Music 
(Festtage neuer Musik), held in Leipzig from October 16-23, 1955. Largely or-
ganized by the Leipzig branch of the Composers’ Union, with some help from 
regional state officials, this festival consisted of seven concerts that mostly 
featured works by local composers, with a few pieces by other GDR compos-
ers, Kazimierz Serocki from Poland, and Shostakovich. Reacting to what they 
perceived as unfair exclusionary treatment at the two congress-linked music 
festivals, the Leipzig composers packed the festival program with their own 
works. The complicated, often antagonistic interaction between Hans-Georg 
Uszkoreit, head of the Music Department in the Ministry of Culture, and com-
posers and officials in Leipzig demonstrates the importance cultural officials 
placed on having festival programs of which they approved. This controversy 
also shows how composers successfully maneuvered around this pressure so as 
to assert their own agenda.
Uszkoreit strongly disapproved of the program of the festival, consisting as 
it did largely of works by local composers willing to challenge the SED. In an 
effort to effect changes, he wrote to both the VDK Executive in Berlin, as well as 
to the local cultural officials in Leipzig. Uszkoreit urged the union leadership to 
support the festival only after “the program would be fundamentally changed,” 
since he felt it marked by “local patriotism” and “opportunism,” and “grants out-
standing positions in the program to composers who both in their personal at-
titudes as well as compositional work cannot be called friends of the GDR.”66 
In a related letter to the local state authorities, Uszkoreit asked for alterations to 
the festival program, claiming that it “shows no conscious strengthening of new 
socialist-realist compositions . . . [it] does not show suitable respect, nor do no-
table service, for the development of progressive contemporary musical produc-
tion in the GDR.”67 After meeting with the regional union leadership in Leipzig, 
the local government official in charge of culture perhaps surprisingly sided with 
the Leipzig composers, and supported the latter’s contention that they had been 
unfairly discriminated against in having their works rejected for performance 
on other occasions. The local official further claimed that the best way to influ-
ence the composers and encourage them to produce more ideologically appropri-
ate works was to adhere to the current festival program and have a lively and 
politicized discussion about those works.68 The only concession to Uszkoreit’s 
demands seems to have been a minimal one—a concert of taped works by Paul 
Dessau and Ernst Hermann Meyer. Uszkoreit’s ultimately unsuccessful efforts 
show the importance cultural officials placed on influencing musical production 
and controlling composers and also the ability of composers to negotiate with and 
indeed defy the central authorities.
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The Leipzig composers sent Uszkoreit a letter both conciliatory and defen-
sive a month after the event. They stressed that it had been important to perform 
much of this new music for the first time, but also acknowledged they should 
have chosen the performed works more carefully—though they pointed only 
to a few smaller pieces by lesser-known composers. The festival organizers did 
agree with the SED’s desire to expose large numbers of people to this music, 
and shrewdly used this party-sanctioned goal as a justification for their actions. 
In their self-critical appraisal of the festival, the Leipzig VDK discussed this is-
sue for future festivals: “it is necessary . . . to enable a true meeting between the 
broader working public and our composers, to give the public a glimpse into the 
work of our composers, while also testing the worth and effects of their work 
in the resonance of the public.”69 Though the Leipzig composers may not have 
shared all of the political goals of the SED and its cultural officials, they did agree 
on the view that composers should try to make contact with and influence society. 
Especially in the atmosphere of the New Course, the Leipzig festival succeeded 
in realizing composer aims in opposition to the party.
The first two festivals organized in the GDR had many similarities with 
the 1951 first Festival of Polish Music. Cultural officials in both countries took 
an active role in organizing events that would promote a political and aesthetic 
program stamped by party-approved ideology. Both composers and society par-
ticipated actively in an event that buttressed the parties’ legitimacy and helped 
them to promote a vision of a patriotic and socialist polity. The second Festival 
of Polish Music, and to a lesser extent the Leipzig festival of 1955, mark an 
important point in the musical-political histories of the two countries, as com-
posers premiered works that did not explicitly subscribe to the party’s socialist-
realist ideology. In Poland, the PZPR had lost a significant amount of control 
over this important group of cultural producers, and thus over the symbols and 
messages spread by them as well, and was never able to reassert its control. In 
the GDR, the SED continued to exercise a great deal of influence over similar 
festivals, though the 1955 Leipzig festival shows that composers were at times 
able to achieve a measure of their own goals. Furthermore, overlapping and 
mutable groupings made up of both officials and composers worked together 
and at cross-purposes, creating a more vibrant festival culture—and musical life 
more generally.
Local and Amateur Music Festivals
Both countries featured a number of smaller music festivals, which in the view 
of East German officials in particular had the potential for significant impact at 
the regional level. In Poland, these were infrequent and relatively small-scale, as 
for example the Kraków Days lasting for less than a week every few years. The 
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GDR, however, inherited a rich tradition of music festivals organized in smaller- 
and medium-sized cities, and these festivals reached the same strata of citizens 
as those in Poland who attended the more numerous concerts of the large Polish 
festivals. The SED exerted its influence here as well to propagate its aims and 
influence among both musical producers and society.
Local Festivals
One important and representative mid-size music festival was the Thuringian 
Festival of Contemporary Music, held in Weimar in 1952, 1954, and on an an-
nual basis thereafter. This festival sought to attract like-minded composers from 
West Germany to promote the idea that artistic currents in the GDR appealed 
to composers all across Germany and to try to convince West Germans that a 
vibrant culture not only existed in the East, but indeed was superior to that in the 
West. The Ministry of Culture took an active hand in overseeing and organizing 
the festival, and the local Composers’ Union branch followed a line accept-
able to the Stakuko’s Music Department. Organizers divided concert programs 
roughly equally between works by composers from the GDR and West Ger-
many. The first festival took place in June 1952 and was called an “all-German” 
event that attracted many West Germans to concerts that included works by 
Gerster and Shostakovich.70
To decide on an appropriate program for the second iteration two years 
later, a group of Weimar composers met nineteen times and discussed 77 works, 
most by fellow local composers, but also including well-known party-approved 
pieces by the likes of Ottmar Gerster and Max Butting, and even by Soviet 
composers Aram Khachaturian and Prokofiev. Some of the party’s favored 
genres, like mass songs and cantatas, were underrepresented due to the fact that 
local composers had not worked much with these forms, but they promised to 
rectify this lacuna in the future.71 Composers’ Union president Gerster praised 
these programs that emerged during “detailed discussions” by the regional 
VDK members.72
The festival organizers made great efforts to bring more of the population 
to the concert venues. In the festival program booklet, the mayor of Weimar 
Dr. Hans Wiedemann stated: “Through the introduction of contemporary musi-
cal compositions to the broadest circles of the working people, we will make 
an essential contribution to our political task of including the entire populace 
in cultural life, so that our new cultural flowering will in reality be carried and 
supported by all the people.”73 The festival organizers engaged a popular local 
conductor, Kurt Müller, to publicize the festival among the workers of the area, 
but with minimal success, thus prompting the proposal that the composers them-
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selves would go to the district’s factories and workplaces to drum up support for 
the following year’s festival.74
These festivals in Weimar were somewhat unusual in their focus on fostering 
an East-West dialogue, but were otherwise fairly typical for this genre of middle-
tier festival. Ministry officials monitored and assisted the local festival organiz-
ers, helped by the union leaders in Berlin. This control from above could be quite 
onerous, as evidenced in the resignation of the local organizer in Weimar in 1955 
because of interference from the VDK leadership.75 If, however, the organizers 
of the Weimar festival, and of other smaller festivals, followed the general guide-
lines propagated by cultural officials, such interventions were limited. When the 
festival included ideologically acceptable music and organizers made attempts to 
attract the local population to the concerts, ministry officials maintained a more 
distant advisory role.
In the mid-1950s, officials recommended that music festivals be mounted 
in even smaller towns, since there they cost less and attracted a relatively 
larger amount of attention.76 These smaller music festivals had been taking 
place throughout eastern Germany for many decades, in places like Schwerin, 
Markneukirchen, Eisenach, Rheinsberg, and Görlitz. The last two are representa-
tive examples of party involvement in festivals on this local scale, and thus of 
party aims to influence the population musically everywhere.
The town of Rheinsberg in Brandenburg had organized an annual music festi-
val since the late eighteenth century. Local party officials “took control of the fes-
tival” and focused it around the concept of cultivating past musical tradition in an 
attempt to show the party’s patronage of a progressive and national culture.77 The 
early festivals presented fairly traditional concerts of nineteenth-century classics, 
since the core aim was to introduce local workers to this music.78 In 1951, the 
concluding festival concert became yet more ambitious, as amateur groups made 
up of workers played pieces by Mozart and Schubert for their peers.79 Under pres-
sure from cultural officials in Berlin, by 1953 the organizers expanded the festival 
to add more contemporary and socialist-realist works for concertgoers. While 
the majority of the twenty or so concerts included traditional classical music, 
two concerts featured contemporary pieces, as for instance the opening-day per-
formance of Ottmar Gerster’s socialist-realist cantata, Eisenhüttenkombinat Ost. 
Several other concerts included contemporary Soviet or East German composers 
as part of the program, such as the concert “German Songs from Six Centuries,” 
which also featured music by André Asriel and Siegfried Matthus.80
The small but symbolic city of Görlitz also featured a representative music 
festival. Right on the Oder-Neisse border with Poland, Görlitz boasted of a tra-
dition of festivals dating from the nineteenth century. With its new postwar im-
portance as a border town, the festival programs perhaps unsurprisingly became 
increasingly political, as in 1951 and 1953, when the emphasis was on develop-
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ing good relations with neighboring Poland. Concerts included productions of 
nineteenth-century Polish composer Stanisław Moniuszko’s nationalist operas, 
Halka and The Haunted Manor, as well as many works by Chopin and by con-
temporary Polish composers.
The Görlitz Festival organizers desired to attract a mass audience to all the 
various concerts and indeed drew 38,000 listeners in 1951, more than half of 
whom came from local factories.81 Mayor Gleißberg stated on the occasion of the 
1954 festival: “Our working people should receive new strength and zest for the 
peaceful reconstruction of our fatherland through the experience of the music of 
the great masters of the past and present.”82 Many of the ten to twenty concerts of 
these annual Görlitzer Musikwochen were made up of traditional works by nine-
teenth-century German greats, but also featured a significant number of pieces by 
well-known composers from the Soviet Union and the other People’s Democra-
cies. Starting in 1953, festival organizers added more works by contemporary 
composers from the GDR, and often in concerts that also featured beloved clas-
sics, a mix that helped assure healthy audience numbers.83 Not infrequently, the 
composer himself would show up for a discussion related to the concert. Amateur 
groups performed many concerts, while others by professional musicians often 
took place directly in the factories.
Officials regularly organized such music festivals in small- and medium-
sized towns across the GDR. They generally realized one of the party’s main 
goals with respect to music: to present the works of approved past masters and 
the best of contemporary socialist-realist production to a large cross-section of 
the citizenry. They, along with the rural music festivals discussed below, were 
perhaps the premier example of the ministry’s goals for music festivals: “to intro-
duce the broadest possible circles of the population to music, while at the same 
time introducing artists to the people.”84 Composers, musicians and the popula-
tion participated together in a party-directed project that provided opportunities 
for ideological education in an entertaining environment.
Amateur Festivals
In both countries, cultural officials organized a large number of festivals to 
involve amateur musical groups in activities under the aegis of the parties. 
These amateur festivals provided officials an opportunity to increase contact 
with many people in a more casual setting arranged by the parties. Such fes-
tivals were generally linked to competitions among non-professional groups 
across each country; the best ensembles advanced to a series of concerts in a 
main city for the final celebration. In Poland, annual festivals encouraged and 
structured significant amateur musical activity. Some of the more notable ex-
amples were the Festival of Amateur Musical Groups of 1953, which featured 
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200,000 participants in 900 choirs, 273 brass bands, and 40 song and dance 
groups. Another festival organized by the Central Council of the Trade Unions 
in 1954 had 1420 choral groups, 1300 dance groups, 902 instrumental groups, 
and 42 song and dance groups.85 In the competitions to decide who would take 
part in the Fifth World Festival of Youth and Students, held in Warsaw in 1955, 
roughly 25,000 ensembles and soloists competed.86 And as we have seen, both 
Festivals of Polish Music also incorporated the participation of amateur musi-
cal ensembles. This mass involvement reached truly astonishing levels during 
the stalinist era.
In the GDR, the festivals that perhaps best expressed the party’s goal of mo-
bilizing broad swaths of society to partake in party-sanctioned musical events 
were the German Festivals of Folk Art (Deutsche Festspiele der Volkskunst), held 
in 1952 and 1954. These festivals sought to have amateur musical groups per-
form politically acceptable folk music as well as newer socialist-realist works 
like Eisler’s New German Folk Songs (Neue deutsche Volkslieder) or Meyer’s 
Mansfelder Oratorium. Contests in the provinces in which six to seven thousand 
amateur groups took part then concluded with several days of concerts by the best 
groups.87 The first festival of 1952 took place in Berlin and offered a handful of 
concerts over a long July weekend. It culminated in a massive concert in the cen-
ter of town, where "all of Berlin dance[d] on the Marx-Engels-Platz!”88 Cultural 
officials viewed the Festspiele in these typical terms: “This bursting forth of the 
creative power of our people . . . is mirrored in the creative work of our profes-
sional and amateur artists, and will be, along with the cultivation of our cultural 
heritage, the content of the German Festival of Folk Art.”89 The Festspiele pro-
vided an ideal opportunity for the party to link the “creative power” of the popu-
lation, or perhaps the simple desire to have fun, to its goals. Further, the inclusion 
and popularization of works by great German composers sought to demonstrate 
that the party was the true custodian of a progressive German culture.
For the second German Festival of Folk Art two years later, officials ex-
panded the competition among the various amateur groups, climaxing in the 
actual Festspiele in Park Sanssouci in Potsdam. Juries evaluated the ensembles 
based on socialist-realist principles. In the view of cultural authorities, these com-
petitions “lead to political and professional qualifications . . . [and] contribute 
to the development of our progressive culture, in that they strengthen the artis-
tic work of the people, increase the artistic achievements of the workers . . . at 
the same time, our artists work more closely with the workers in the amateur 
groups and create works for them.”90 These Festspiele in the GDR, as well as 
other similar amateur festivals in both countries, embodied the festival ideal to 
which the parties aspired: professional artists working with ordinary people in a 
party-directed project to create a new and socialist culture.
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The choir and orchestra of the Leipzig Iron- and Steelworks on stage and surrounded by 
portraits, clockwise from left, of SED General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, President Wilhelm 
Pieck, and Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl (SLUB Dresden / Abt. Deutsche Fotothek, Roger 
& Renate Rössing, October 1954).
Rural Music Festivals in the GDR
Both the SED and the PZPR made considerable efforts to bring music out to 
the countryside in order to extend politicized music to the most remote villages 
of each country. In Poland, this effort took the form of concerts organized by 
the state concert agency, Artos, discussed in the following chapter. The GDR’s 
equivalent agency did the same, but East German cultural officials additionally 
worked to organize a large number of rural music festivals, known as the ländli-
che Musiktage. Music for the countryside became a focus of greater attention in 
the aftermath of the Uprising of June 17, 1953, when the party struggled to im-
prove conditions for all sectors of society and convince all citizens of the SED’s 
legitimacy and authority. The rural festivals aimed to serve as “the great cultural-
political lever that will help us fulfill the demands of the Seventeenth Plenum,” 
with its emphasis on the rural areas.91 The SED believed bringing music to the 
nonurban masses would help spread its message and establish legitimacy in all 
areas of the country.
The district of Rostock organized the first of what would come to be referred 
to as ländliche Musiktage from December 6-12, 1953. As the planning for these 
festivals began in advance of the party’s intensified focus on rural areas, the Ros-
tock district’s festivals anticipated the leading edge of this adjustment in SED 
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cultural policies. The goal of the cultural authorities in Rostock was to mobilize 
professional and amateur musicians to perform music for a wide and non-tradi-
tional audience. During that first iteration, 354 concerts took place in nearly ev-
ery village in Rostock’s seven sub-districts (Kreise) and attracted the impressive 
number of 40,000 listeners. The organizers in Rostock congratulated themselves 
for bringing serious music to those who had never heard it before, and made 
ambitious claims about winning the ears of the rural population for this music.92
Officials in the Ministry of Culture seized on the Rostock festival as a model 
for the proposed rural music festivals to be instituted all across the GDR. As with 
other areas of musical life, they concluded that the Rostock concerts “created an 
example of how the consciousness of humans can be developed in a progressive 
sense through the influence of music . . . this example will then be spread over 
all regions,” and made it ministry policy to encourage at least one rural festival 
per district per year.93 To help jump-start the formation of these festivals, the 
ministry arranged for special financial support to be made available from the 
state cultural funds from 1954 to 1956.94 The ministry particularly prioritized 
the bringing of musical culture to the rural areas, since the officials believed that 
music represented “an effective means of political-educational work with respect 
to the masses.”95 Officials felt these festivals provided a method of creating the 
model socialist citizen, and also helped to “overcome the cultural backwardness 
of the village.”96 Alongside pedagogical aims, enjoyment and entertainment were 
of course also important goals of the concerts, as seen in the program booklet 
from the district of Grevesmühlen: “The aims of the festival are to bring joy and 
gaiety to our people through music, and to acquaint them with the works of our 
present and past masters.”97 Professional and amateur musicians from city and 
countryside came together to perform for rural audiences during these festivals. 
Cultural officials thereby hoped to promote solidarity among different sectors of 
the population, and to realize the goals of collapsing the distinction between high 
and low culture, and between urban and rural citizens. In sum, cultural officials 
viewed these concerts as an effective way of making contact with and influenc-
ing the rural population while presenting the party’s program in a positive light.
The rural festivals generally consisted of small-scale concerts, performed by 
local orchestras, chamber music groups, or soloists. Audiences numbered usually 
in the dozens, or sometimes hundreds. High-ranking officials in the ministry de-
bated and experimented with the programming for these concerts in the different 
districts to strike a balance between ideological considerations and audience sat-
isfaction. In the early days of the ländliche Musiktage in 1954, ministry officials 
pushed for more contemporary socialist-realist music at these festivals, but this 
strategy made it quite difficult to attract a sufficient audience, as happened at sev-
eral concerts during Neubrandenburg’s festivals in 1955 and 1956.98 A concert of 
serious music in Halle had similar problems, but at this early stage the ministry 
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preferred to blame the population’s low interest on the local officials’ failure to 
work hard enough to convince people to come.99 At the other extreme, one series 
of concerts in Magdeburg featured Verdi arias, considered ideologically worth-
less by the central authorities, and the ministry came down hard on officials there 
for “orienting to the preferred wishes of the orchestra leaders, rather than taking 
into account the formation and education of the listeners.”100
A happy medium, which attracted respectable audience numbers while satis-
fying the ministry’s push to have a political thrust behind the program, developed 
slowly. Playing less-demanding works by ideologically appropriate German mas-
ters pleased listeners while passing political muster; such concerts contributed 
to cultivating the classical tradition as defined by the party and also fulfilled the 
political goal of bringing culture to the masses. Other concerts featured gehobene 
Unterhaltungsmusik, or more refined light music, often written by contemporary 
composers and having at least a vaguely ideological cast.101 By 1956, the ministry 
had made a tactical decision to reduce the number of politicized contemporary 
works in these concerts in order to educate the ears of rural populations more 
gradually.102 Concertgoers thus succeeded in negotiating for concerts they found 
more pleasing. If the party pushed programs consisting of strict socialist-realist 
works too far, the concert halls remained empty. Cultural officials acquiesced to 
programs that generally contained ideologically acceptable crowd-pleasers, with 
an occasional lighter contemporary work included as well.
The cultural departments of the governing council of each district bore re-
sponsibility for the organization of these rural festivals, and the ministry officials 
in Berlin encouraged them to coordinate effectively. The party viewed this project 
in explicitly cultural-political terms, and the ministry came down hard on those 
districts that did not put on good festivals.103 It constantly exhorted local officials 
to organize more fully and stretch the available funds as far as possible. The 
opinions of Leipzig district officials that the well-planned 1954 festival in subdis-
trict Torgau, with its ten concerts and 1000 listeners, simply did not accomplish 
enough in relation to the resources invested, did not deter the central ministry in 
Berlin from pushing its aims with renewed vigor in 1955.104 It criticized other 
districts strongly for not doing more; officials in Cottbus, for example, were taken 
to task for pushing most of the work onto the local branch of the state concert 
agency and relying too heavily on the local orchestra instead of trying to promote 
the involvement of amateur groups.105 In another case, the ministry reprimanded 
local officials in Magdeburg for not using festival subsidies properly, for present-
ing concerts that did not contribute to the ideological formation of the audiences 
(for instance, the concert of Verdi arias mentioned above), and for in general 
ignoring its “diverse recommendations.”106 Central Ministry officials constantly 
found themselves admonishing local officials for using funds to subsidize previ-
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ously planned concerts by local orchestras when that money was to be used for 
planning new concerts in the spirit of the ländliche Musiktage.
By 1957, these rural festivals had been taking place for several years, with 
the ministry well pleased at the progress in many regions, especially in the early 
model district of Rostock. Other districts, like Cottbus and Frankfurt/Oder, were 
less organized and had few or no festivals, despite continued pressure from the 
ministry in Berlin, in yet another example of central party authorities struggling 
to implement their aims. Nonetheless, the party and ministry considered the rural 
festivals a political and cultural success, as well as a key means of both spreading 
a message to a broader section of society and involving these citizens in its aims. 
The rural population generally seemed to attend and appreciate these festivals, 
especially after it had forced a recalibration to more entertaining and less politi-
cized concerts around 1955.
Conclusion
In the stalinist decade, the parties in both countries actively engaged artistic elites 
and society more broadly in creating a master symbolic narrative that embodied 
a progressive, humanist nationalism combined with socialism. Through the in-
stitution of music festivals of all kinds, cultural officials encouraged composers 
to assist them in creating this paradigm, which, for music, was embodied in the 
concept of socialist realism. Indeed, the participation of a sufficient number of 
composers was essential, as the parties could not attempt their domination of the 
symbolic world by force alone. The SED was mostly successful in establishing its 
political-cultural vision through the many festivals in the GDR, despite notable 
exceptions where composers proved able to negotiate and achieve some of their 
own, differing objectives. In Poland, the PZPR had great success with the first 
Festival of Polish Music, though party dominance began to break down after 
1953. Thereafter, composers were able to carve out a great deal of autonomy with 
respect to the second Festival of Polish Music, and then emancipate themselves 
almost completely with the Warsaw Autumn festival starting in 1956.
Throughout both countries, amateur performers and concertgoers took part 
in and attended festivals stamped with the vision of the SED and PZPR. By par-
ticipating in and attending these politically inflected events, they at minimum 
tacitly acknowledged the legitimacy of socialist rule. They sang and heard party-
approved works from the past, as well as the ideologized production of the pres-
ent, and the messages expressed in these musical compositions filled the aural 
space of the concert hall and factory clubhouse. Of course, citizens could stay 
away from the concerts, and attendance was an abiding concern of the parties 
and festival organizers; tension always existed between fulfilling political goals 
through appropriate programming and performing popular, but ideologically 
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worthless works that would guarantee a full house. Over time and through a pro-
cess of give and take, officials arrived at concert programs that entertained and 
educated. The music festivals described here were one element of a symbolic 
universe that surrounded the composer, the factory worker, and the peasant, at 
leisure as well as at work. Though voices of dissent to the parties’ aims were 
heard and negotiation of party goals did take place, for much of the period under 
consideration, most composers and much of the population willingly participated 
in the building of the socialist project through the medium of festivals. A similar 
dynamic motivated the organization of concert life more generally, the subject of 
the final chapter.
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All over East Germany and Poland, from the hallowed chambers of the Berlin 
Staatsoper to the most basic public hall in the Polish countryside, music sup-
ported by state funds blanketed the landscape. Workers, peasants, and the tradi-
tional urban concertgoer encountered Bach and Chopin, but also cantatas about 
Stalin and mass songs praising the party, in performance spaces from traditional 
concert halls to factory clubhouses and rural venues. The entirety of this music, 
however, was not always what party officials, music ensemble directors, or audi-
ences desired. Each group played a significant role in determining what music 
appeared in public venues, as struggles and negotiation marked the emergence of 
concert life in the proclaimed new socialist era.
In addition to music festivals, concerts more generally were an effective 
means to bring music to large numbers of East Germans and Poles. The parties 
aspired to influence both the programs and ensembles involved in the countless 
concerts, large and small, organized across the two countries. The PZPR and SED 
attempted to monopolize the organization of smaller-scale concerts through a 
monopolistic, national concert agency, and pushed to clear the field of private im-
presarios. Cultural officials also strove to influence the activities of the orchestral 
ensembles of the two countries, provoking varied responses from music directors 
and musicians. The parties engineered an explosion in the number of orchestras, 
with mixed results, and also struggled to maintain control over the programming 
of these ensembles. In all areas of concert life, aspirations to total domination 
were hindered by organizational and staffing challenges, stubborn and ambitious 
ensemble leaders, underqualified and unwilling performers, and concertgoers 
reluctant to accept programs stamped with the party’s vision. Tension between 
disgruntled audiences and ambitious plans for a thoroughly ideological musical 
landscape forced officials to compromise, leading to the gradual emergence of 
the musical stage revue as well as other concert programs that both entertained 
and educated.
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The State Concert Agencies
The SED and the PZPR created extraordinary institutions that attempted to con-
trol most of the smaller-scale concerts organized in the two countries.1 The parties 
charged a state concert agency with the utopian goal of bringing music to workers 
and peasants in order to shape them into cultivated individuals. Both parties sup-
plied the definition of cultivation and, through these institutions animated by a 
belief in the transformative power of music, organized performances appropriate 
to the “new socialist person.” At the same time, cultural officials believed that 
they could secure the allegiance and loyalty of the population by bringing the best 
of past and contemporary music to untrained and presumably appreciative ears. 
To create a monopoly for approved music and thereby achieve control over the 
concert world, the parties struggled to eliminate any private concert agencies in a 
prolonged and fierce battle. These two sprawling and influential concert-organiz-
ing institutions—Artos and its successor the CZIE in Poland and the DVD and its 
replacement the DKGD in the GDR—faced challenges in mobilizing performers 
and casting an appealing yet ideological musical web over audiences.
In Poland, the formation of the state concert agency followed a pattern simi-
lar to the other institutions examined here: a basic template evolved and grew 
over the first years after the Second World War, achieved a certain stability by 
1950, peaked in influence in the early part of the next decade, and declined rap-
idly after 1953. In the immediate postwar period, the party created a Central 
Concert Bureau linked to the Polish Musicians’ Trade Union to organize musical 
events. The party folded this institution into the State Organization for Artistic 
Events, Artos, in July of 1948, and then nationalized it as an official state orga-
nization on January 1, 1950.2 Artos continued to operate until late 1954, when 
the Ministry of Art and Culture dissolved and subsumed it as part of the general 
drive to reform during destalinization. This successor institution within the min-
istry, the Central Administration for Artistic Events (Centralny Zarząd Imprez 
Estradowych, or CZIE) then took over most Artos functions.3 The ministry had 
granted Artos monopoly rights to organize concerts in October 1951, though in 
reality neither it nor the CZIE ever enjoyed such absolute control.4 And although 
Artos officially operated independently from the state and PZPR apparatus until 
its reorganization into the CZIE in 1954, in practice it functioned like a depart-
ment in the Ministry of Culture during the entire period, and indeed came under 
frequent and close scrutiny by state and party authorities. The central office in 
Warsaw had 110 workers in 1953; throughout the country, Artos employed 386 
people in 1950, a number that rose to 869 by 1953.5 Both Artos and its successor 
the CZIE played an active role outside the capital with offices scattered across the 
country.6 This apparatus, both in Warsaw and the provinces, sought to direct the 
bulk of non-orchestral concerts throughout the country.
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The equivalent institution in the GDR took shape more slowly given the 
uncertainties surrounding the political fate of Eastern Germany. After the chaos 
of World War II, a plethora of public and private bodies took part in restarting 
concert life in the Soviet Zone. The former were regionally organized at first and 
grew in importance over the next several years, especially after many private 
concert organizers collapsed with the currency reform of 1948. In the next year 
in the freshly-minted GDR, the newly formed, nationwide German Performance 
Agency (Deutsche Veranstaltungsdienst, or DVD) absorbed these regional agen-
cies.7 The Stakuko, the Ministry of Culture’s predecessor, took over the DVD in 
June 1951 in order to supervise more closely the organization of concerts and 
to help expand its role in creating ideologically appropriate programs. Then, on 
January 1, 1953, this organization became a state-owned enterprise, and was 
renamed the German Agency for Concerts and Guest Performances (Deutsche 
Konzert- und Gastspieldirektion, or DKGD).8 This organization, as well as state 
support for orchestras and musical performance more generally, made for a major 
expansion on the Nazi funding of thousands of concerts per year and subsidies for 
existing and several newly founded orchestras.9
By 1951, the East German agency had three main departments, including 
an Art Department that was the most important, in light of official emphasis on 
creating politically appropriate programs.10 Connected to the Art Department 
was a program committee that made recommendations regarding ideological 
and artistic facets of potential programs, an inspection commission (Abnahme-
Kommission) that consisted of representatives from relevant mass organizations 
and decided on the programs that would indeed be used, and an eight-person 
Autorenkollektiv that helped write new programs. As part of the New Course, 
officials added a further consultative body in 1954, a music council made up of 
composers, musicologists, and professors that met roughly bimonthly to advise 
the DKGD on its various projects. The GDR’s concert agency employed 321 
workers in 1952, including 117 in the main office in Berlin and 204 out in the six 
regional offices.11 Despite discussion of reducing the total number of workers, it 
in fact had risen to 416 by late 1954, as the number of regional offices ballooned 
to 15, and 564 by 1957.12 The hundreds of employees in each country’s agency 
testified to the importance the SED and PZPR placed on their work and mission.
Personnel Challenges
Both organizations desired to engage both highly qualified performers as well as 
administrative personnel in the project of educating, influencing, and entertain-
ing their respective populations—with decidedly mixed results on all counts. Ar-
tos made use of a qualifying committee designed to evaluate whether musicians 
and singers possessed the necessary skills, a process largely limited to artistic, 
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and not ideological, considerations.13 In practice, however, many performers in 
Artos-sponsored events had not been vetted by this committee, a situation Artos 
repeatedly vowed to rectify, with mixed results.14 Those who had in fact under-
gone committee scrutiny nonetheless often left much to be desired, as complaints 
about performers with dubious “moral” and artistic qualifications were rife.15 
And even those individuals who had received the highest qualification did not 
always seem so talented in practice, thus prompting the leaders of the Music De-
partment of Artos to demand requalification for questionable cases.16 Generally, 
the majority of performers in Artos productions received positive or acceptable 
evaluations, but negative assessments were all too frequent. One inspector rated 
an Olsztyn ensemble’s performance on “a catastrophic level . . . with gaffes of a 
political nature . . . from the entire group not a single member is worthy of con-
tinued collaboration.”17
Artos blamed part of this problem on its rapid expansion, which made it nec-
essary for regional offices to use underqualified, inexperienced, and even amateur 
performers in its concerts. In the view of central Artos officials, this state of af-
fairs was not only a disservice to audiences, but also to the artists themselves, as 
they often became ill while working under difficult conditions in the countryside, 
and in the longer term had their artistic development arrested.18 In general, Artos 
leaders wanted its administrators in the provinces to take more care in develop-
ing and employing performers.19 To this end, Artos organized ideological and 
vocational schooling for numerous artists, though officials often cancelled these 
courses due to lack of funds. In this inconsistent manner the party, through Artos, 
tried to shape these individuals as part of their goal of influencing all of society. 
Artos planned to drop the worst of the performers from its programs, even as it 
tried to expand its collaboration with quality artists.20 Tales of songs chaotically 
sung and instruments poorly played filled inspectors’ reports, although positive 
reviews of some Artos productions also exist.21
The DVD/DKGD experienced similar criticism relating to its artists, and 
offered an identical explanation: that the organization’s explosive growth and in-
creased responsibilities forced it to use performers of varying and unproven qual-
ity. Unlike Artos, which tried to supply some artistic schooling for its performers, 
the East German agency blamed the Artists’ Union for not providing proper 
training.22 Since it counted on this and other educational institutions to provide 
adequate artistic preparation, from an early stage the DVD/DKGD focused on 
“systematically attracting and systematically controlling” the best professional 
artists as well as young aspiring performers.23 This goal remained constant—in 
1956 the organization’s Music Council proposed to select and foster the best art-
ists by giving them the most prestigious concerts.24
The porous border with the West added another consideration lacking in Po-
land, as DVD/DKGD officials could hire West German soloists and ensembles, 
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which often attracted larger audiences, due probably to simple interest in the less 
familiar. The high-profile “Hour of Music,” for example, engaged artists from 
the Federal Republic in roughly one out of every five concerts during the 1954-
55 season and every seventh event in 1955-56.25 Ministry officials opposed this 
high percentage, as it claimed that 30 percent of the 2000 freelance musicians in 
the GDR were un- or underemployed. The latter individuals often complained 
bitterly about this and other perceived slights perpetrated by the DVD/DKGD.26 
The tensions involved in attracting audiences while satisfying both party and 
musicians proved to be considerable.
The leaders of both the Polish and East German agencies also strove to have 
competent and politically aware administrators working for them at all levels of 
the organization. The cadre question proved a constantly vexing one in many 
cases, however, especially with respect to coordination between the central of-
fice and the provinces. From its initial years onwards, Artos in Poland constantly 
suffered from a “paucity” of good workers that made its work much more dif-
ficult.27 Both internal and external reviews revealed numerous problems with Ar-
tos employees. An internal report charged that “administrators skimp on their 
obligations . . . even technical issues are fulfilled negligently and without a sense 
of responsibility.”28 Artos attempted to justify these cadre problems by asserting 
that many of the workers they hired had already been rejected by other arts-
related institutions due to professional and political shortcomings, and that this 
small, problematic pool provided Artos its only job candidates. A related report 
claimed that many workers had formerly worked for private impresarios, and 
were thus “politically doubtful.”29 In order to motivate its regional concert or-
ganizers to work more intensively and responsibly, Artos replaced fixed salaries 
with an incentive-based system, which it claimed it used fairly in contrast to the 
abusive practices of former impresarios. As with its performers, Artos placed 
hope in professional and political schooling for its workers, but here too intention 
and reality diverged. While Artos did sponsor a two-week course in 1954, another 
planned training session in 1956 was not carried out.30 The PZPR, through its 
primary party cells in Artos, also tried to effect changes among Artos personnel, 
especially with respect to “hooliganism, drunkenness, and immoral conduct.” It 
was able to claim little success due to the alleged deaf ears of Artos leadership, 
as well as continued lax hiring of new workers of uncertain moral and political 
standing.31
With respect to programming, Artos’s greatest problem seemed to be assert-
ing control over its offices in the provinces. As a 1953 report put it, the leaders 
of the Warsaw, Łódź, and Szczecin offices worked well, but many others had not 
mastered their regions’ problems or become an important factor in the cultural 
life of their areas.32 In a typical example, a party review of Artos’s Gdańsk office 
faulted its director Aleksander Kostrzewa for not pushing his employees harder 
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and exercising the necessary vigilance with respect to their political mistakes. 
The report also criticized other leading Artos administrators in Gdańsk for sloppy 
work and a lack of political preparation.33 Lublin’s director Tadeusz Chyla also 
garnered the disapprobation of the party; in disregard of the regulations, he had 
been locally appointed without the Ministry of Culture’s approval. The minis-
try also considered him overly ambitious and too sympathetic to musical groups 
“with clerical and sentimental overtones.”34 Despite this criticism, he was not 
removed, and almost two years later regional government officials were still call-
ing for his ouster due to his alleged dictatorial methods, his antipathy to party 
and state, and his refusal to hire party members.35 The Polish party’s weakness 
throughout the country is quite evident here, as Artos, an organization it created, 
proved to be resistant to party influence on many levels.
The DVD/DKGD shared many of the same problems as its counterpart in 
Poland, especially with respect to finding qualified personnel. In its early days, it 
also hired former employees of private concert organizers, and agency Director 
Kurt Grösch complained they inappropriately asserted their expertise over more 
politically reliable workers in the DVD/DKGD.36 Another particular problem 
pertained to workers who possessed the requisite practical skills, but knew little 
about music, a state of affairs the Stakuko wanted to change.37 By 1953, DKGD 
leaders could praise themselves for having assembled “a cadre made up largely of 
socially aware employees,” though they acknowledged that the agency did need 
to make some improvement.38 The Stakuko, however, was less confident in the 
DKGD employees, and proposed an extensive ideological and practical school-
ing program that involved a yearly two-week course for some workers, a training 
day twice a month for others, and two lesson-hours a week for employees in the 
regional offices.39 In the opinion of an inspection report, a further problem was 
simply over-hiring; the Berlin office, for example, employed 56 people instead 
of the approved 40.40 These problems of underqualification and overstaffing, if 
anything, seemed to be even more intractable at the regional offices.
A confidential report by the Ministry for Culture in late 1954 demonstrated 
that many of these cadre problems had only gotten worse. Most of the DKGD’s 
57 central office employees at the time were not SED members—nine had in fact 
been in the “fascist” Wehrmacht—and only four had any professional training in 
the arts. The report reserved special criticism for Director Grösch. The inspectors 
accused him of a litany of errors, from drinking alcohol on the job to suppress-
ing open discussion.41 The Grösch era, which had begun in early 1952 with the 
advent of the Stakuko’s centralized dirigisme, ended ignominiously in early 1957 
with the appointment of Helmut Damerius as director.42
A lack of qualified personnel hindered the fulfillment of both agencies’ broad 
aims. This cadre weakness was further compounded by frequent problems be-
tween the central and regional offices, especially in the case of Poland. Further-
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more, the regional officials often made concessions to audience taste, a theme 
explored below, which infuriated a central leadership striving for ideological pu-
rity. And both the Polish and East German agencies also encountered obstacles in 
finding performers who were both talented and disciplined, thus making it more 
difficult to carry out their project of bringing appropriate music to the work-
ers and peasants of their respective countries. These manifold staffing problems 
hampered the two agencies’ aims to permeate concert life with the desired politi-
cal message.
Ideological Mission
Complications notwithstanding, infusing socialist ideals into an expanded musi-
cal world was the driving imperative behind the Polish and East German concert 
agencies. For its part, and despite its several incarnations, the basic goals of Artos 
remained generally constant over this period, and coalesced into two overarching 
aims: to organize party-sanctioned concerts for all members of Polish society, 
and to produce the content for these events by creating new repertoire and ap-
proving selected works from the past. As part of its plan to reach all citizens and 
“fight for the new listener,” Artos pursued a three-pronged strategy of organizing 
smaller concerts in schools, in workplaces and factories, and in the countryside 
and small towns.43 Artos officials considered school concerts the most important, 
but factory and rural concerts took on increasing importance as Artos struggled 
to fulfill the PZPR’s goal of bringing music to the working class and peasantry. 
Artos viewed its concerts as “essential for attracting the masses to music and for 
gradually forming them.”44
During its first years in the late 1940s, Artos attempted to establish itself by 
licensing performances and organizing concerts both in the countryside and fac-
tories, but also quickly turned to making its programs more ideological.45 Increas-
ingly, Artos became involved in producing the content of the actual concerts, 
instead of merely approving or rejecting proposed performances.46 Preceding 
many concerts, vetted speeches placed the performance in an approved ideologi-
cal context and praised the party’s achievements in the cultural and wider po-
litical realm. Speakers proclaimed that the party had liberated music from the 
stranglehold of the bourgeoisie and that culture now rested in the hands of the 
workers. These didactic, introductory speeches also provided a new, socialist 
(and unsurprisingly predictable) interpretation of music history: Mozart was a 
progressive for his time, Chopin expressed the hopes and desires of progressive 
humanity, and Karol Szymanowski exhibited an awareness of the sufferings of 
the people through his music.47
While on the surface the East German agency’s scope seemed more circum-
scribed than that of its Polish counterpart, in practice the DVD/DKGD did also 
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develop ideologically appropriate programs and work with authors and com-
posers, though this emphasis waxed and waned given the political situation. As 
with Artos, DVD/DKGD officials viewed themselves as bringing culture to the 
masses, and concentrated on factories and the countryside; school concerts were 
less of a priority than in Poland.48 As the official impresario of the state, the 
DVD/DKGD managed a wide variety of events, from concerts given by major 
orchestras like the Dresden Philharmonic or Leipzig’s Gewandhaus orchestra, to 
small dance productions or recitals, and with an audience size from a few dozen 
to many thousands. These concerts sometimes took place in formal concert halls, 
but more frequently in factory clubhouses or modest venues out in rural areas. 
There was an early and constant push to work with the FDGB and other unions in 
order to reach new ears in factories and workplaces; a focus on attaining even the 
smallest village in the farthest-flung area of the countryside later complemented 
such aims.49
Both the East German and Polish agencies put great faith in the transforma-
tive power of music in the pursuit of explicitly ideological goals, and thus the 
concert agencies were key in reaching ears. Artos saw itself engaged in a “battle 
for the new listener,” so as to “form the new citizen and rebuild his psyche.”50 
The DVD/DKGD’s aims were quite similar, though they seemed to resonate with 
a particularly German sense of Bildung (cultivation). The agency’s overarching 
goal was
to organize events with educative and consciousness-forming (bewusstseins-
bildenden) character and to raise the cultural level of the population. The 
value of the DKGD’s work . . . is taking culturally and educationally valuable 
artworks in an understandable form to the broadest reaches of the population 
in both cities and the countryside, and filling people with enthusiasm for 
great works of art.51
Similar calls to “further develop and change the social consciousness of the 
workers” imbued the organization’s ethos, and were connected to aspirations to 
“lift the cultural level of the workers.”52 The DVD/DKGD sought to realize the 
Enlightenment project of bringing culture to the uncultivated in order to help 
form them into progressive human beings. A desire to transmit the best of Ger-
man and world culture to the population was clearly on display here. It is also 
quite evident, however, that these activities intended to mold the population into 
model GDR citizens. Indeed, the DKGD’s principal objective for 1954 was “to 
win the workers for the ‘New Course’ of the party through the means of art” and 
to foster patriotism and loyalty to the state.53
In the view of party leaders, however, the DKGD did not live up to its 
mission, and it came under heavy criticism in 1957, a time when the hardlin-
ers around Ulbricht reasserted stricter control. Alexander Abusch excoriated the 
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agency’s leaders at the Kulturkonferenz for “opportunistically” organizing popular 
programs without concentrating enough on ideological considerations.54 As men-
tioned, party leaders removed Director Kurt Grösch, and they pressed the new 
leadership to exercise more ideological and centralized control.55 The DKGD ex-
plicitly reiterated its aims at this time by asserting that the introduction of the best 
of both past and contemporary music from Germany and the Soviet bloc countries 
should influence the population to be more patriotic, motivated, and socialist.56
Although well over half of Artos’s concerts took place in schools rather than 
in workplaces or the countryside, the numbers of concerts and attendees in Po-
land lagged behind equivalent statistics for the GDR, a state of affairs that sug-
gests that the East Germans were more successful than the Poles in reaching their 
peasants and workers. For Poland, the figures are:57
1950  6,162 events 2,117,592 spectators
1951  8,642  3,804,099
1952  11,335  4,848,272
1953 (planned) 14,807  5,011,370
While for the GDR:58
1952  20,214 events 6,350,000 spectators
1953  29,821  10,700,000
1954  (unavailable)59
1955  34,389  12,000,000
Though these figures are undoubtedly somewhat exaggerated, since officials 
pressured the agencies to demonstrate success, such inflation was probably slight 
due to internal control, especially in the case of the GDR. Both countries showed 
spectacular increases in both the numbers of events and attendees. The signifi-
cantly higher figures for the GDR indicate a more modernized society, a more 
highly developed musical infrastructure, and a more involved party. The East 
German numbers are even more impressive since they do not include most school 
concerts, a fact that demonstrates a much higher penetration of factories and the 
countryside than in Poland.
A small but not insignificant ideological goal was that of increasing the unity 
of and understanding within the socialist bloc, and thus each country’s agency had 
a hand in organizing guest performances of artists from the other country. Despite 
the relatively cool high-level relations between Poland and the GDR, officials 
worked both to promote a positive image of their country’s music to citizens of 
the other, and also to present the other’s music in a positive light. One notable 
example was a visit to Poland from Dresden’s Kreuzchor, a boys’ choir, which 
performed Bach, Wagner, and even PZPR member Jan Maklakiewicz’s song The 
Traktor Driver and the Girl (Traktorzysta i dziewczyna).60 This performance was 
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part of a larger “Week of Progressive German Culture” in the fall of 1954. At 
home, the East Germans similarly organized weeks of friendship that featured 
Polish ensembles performing both contemporary music and that of past masters.61
Both agencies had lofty ideological goals in their mission to bring musical 
culture to a broad cross-section of their respective societies, and they did achieve 
considerable success. They thereby carried out one of the parties’ stated aims—to 
democratize culture and attempt to elevate every citizen. These efforts, the SED 
and PZPR hoped, would earn them legitimacy in the eyes of their respective peo-
ples. Through the experience of attending party-organized concerts and hearing 
party-approved music, the state concert agencies hoped that workers and peasants 
would be shaped in the way the parties desired.
Concert Programs and Audience Response
Party and concert agency officials in both countries considered influence over 
the ideological context of these events more important than the sheer number 
of concerts, however. The authorities screened older works from each country’s 
classical heritage before they granted performance approval, as they wanted to 
present a particular image of important national composers and shape the mes-
sage communicated by this music. The agencies also paid considerable attention 
to works by composers from other countries, as well as more serious programs 
of folk music. The main push, however, was for new, ideologically tinged works 
that would aid in the creation of the new socialist person, and this effort often 
took the form of the musical stage revue (Estradenkonzert or impreza estradowa) 
in response to audience taste. In general, officials linked both serious and light 
programs to current political events and filled them with explicitly ideological 
themes. Sometimes concerts coincided with an artistic commemoration, which 
also generally contained some political overtones.
Unsurprisingly, the works of Poland’s primary musical legend Frédéric (Fry-
deryk) Chopin featured in many of the concerts organized by Artos. A massive 
cultural mobilization took place in 1949 for the 100th anniversary of Chopin’s 
death, and Artos participated by organizing a large number of events. For ex-
ample, in Szczecin the local branch planned no less than 43 concerts in factories 
and other workplaces.62 Artos also programmed Chopin’s music frequently in 
concerts linked to various political events, as the party strove to establish legiti-
macy by linking itself to this powerful and respected symbol of the Polish nation. 
The specific works chosen and the manner of their presentation were of concern 
to Artos, since its officials had been criticized for Chopin programs that were 
“chaotic and random.”63
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A February 1951 concert by pianist Barbara Hesse-Bukowska for workers and their families 
at a factory in the Warsaw neighborhood of Żerań on the occasion of the 141st anniversary of 
Chopin’s birthday. Note the slogan about “peace” in the upper left and the warm clothes worn 
by the audience members in the likely unheated hall (PAP 11647/4, CAF Kondracki).
Other notable Polish composers from the past also received attention on an-
niversary occasions, as Artos endeavored to fulfill the party’s desire to be seen as 
both the rightful heir of a progressive Polish cultural tradition and the entity that 
brought this culture to all sections of society. Concerts frequently featured the 
esteemed nineteenth-century opera and song composer, Stanisław Moniuszko, 
especially around the time of the 80th anniversary of his death in 1952. The influ-
ential Karol Szymanowski posed more problems because cultural officials con-
sidered many of his works formalist, but the party nonetheless claimed him as 
well due to his patriotism and worldwide fame. On the occasion of the fifteenth 
anniversary of his death in 1952, Artos organized concerts all over the country.64 
For these events, authorities often selected Szymanowski’s folk-based late works 
and largely avoided his earlier, more modernist compositions.65
In didactic concerts with names like “Polish Music in Its Historical Develop-
ment” and “Travels along the Musical Score,” the party introduced new listeners 
to the great works of the Polish canon. A small but significant number of concerts 
featured compositions by contemporary Polish composers.66 Also frequently 
played were the traditional German classical composers, now defined as repre-
sentatives of a progressive German political-cultural tradition. Typical concerts 
included one featuring Beethoven in a cycle entitled “Composer Profiles,” or 
series of concerts related to a composer anniversary. Other common programs 
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included “An Evening of . . . ” structured around a certain genre of music like 
the waltz, aria, or sonata.67 Other composers that received special attention in the 
typical year of 1954 were Ludomir Różycki, Henryk Wieniawski, Mussorgsky, 
Tchaikovsky, Bach, Schubert, Mozart, and Rossini.68 The presence of the Rus-
sians perhaps stands out, but this eclectic list would seem to indicate a desire 
to bring the best of the national and international musical tradition to the Polish 
population. Polish audiences, however, did not necessarily appreciate all of these 
composers. A 1952 internal analysis of the popularity of Artos’s programs found 
that the best-attended were those that included opera arias, especially those by 
Moniuszko, Verdi, Bizet, and Puccini. Recitals by well-known performers came 
a close second. Moderately popular were programs of light and dance music, and 
least popular were chamber music concerts.69 The key factor overall seemed to be 
melody, as audiences strongly favored music of a lyrical nature, from light music 
to that of Soviet composers.70
Like the Polish authorities, East German officials also sought to bring the 
workers and peasants the best of the classical musical tradition, as well as con-
temporary works by both Germans and composers from the other socialist coun-
tries.71 Also as in Poland, the DVD/DKGD, where possible, linked its concerts to 
composer anniversaries or important political holidays.72 Particularly noteworthy 
here are the 200th anniversary of Bach’s death in 1950 and the 125th anniversary 
of Beethoven’s in 1952, with both cast as progressive for their time, and result-
ing in a spirited jousting with the Federal Republic to define their legacies.73 
In general, programs contained “a positive approach to life and were optimistic 
and formative” and were also to “relate to societal problems.”74 Further, “cheer-
ful programs and those entertaining on an elevated level are desired . . . joy in 
life should be encouraged and the productive energies of the workers should be 
further developed.”75 But these concerts were not just about entertainment: “The 
main aim of the programming of the DKGD must be to influence the develop-
mental process of the masses.”76 The party clearly attempted to determine how 
this development would take place, even as they worked on making it fun, too.
Indeed, the cultural authorities and the DVD/DKGD formulated specific 
goals for the content of the programs. Each regional office should feature “qual-
ity” music in 60 percent of its events, with theater and cabaret 30 percent and 
other genres 10 percent.77 Reaching this goal of 60 percent for musical programs 
proved challenging for the regional representatives of the concert agency. As 
frustrated local officials noted in 1953, this aim was “in no way reached . . . and 
we ask for a change, if necessary through the prevention of pure entertainment 
and cabaret programs.”78 Cultural officials wanted more concerts of serious mu-
sic, and had to contend with popular pressure for lighter fare.
Despite protests from concertgoers, German authorities also included a high 
percentage of contemporary music in their programs. Agency guidelines man-
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dated that, of the musical events, half featured Volksmusik and half serious mu-
sic, with the latter broken into 50 percent of past masters, 25 percent of music 
from the USSR and Soviet bloc countries, and a final quarter of contemporary 
music from all over the world, but mostly the GDR.79 The amount of contem-
porary music differentiated the GDR’s agency from its counterpart in Poland; 
the DVD/DKGD made a sustained push to reach this 25 percent, and indeed to 
exceed it.80 By 1957, of the 114 programs played by DKGD-engaged soloists, 
71 percent contained at least one work by a contemporary composer.81 This push 
for more serious and contemporary works met with varying reactions from au-
diences. Lighter programs, like the Volkslieder and contemporary songs played 
by the Dresdner Heimat-Quintett, garnered frequent and positive feedback from 
concertgoers.82 More serious programs often received negative reactions from au-
diences, but the DKGD central authorities tried to maintain a firm line. Regional 
cultural officials complained that people were less interested in contemporary 
works because they favored lighter music and disliked concerts on too high of 
a level or too “high quality.”83 Nonetheless, in 1957 the DKGD leadership still 
pursued the same policy: “Despite protests from the audience, we will not lower 
the current number of contemporary works.”84 All this produced an unsurpris-
ing reaction from audiences—they often avoided such events. One official from 
Neubrandenburg related that people stayed away from concerts advertised as 
chamber or orchestral music, and a 1956 Berlin newspaper article described the 
all-too-common situation of a chamber concert with an audience of ten.85 The 
central DVD/DGKD administrators confronted the thorny dilemma of balanc-
ing politicized and demanding programs with the desires of the population, and 
strongly favored the former.
However, the programming policy developed in the DVD/DKGD main of-
fices at times differed from concert reality out in the East German provinces. 
Local officials often did not follow the tough official line and defied central con-
trol by organizing less ideological, but more entertaining concerts so as to at-
tract audiences—an attempt to fulfill the directive to reach more people and use 
resources effectively, while also satisfying the local population. In response, a 
key official report on the Berlin region condemned the practice of organizing 
more light concerts in place of serious ones in order to make more money and 
meet budgetary goals.86 The DVD/DKGD had at best only limited success, as a 
Ministry of Culture official complained in 1957: “The leadership of the DKGD 
did not endeavor to develop a socialist culture and only supported the creation 
of progressive programs in a small way. In contrast, it wasted large sums of de-
velopmental money on a large number of petty bourgeois programs that had no 
cultural-political or material effect.”87 During the thaw years after 1953, some in 
the concert agency’s ranks attempted to compromise between the demands of the 
party and the desires of the concertgoers, and in the end displeased both.
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The jewel in the DKGD’s crown, and a moderate achievement in this con-
text, was a concert series with soloists, chamber groups and small ensembles, 
developed in 1953 and entitled the “Hour of Music.” The prospectus for the series 
clearly describes the intent:
The “Hour of Music” should offer our people the experience of great art in 
exemplary renditions. We are attempting to realize this goal through diverse 
programs, in which both the classical cultural heritage as well as contemporary 
works of all nations are focused upon, and through the participation of our great-
est artistic talents.
Music is a living force that strengthens, forms, and educates us for the great 
tasks of our time.
Let the “Hour of Music” help our working people in cities and the country to 
make their lives richer and more beautiful.88
The alleged power of music to shape and motivate the country’s citizens in-
spired this initiative, and indeed the “Hour” aimed to focus largely on workers 
in factories and the countryside. The goal of the second season in 1954-55 was 
to present roughly half of the concerts in factories.89 Audiences were small in 
the first several years, with an average of 205 to 225.90 Roughly three-quarters 
of the performers came from the GDR, but 13 to 18 percent were West Ger-
man, and a few musicians came from the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. 
The DKGD demanded that contemporary works be included in the concert pro-
grams, and eventually instituted a policy where each concert would have at least 
one contemporary work from the country of the soloist or ensemble.91 In the 
1345 concerts of the 1954-55 season, 103 out of 220 performed composers were 
contemporary, including 33 from the GDR.92 These high numbers continued dur-
ing the 1955-56 season, as nearly half of the works performed were by contem-
porary composers.93 The “Hour” fulfilled a niche mapped out by the DKGD: 
to bring serious music by past and present masters to the people of the GDR. 
Despite numerous organizational problems, the “Hour” did prove to be a modest 
success with concertgoers.94 To generate more enthusiasm for party-approved 
musical initiatives, East German authorities also developed the concept of a 
less-serious “Hour of Music” that would also offer quality fare by competent 
musicians, but of a lighter nature and with explanatory lectures given by noted 
composers and musicologists.95
In Poland, Artos did not have the same success with its lighter fare as it 
did organizing more serious programs. One step down from concerts featuring 
Chopin and the like included frequent and popular concerts of opera and operetta 
arias, especially those of Verdi and Puccini.96 Another popular program focused 
exclusively on nineteenth-century French composers like Massenet, Halevy, and 
Meyerbeer.97 Most, however, were mixtures of the usual Italian and German clas-
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sics, with perhaps a greater number of Russian and Czech pieces than might 
be expected. Artos administrators pushed for more Polish, Russian, and Soviet 
selections in these programs, but appear to have had only limited success. The 
audiences desired more traditional music, and local authorities in large measure 
acquiesced, in a significant difference from their counterparts in East Germany, 
who attempted to program less Verdi and more socialist realism.98 Artos used two 
traveling operatic troupes in the early 1950s: “Janek” played to sold-out venues 
on a regular basis (here again, central administrators constantly desired to make 
the programs more ideologically appropriate), and “Pajacy” got underway by 
1954.99
Operettas were more problematic for Artos officials, who disapproved of 
their often frivolous and “bourgeois” subject matter, while the public enjoyed 
them greatly. Operetta had a particularly contradictory history in the Soviet 
Union, as this art form was originally considered bourgeois and unsuited to a 
revolutionary program, and operetta theaters were frequently closed down in 
the first years after the revolution. Thereafter, however, both traditional Vien-
nese operettas as well as indigenous folk musicals were standard offerings.100 
In Poland, Artos attempted to control the productions of these popular Viennese 
operettas as well as to encourage the production of new, ideologically appropri-
ate ones.101 In one typical example, Artos granted a license for a company to 
produce Franz Lehár’s The Land of Smiles in 1953, but found the production to 
be “ill-prepared and on a low artistic level.” That it nonetheless achieved great 
success and unusually full performance halls prompted Artos to focus on better 
and more appropriate operetta programs.102 Artos’s success at changing operetta 
programming was at best limited, as The Land of Smiles continued to be poorly 
produced in 1955.103 Reviewers also targeted other operettas from Artos’ succes-
sor institution; in October 1955, three inspectors attended a performance of Paul 
Abraham’s 1930 operetta Victoria and her Hussar. They deplored the libretto 
for being “naïve and banal,” but interestingly did not comment on the negative 
portrayal of the Russians or the heroic American protagonist. While criticizing 
the orchestra, ballet, and choir, they remarked that the director saved the produc-
tion from being “trash” and noted that the audience was highly appreciative and 
asked for encores.104 Here as elsewhere, the desires of the population trumped the 
political demands of the party, as politically inappropriate operettas played to full 
houses around Poland.
In its early years especially, the DVD/DKGD also organized a large number 
of concerts with selections from operas and operettas. Its leaders, however, rec-
ommended that operetta music never feature as the main content of a program, 
but rather be used for lighter moments in concerts devoted to other music.105 East 
German cultural officials also pushed for ideologically suitable new operettas, 
but without much success save for Eberhard Schmidt’s Bolero (1952), set in the 
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Spain of Cervantes and portraying the poet’s links to the fight of the peasantry 
against its oppressors.106 In both countries, opera and operetta were particular 
crowd pleasers, and the two agencies struggled to reconcile this popularity with 
the nature and amount of this music played.
Both in Poland and the GDR, authorities frequently linked concerts to vari-
ous political celebrations, anniversaries, and holidays in order to associate party-
approved music with leisure and relaxation. For example, Artos organized a 
large-scale series of concerts all over Poland tied to the “Month of Polish-Russian 
Friendship” of 1948, which started on October 7 and culminated with commemo-
rations of the Russian Revolution on November 7. These concerts unsurprisingly 
featured a good deal of Russian, Soviet, and Polish music.107 In one area of Silesia 
during the following year’s celebrations, Artos organized 96 events consisting 
mostly of Polish and Russian songs, and attracted some 50,000 people. Accord-
ing to the local party authorities, the programs had an “appropriate ideological 
and artistic level,” and audiences attended with “great respect and enthusiasm” 
and responded with “lively applause.”108 The governmental authorities in Silesia 
complained, however, that the concerts were a success almost in spite of them-
selves, as Artos exhibited “weak control” as well as “incompetence and a lack 
of initiative.”109 Lublin’s cultural administrators took a negative view of Artos’ 
performance, complaining that the featured works often had little to do with the 
occasion, and that poor organization resulted in flawed events.110 In the Kraków 
region, Artos seemed to do a better job, where the local officials praised Artos 
for organizing 248 concerts, largely in factories and workplaces. Over 100,000 
spectators in the area heard Soviet songs and other music, and excepting one 
case of an “undisciplined audience,” officials reported enthusiastic responses 
and a “political-propaganda” success.111 In Szczecin, almost 15,000 agricultural 
workers responded “quite warmly” to concerts of Soviet music, but the local 
government administrators were somewhat critical of the performances of the 
same overplayed Soviet repertoire.112 Artos’s involvement also included numer-
ous school concerts, which hewed closely to the appropriate political line. The 
ministry’s Musical Department Director Paweł Kruk, who explained in reference 
to these celebrations: “music is propaganda,” would have been quite pleased.113 
Because all of these reports come from party officials, it is hard to determine if 
the events were as successful as these comments suggest, but the copious nega-
tive criticism also in these sources lends them credibility. In the end, Artos did 
organize concerts of Soviet music attended and at least moderately enjoyed by 
hundreds of thousands of Polish workers, peasants, and students.
Artos also provided musical entertainment for the wave of celebrations 
linked to the unification of the two workers’ parties in December 1948. For over 
100,000 concertgoers, it organized 164 concerts that included violin pieces by 
Dvořák, Mussorgsky, and Henryk Wieniawski, vocal works by Polish and Rus-
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sian composers, and recitations of poetry. Officials claimed “the arts were reach-
ing the shop floors and the hearts of workers.” And indeed, a factory committee 
in Żyrardów related that its audience reacted “with great satisfaction and thunder-
ous applause,” and the leaders of the State Alcohol Monopoly factory in Warsaw 
asked for more such events, because “they entertain, and educate.” 114 While these 
comments came from party members within the various factories, they do seem 
to indicate engagement with the music.
Artos further enhanced other important holidays with musical performances. 
The birthdays of important political leaders like Stalin and president Bolesław 
Bierut, May 1 and the July 22 liberation day, various elections, and the ratifica-
tion of the new constitution in 1952 all provided symbolic occasions to shape the 
new socialist person with music. Officials chose music from traditional Polish, 
Russian, or Soviet composers in addition to the usual festive works by the great 
nineteenth-century German composers, and mixed in a few contemporary mass 
songs.115 For the GDR, a similar list of commemorative events provided the DVD/
DKGD with opportunities to organize entertaining and didactic programs.116 Au-
thorities linked the gravity and prestige of music to events considered important 
by the parties as a means to legitimize and celebrate their rule.
Both agencies thus placed considerable emphasis on programs of contem-
porary and classical European music. In theory, this music communicated an 
ideological message to millions in both countries. Indeed, especially in East Ger-
many, authorities could count some successes, especially those concerts relating 
to the transmission of a particular take on each country’s musical heritage. In 
practice, however, the kind of musical “education” authorities had in mind did 
not reach the hoped-for larger numbers. Despite the best efforts of the agencies, 
many concerts were poorly planned or simply contained music without the de-
sired ideological focus. The GDR’s agency did a much better job of maintaining 
a consistent message, but in both countries regional officials sometimes bowed to 
audience demand for lighter programs with less explicit political content.
The Musical Stage Revue as Compromise
Audiences in both countries pushed back against concerts that skewed too po-
litical without also entertaining, and a tacitly negotiated solution emerged. In re-
sponse to the difficulties in creating ideologically appropriate programs that also 
diverted, cultural authorities in both countries worked to develop new genres of 
musical performance in the early 1950s. This imperative crystallized around the 
concept of the impreza estradowa or Estradenkonzert, a lightly politicized stage 
revue that combined song, instrumental music, and spoken word in a musical va-
riety show. A konferansjer or Conferencier (narrator or emcee) linked the songs 
and sketches and played a crucial role in communicating a political message. The 
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goal was to produce a cabaret-like performance that would combine light enter-
tainment with an ideological message in an attempt to entertain and influence 
urban and rural audiences. Both countries had, of course, long traditions of staged 
musical-theatrical events, from carnivals up through the more recent cabaret. The 
most contemporary template, however, was an import from the Soviet Union that 
used the term estrada to refer to a wide variety of staged performances. After 
many variations and buffeting in the political winds of the 1920s and 1930s there, 
it developed into a generalized appellation for staged light entertainment.117 The 
state concert agencies in Poland and East Germany explicitly modeled them-
selves on the Soviet experience.118
Throughout the first half of the 1950s, Artos officials struggled to square 
the circle of the ideologically appropriate, entertaining event, and focused on 
the challenge of creating and producing quality imprezy estradowe.119 Officials 
proved able to identify what was not acceptable, but had a very difficult time 
developing appropriate programs themselves. In 1950, an Artos inspector heavily 
criticized two widely seen performances in this new genre, “Summer Humor” 
and “Laughs above the Norm,” for being “typical examples of a petty-bourgeois 
review and of a very low standard,” code for banal entertainment that did not 
politically edify. The Artos administrator responsible for this programming ac-
knowledged its weaknesses and claimed new, more appropriate productions were 
in the works—but the aforementioned two would continue to be performed for 
yet another month due to the lack of any other options.120 A fairly typical es-
tradowa program included a Paderewski minuet, a Russian song, several con-
temporary Polish mass songs, and a handful of political sketches. Throughout 
the performance, the emcee was supposed to provide lively comments and jokes 
with a political edge.121 Common ideological themes included friendship with 
the Soviet Union, the building of communism, reconstruction of the country, and 
peace.122 Artos also translated songs from the Soviet Union and the other people’s 
democracies to provide appropriate material for these programs.123
Program development remained a considerable problem for Artos, which re-
ceived massive criticism from within and without for its activities in this area. A 
spate of evaluations in 1953 heavily criticized these performances for “thought-
less and conception-less medleys” and advised Artos to “withdraw programs 
devoid of ideals, which are harmful due to their low standard and lack of ap-
propriate content.”124 Another inspector excoriated Artos’s imprezy estradowe for 
their poor organization and muddled ideological content. He described a typical 
Artos program as including an introductory song followed by the reading of a 
newspaper article on politics and a few stale jokes, then two Russian or Soviet 
songs, a political sketch, two contemporary songs (often prewar songs with new 
words), a political poem and feuilleton, then a final song by the entire ensemble. 
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This inspector asserted that such unoriginal and pointless programs neither aided 
the party’s goals nor entertained the audience.125
A few of these reports did credit Artos with some progress since its early 
days, but the praise was faint and only positive in its relative context. By 1954, 
party cultural officials noted that improvements had been made on programs for-
merly rife with “serious political blunders, vulgar and insipid jokes . . . cheap 
sentimentalism, and artistic and literary mediocrity.”126 One inspector described 
Artos’s early programs as “insipid . . . including prewar trash . . . boring.” He 
called for programs that were “cheerful, with an optimistic look at the world, 
funny, and including scathing satire” to attract audiences unreceptive as a result 
of Artos’s previous programs.127
On the local and regional level, Artos officials often could not live up to 
central planners’ goals. For example, a group of party officials initially praised a 
planned Gdańsk performance of “Meeting at Ania’s” (Spotkanie u Ani) for focus-
ing on a contemporary political theme, in this case, the life of a young female 
tractor driver.128 In its actual production, however, some of these same officials 
found much to criticize. The director of the ensemble had added new material to 
a script sent out by the central offices in Warsaw, but had allegedly not thought 
through the political implications of these changes. The inspectors found that the 
mix of new and original text created an “ideologically flawed” picture of Ania, 
and that in general the production did not hold together well.129
A more typical medley of songs and texts for the countryside, “Give Us a 
Happy Face” (Prosimy o przyjemny wyraz twarzy), also met with significant criti-
cism by central inspectors due its lack of political punch. One reviewer felt the 
mix of Polish and Russian songs leaned too far towards the latter, thus potentially 
boring the audience, and the texts did not adequately engage the political prob-
lems of the day. The inspectors characterized the texts to songs like “The Wasters 
of Raw Materials” (Brakoroby), “Beatnik” (Bikiniarz), and “The Drunk and the 
Swine” (Pijak i świnia) as dealing with political issues unimportant to a rural au-
dience. A song asking citizens to subordinate love to work was recommended for 
deletion, as they considered such exhortations simply too far from reality. Other 
aspects of the program supposedly gave the impression of “prewar trash” and 
inspectors blamed in large part the Artistic Director in Gdańsk, who had written 
many of the supplementary texts.130
A 1953 inspection of the regional office in Lublin produced criticism of “A 
Common Story” (Zwykła historia), a stage revue made up of fourteen songs and 
sketches. The central office in Warsaw sent the material, but the inspector found it 
inappropriate for the rural audiences in this eastern region. He labeled one song, 
“On Bureaucracy,” of poor quality, and implausible and irrelevant to the coun-
tryside. Another about the advance of women as well as “The Apartment Specu-
lator” were also criticized for being far from the concerns of this rural region’s 
216   ♦  Composing the Party Line
audiences, and the latter was even called “yesterday’s problem.” In general, he 
deemed the program politically inappropriate.131
Such negative examples were legion. While Artos inspectors did sometimes 
praise programs and performers, the majority of their evaluations were critical, 
and often extremely so. All too frequently, inspectors found the music “shrill 
and chaotic,” the performers “lacking taste,” the program “haphazard” or “hope-
lessly stupid,” and the overall impression of the performance “devoid of artistic 
experience and has not the slightest reason to exist” or even a “total mistake.”132 
Often the audience was small and bored; an extreme but generally not untypical 
example included “ninety percent hooligans . . . who smoked cigarettes, con-
versed, laughed, and made loud and rude comments to the performers.”133 One 
performance for workers moved the inspector to write: “My impression of the 
entirety was unbelievably unpleasant and sad . . . the [song] texts in most cases 
were nonsensical, pornographic, and had a destructive effect on the taste of this 
new audience. The performance was ideologically and artistically harmful.”134 
By 1954, six years after the founding of Artos, it continued to be criticized for 
using stale or inappropriate material, having low artistic standards, and employ-
ing nonideological, poorly conceived programs that focused on irrelevant love 
stories or human foibles.135
Audiences did at times also react positively to Artos’s revue programs. One 
performance in a small town outside Kraków was applauded with cries of “long 
live Kraków’s Artos!” 136 In another, the audience reacted in a lively manner and 
sang along, and further asked that the ensemble return more frequently.137 Per-
haps the most positive reaction took place in Silesia, where an orchestra was 
rewarded with “a hurricane of applause” from spectators who especially appre-
ciated a Czech foxtrot, a Brahms waltz, and, interestingly, Hanns Eisler’s anti-
American mass song Ami Go Home, which had to be repeated several times due 
to audience enthusiasm.138 Such responses proved nonetheless relatively infre-
quent. Jazz began to be included in programs in the mid-1950s—a clear sign of 
the political and cultural sea change underway—and these events proved to be 
popular and successful with audiences.139
Artos faced a host of other problems related to these imprezy. The most com-
mon complaint of central administrators and inspectors was that the traveling 
ensembles went to familiar and easily accessible locales, and failed to seek out 
new audiences in more remote parts of the country.140 Some groups played the 
same concerts too frequently for the same audiences, while others performed 
programs designed for the countryside in cities.141 Yet another common problem 
was that regional Artos employees failed to send in proposed new programs to 
the central office in a timely fashion, and thus unapproved performances often 
took place before suggestions and changes could be made by Artos leaders.142 
The obstacles to providing quality and ideologically appropriate concerts for the 
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masses were formidable, and while it achieved some successes, Artos was clearly 
not up to the task.
In the GDR, officials also viewed the Estradenkonzert as a way to attract 
and influence new listeners. Here too, the term was a general one used to indicate 
events that combined songs and theater, and that would introduce the “merri-
ment” that audiences so desired without sacrificing the pedagogical and political 
goals of the party.143 East German officials did not consider these concerts an end 
in themselves, but rather a way to introduce new ears gradually to serious music, 
and especially contemporary music.144 Ministry of Culture official Uszkoreit put 
it succinctly: “Estradenkonzerte should be an intermediary step for those who are 
not yet ready for more serious concerts.”145 The aim was to “win new listeners for 
good music,” and thus the concerts should be well thought out and have artistic 
integrity.146 Ideologically useful programs were to be free of the usual “enter-
tainment tax,” and included concerts with music from the “progressive cultural 
patrimony,” both national and foreign, progressive contemporary composition 
from the GDR, USSR, and People’s Democracies, and dance and light programs, 
including cabaret, that had been approved by officials from the DKGD. The tax 
itself was viewed as a means to “limit and overcome” musical performances that 
the party wanted to stamp out.147 Ministry officials were not adequately satis-
fied, however, as they continued to push for more and better Estradenkonzerte 
in 1956.148
Audiences reacted to these programs with ambivalence. There are many re-
ports of successful events, as for instance one in Drewitz that produced a lively 
discussion with the workers in the audience as well as calls for more such pro-
grams.149 On the other hand, an early, Estraden-like concert entitled “A Trip 
around the World in Song” came in for heavy criticism by one reviewer. She 
called the program poorly organized, with an operetta aria stuck in the middle of a 
number of songs related to liberation struggles. The performers were, in her view, 
wretched, and the ideological message of the evening muddled at best.150 Orga-
nizers for clubhouses out in the countryside also criticized “Love, Laughter and 
Music” (a two-hour program with two emcees, an accordion duo, and a comic) 
for being poorly put together, inappropriate for their audiences, and lacking good 
content.151
Yet another problematic aspect of these stated reviews in both countries was 
the role played by the emcee. This position was considered of great importance 
in the Soviet Union, as this person shaped the political tone of the evening.152 In 
Poland, the emcee played a crucial part in keeping the audience interested and si-
multaneously assisted in the communicating of a political message. Yet criticism 
by Artos officials and ministry and party inspectors was frequent and vociferous. 
Emcees were generally supposed to follow an approved script, but they often 
ad-libbed, and in doing so frequently committed serious political blunders. Their 
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jokes at times verged on the vulgar, or recalled the politically questionable humor 
of the prewar period.153 One inspector criticized such “weak, old, shabby jokes, 
for example about the talkativeness of women.”154 Artos officials also wanted the 
emcee not to coquette with audience members, not to ask for applause, and to 
avoid appealing to the worst instincts of the audience. Artos also demanded that 
the emcee refuse requests for encores, as it felt this was another way in which un-
controlled content could tarnish the desired ideological sheen of the program.155
The DVD/DKGD also recognized the importance of the role of the emcee 
in its Estradenkonzerte. Though many fulfilled this position well, there were fre-
quently others like the one at the Drewitz program described above; despite an 
otherwise successful program, the reviewer found him unclear and longwinded, 
and the source of worthless ideological guidance.156 The DVD/DKGD and the 
party desired to do more to educate the emcees both ideologically and artisti-
cally.157 At a minimum, the party demanded that they affirm the socialist transfor-
mation taking place in society—a very basic expectation that demonstrates the 
scope of the problem.158
In infrequently achieved ideal form, these stage revues were an effective 
response to popular demand for fun, as they provided light entertainment while 
transmitting party-approved messages. Audience reaction was, however, decid-
edly mixed. In both countries, serious problems in basic materials and in the 
actual production prevented the successful achievement of the concerts’ aims. A 
politicized program emanating from the center encountered a complicated reality 
of provincial mismanagement and underqualified performers. The DVD/DKGD 
realized some of its goals more effectively than its Polish counterpart, but both 
proved unable to consistently organize ideologically appropriate concerts that 
both pleased and educated the population.
Unauthorized Concerts
In addition to the challenge of balancing engaging performances with an ideo-
logical message, the agencies also contended with a bevy of private concert or-
ganizers. The latter were also active during this period and appealed to audience 
desires for entertaining, unpolitical programs outside of the totalizing gaze of the 
parties. They therefore became targets of the authorities’ wrath. Because of the 
parties’ desire to control all aspects of cultural life and to communicate a unified 
message, officials attacked unlicensed groups playing potentially subversive mu-
sic as well as those who might organize their events.
In Poland in the late 1940s, the force of the state gradually came down upon 
these illegal performances, known as dzikie imprezy—“wild” or unlicensed con-
certs. In Szczecin for instance, the authorities began an aggressive program to 
“exterminate the dzikie imprezy of private concert organizers.”159 In 1948, the 
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Music Department in the Ministry of Culture ordered all amateur musical groups 
to register with the government in the hopes that they could control the “wild” 
performing groups. By October of 1951, officials granted Artos a monopoly over 
the organization of all concerts in Poland; in practice, this order meant that all 
events needed to be registered with Artos, but that other persons or institutions 
could still organize concerts.160 Around this time, Deputy Minister of Culture 
Sokorski ordered local government officials to work together more effectively in 
order to step up attempts to “liquidate the plague of unlicensed events.” He par-
ticularly called attention to “scheming, profit-seeking organizers” who illegally 
organized concerts on the fringes of official campaigns like the “Committee for 
the Defense of Peace,” “Help for Korea,” or “Rebuilding Warsaw.” Such concerts 
allegedly “appealed to bourgeois tastes” and were harmful to the development of 
progressive cultural policies.161
By 1953, Artos officials could claim considerable, though not uniform suc-
cess in eliminating such unlicensed events. One report, for example, asserted 
a need for continued vigilance as some groups “impersonated Artos-approved 
groups and offered pernicious programs of poor quality.”162 Another report de-
scribed impresarios who continued to organize concerts under the cover of major 
political campaigns like the popular theme of “Rebuilding Warsaw.” One case, 
relating to a certain W. Kozlowski, even resulted in a court verdict.163 These ex-
amples of the party cracking down occurred in 1953, near the apex of stalinist 
control in Poland, when cultural officials could most powerfully exercise their 
influence with respect to unapproved performances.
These seeming successes proved chimerical at best. As the PZPR was weak-
ening by 1955, reports once again noted a “plague of wild performances that 
base their programs on unrefined entertainment without any artistic standard.”164 
Another report talked of “anarchy” with respect to concert organizing, as well 
as a spreading of “trash and pseudo-artistic superficiality.” Perhaps equally im-
portant for cultural officials, all this activity resulted in money going to “schem-
ers” rather than to the state.165 The problems continued, however, as in Wrocław, 
where cultural authorities reported a huge deficit that they blamed on the pro-
liferating number of unauthorized groups organizing competing events.166 And 
in early 1957, the Composers’ Union discussed the large number of unlicensed 
bands, now playing jazz and rock ‘n’ roll, which were “ruining the need for the 
consumption of decent music.”167 In Poland, the party’s pretensions to total con-
trol had been definitively shattered.
The GDR produced a larger number of dramatic cases in its dealings with the 
private concert organizers. In contrast to Poland, where the unauthorized perfor-
mances seemed to be undertaken by small-scale operators, East Germany had a 
number of longstanding and important impresarios in its major cities. The road to 
DVD/DKGD dominance was tortuous and fraught.
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Many private Konzertagenturen had gone out of business in the late 1940s 
due to the currency reform and increased involvement by the party and state in 
the organization of musical life. Some notable concert agencies nonetheless still 
operated, and the heavy hand of the Stakuko, working with the somewhat more 
conciliatory DVD/DKGD, made itself felt starting in 1952. Recently appointed 
Director Grösch, in consultation with Stakuko head Holtzhauer, proposed assert-
ing control over the private concert organizers through three methods: allowing 
some to work as free agents, but requiring that they give a percentage of their 
profits to the DVD; co-opting others to work directly for the agency; and ignor-
ing others in hopes that they would simply disappear.168 Indeed, throughout 1952, 
the DVD took an accommodating approach to many of the independent concert 
organizers and desired to work closely with them to make use of their exper-
tise.169 True to its monopolistic desires to control all cultural life on its terms, 
however, the Stakuko pushed for options two and three, and declared that the 
newly forming DKGD would directly control all concert organizing. According 
to the Stakuko, there no longer existed a “societal need” for private impresarios, 
and thus all licenses would be revoked as of December 31, 1952.170 With the 
advent of the New Course and the Uprising of June 17, 1953, the party and the 
Stakuko took a more conciliatory line and reinstated the licenses. Inexorably, 
however, officials pressured the private agencies and instituted an even more 
massive crackdown.
In the early 1950s, some impresarios attempted to work under the aegis of 
the agency, as in the case of Friedhelm Rabofsky. At first he attempted to play 
off the DVD against the Stakuko to preserve his autonomy and business. By the 
fall of 1952, he had yielded and begun to work with the DVD/DKGD in a sort of 
freelance capacity, especially in the area of engaging foreign soloists, but this had 
ended by April 1953 in mutual recriminations. Rabofsky then tried to preserve 
some employment for himself by proposing that he would serve as manager for 
a handful of artists, but was temporarily saved by the changing of the political 
winds in the late spring of 1953, when he resumed his activities as an impresa-
rio—for a short time.171
Other concert organizers tried to fight the new regulations and continue their 
business activity. Hermann Lorz pleaded his case to the local governmental au-
thorities in Dresden and eventually wrote a long letter to the Central Committee 
of the SED that argued both his legal right to continue working as well as the 
continued need for his services in his hometown.172 He eventually came to an ac-
commodation with the DKGD, and he managed to survive as head of a heavily 
monitored private firm.173 His Dresden colleague, Erich Knoblauch, staged an 
even more spirited defense of his activities as a private concert organizer. Knob-
lauch had worked as an impresario since 1920 and had even handled a visit by the 
noted communist sympathizer Paul Robeson in 1930. In 1952, he marshaled the 
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support of the local government, who praised his good work to the Stakuko.174 In 
a long letter to officials in early 1953, he defended his right to continue his activi-
ties through sophisticated legal argumentation, his wish to work for the good of 
the GDR, and the purported evident need for his skills.175
With the advent of the New Course, the recently revoked licenses were rein-
stated in the summer of 1953. Emboldened by this success and the thaw in gen-
eral, Knoblauch imprudently continued his offensive by pressing for the right to 
expand his activities from Saxony to all of the GDR and by demanding damages 
for the months in 1953 when his license was revoked and his business and health 
consequently suffered. Both claims provoked a lengthy legal battle in the form of 
an exchange of letters in which ministry and local officials resorted to obfusca-
tion and stalling to stymie the assertions of Knoblauch’s lawyers.176
This general state of affairs took a dramatic turn in the spring of 1955, when 
authorities arrested Rabofsky and the head of Konzertagentur Hothan in Halle, 
Siegfried Walter.177 Despite an outpouring of supportive letters from cultural fig-
ures, a trial of Walter, Rabofsky, and also Knoblauch began in early 1956. In July, 
the first two were sentenced to two and three years of imprisonment respectively, 
while Knoblauch received five. The authorities alleged that these three violated 
article 6 of the constitution, which prohibited antistate agitation (Boykotthetze). 
The judgment asserted that they had worked closely with West German concert 
agencies and made negative comments about the GDR and the DKGD there. It 
also maintained that they had misused their licenses as cover for other, unlicensed 
organizers.
In the GDR, and less so in Poland, the parties and the state concert orga-
nizers acted aggressively to eliminate any competitors. The authorities’ actions 
seem a perfect instance of Jan Gross’s concept of the “spoiler state,” where weak 
structures assert and maintain their control by removing other potential sites of 
power.178 Both Artos and the DVD/DKGD were relatively frail organizations that 
had difficulty carrying out their assigned tasks. With the help of their respective 
parties and governments, they acted to achieve dominance only partly through 
quality work and interesting programs but also by clearing the playing field 
through the full force of the stalinist apparatus. In the GDR, the party was able to 
realize and maintain a significant number of its totalizing aims, while in Poland 
this proved far less the case.
The Orchestral Landscape
Cultural officials in both countries also undertook ambitious initiatives in the 
more traditional world of symphony orchestras, as they dramatically expanded 
the number of ensembles and worked to assert influence over both musicians 
and concert programming. This orchestral bubble popped spectacularly in the 
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GDR, but the significant and enduring increase demonstrates the desire of the 
Polish and East German parties to have a greater number of professional en-
sembles play more approved music for ever larger audiences. All three goals 
were achieved, but less successfully than the SED and PZPR had hoped, in 
part due to the conflicting desires of conductors, musicians, and concertgoers. 
These orchestras represented a prestigious and important source of musical per-
formances, and thus received considerable largesse and attention from cultural 
officials. Conductors and musicians seized these opportunities to advance their 
own personal and professional agendas, at times counter to that of the party. 
Unsurprisingly, the parties wanted these professional ensembles to play music 
that supported their political aims, and as a result control over both the nature of 
these ensembles and the actual concert programs proved to be a significant point 
of contention. The PZPR and SED pressed orchestras to travel to factories and 
the countryside and give performances for non-traditional audiences, as well as 
to become more closely involved with the amateur groups based there. Cultural 
officials also attempted to influence conductors, music directors, and musicians 
directly to carry out party aims through the means of ideological schooling for 
these orchestra members. Thanks to tradition as well as contemporary efforts, 
East Germany had more orchestras per inhabitant than any other country in the 
world and especially offered many opportunities to create a politically effective 
socialist network of orchestras.179
In Poland, events in the realm of the professional musical ensembles fol-
lowed the familiar pattern. A massive expansion in the late 1940s was linked 
closely to heightened party control, which gradually gave way to much more 
autonomy by the mid-1950s. In interwar Poland, there had been but a handful of 
orchestras, and only one or two significant opera houses. The three opera compa-
nies giving performances in 1948 increased to five by 1956, and were joined by 
two operetta ensembles.180 By 1947, six large philharmonic orchestras and four 
smaller symphony orchestras had already been revived or created, figures that 
jumped to seven and six by 1949, and then to nine and nine by 1956, with the 
number of concerts given annually rising from under 600 to nearly 6000.181 In the 
late 1940s, Polish authorities nationalized nearly all the ensembles and put them 
directly under the control of the Ministry of Culture. This growth was intended 
to be as much bottom-up as top-down; cultural officials envisioned the most suc-
cessful amateur groups maturing into professional organizations that would then 
be taken under the wing of the state.182
The smaller, lower-tier professional ensembles were of varying quality and 
political reliability. Some manifested a lack of discipline and gave sub-par con-
certs, like the orchestra in Kielce, which had poor attendance at the ideological 
courses organized for its members and rarely gave concerts in the countryside.183 
Another small ensemble in Bielsko-Biała received a devastating evaluation 
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from a Culture Ministry inspector in 1950, and also given that their best players 
had recently gone to the Polish National Radio Symphony Orchestra, was dis-
banded—despite the broader push to expand the number of ensembles.184 Much 
more successful was the “Traveling Symphony Orchestra of the Workers’ Phil-
harmonic Society,” which gave a wide variety of concerts including works from 
Beethoven to mass songs, many of which were well received by these new audi-
ences. From its base in Poznań, it gave these concerts out in the countryside, in 
schools, and in workplaces, and also took active part in political campaigns.185
A 1952 concert given by the Polish Radio Orchestra under conductor Jerzy Gert at the 
Wawel Castle in Kraków. Note the image of Bolesław Bierut, President of Poland and 
PZPR General Secretary, as well as the slogan above it referring to the Six-Year Plan (PAP 
21871/10, CAF Węglowski).
The rapid expansion of ensembles caused severe problems, since an ade-
quate number of trained musicians simply did not exist, leading to poaching of 
both conductors and performers among the leading orchestras. The most active 
here would seem to have been the philharmonic orchestra in Warsaw; its lead-
ers used its central location, symbolism, political contacts, and higher salaries 
to try to lure the best musicians from other ensembles in an effort to create the 
premier orchestra in Poland. Around 1950 the Polish National Radio Symphony 
Orchestra, perhaps the leading ensemble of the time, was raided, and a few years 
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later the Poznań Philharmonic strove to defend itself.186 In 1955 the Polish Radio 
Orchestra of Bydgoszcz paid the ultimate price in losing its best members to War-
saw; it was dissolved despite energetic appeals by its members to the party on the 
basis of its political and artistic successes, which included numerous concerts in 
workplaces and a concert cycle “On Saturday after Work.”187
The experience of the Warsaw Philharmonic crystallized a series of con-
flicting issues related to the nexus of music and politics in the orchestral set-
ting, and demonstrates how conductors and musicians could use their standing, 
combined with the party’s reliance on them to create a respected ensemble, to 
secure their own goals. After a difficult start postwar with five conductors in 
five years, it seemed to achieve some stability under Witold Rowicki around 
1950. He initially seemed ideal from the party’s perspective, as he was tal-
ented and respected, programmed a high percentage of contemporary Polish 
music, and drew large audiences.188 And while officials recognized these strong 
points and generally considered him politically loyal, they also faulted his ego-
tism and lack of ideological engagement and complained that he prevented 
the party from effectively controlling the ensemble.189 Rowicki was well aware 
of his prestige and standing, and acted with relative impunity with respect to 
the party; a crisis situation developed as PZPR officials and party members in 
the orchestra clashed with him repeatedly. In early 1955, with the symbolic 
importance of the ensemble raised further with its showpiece new home and 
renaming as the “National Philharmonic,” the PZPR finally moved to assert 
control over the orchestra and removed him as conductor and artistic director, 
provoking significant dissatisfaction and even violence from his supporters. In 
order not to make a martyr of him, he was given prominent positions with other 
leading ensembles for the next few years, and in a sign of party weakness, was 
back at the helm in Warsaw in 1958.190 Bohdan Wodiczko was appointed the 
new leader in the interim against the wishes of some in the orchestra and in a 
very chaotic situation both administratively and politically.191 Cultural officials 
sought to support him and attract better musicians through housing and finan-
cial incentives in order to create an ensemble that would represent People’s 
Poland well at the Chopin Piano Competition in 1955 and the Warsaw Autumn 
Festival the following year.192 Despite Rowicki’s dramatic but temporary re-
moval, these events demonstrate the power of musical elites to negotiate a sig-
nificant amount of autonomy, even in the face of committed and concentrated 
efforts by party officials.
The state provided orchestras with generous subsidies, and also subjected 
their concert programs to review to ensure they passed political muster.193 In 
practice, however, cultural officials acted with a relatively moderate hand when 
it came to repertoire, as they called for lighter music more accessible to workers, 
a link between concert programs and political commemorations, and increased 
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attention to contemporary music; by mid-decade, postwar Polish music made up 
a quarter of concert programs.194 Starting already in late 1953, ministry officials 
gave orchestras more autonomy, but were reluctant to give up total control over 
concert programs, and even held up the concurrent East German decision (ex-
plored below) to relinquish this prerogative as a negative model.195 As they had 
feared, with the increased freedom music directors began programming works of 
many Western composers previously deemed formalist.196 Relatedly, and as part 
of its broader drive to decentralize, by 1956 the ministry had placed oversight 
responsibility for the smaller symphony orchestras with regional authorities but 
maintained control over the larger philharmonic orchestras.197 The Composers’ 
Union and performers from their own union protested against the former mea-
sure, arguing that regional cultural officials lacked the necessary expertise, and 
asked for more autonomy to be given directly to the directors of these musical 
ensembles.198 In a weakened state at the end of the stalinist decade, party and 
ministry officials flailed about for a way to maintain influence over program-
ming, but proved unable to do much formally or informally to reassert control 
over concert repertoire.
The ministry sought to influence orchestras and their members in other ways 
as well, such as founding primary party cells in most musical ensembles, though 
their efficacy was questionable, especially as the party began to lose legitimacy 
after 1953.199 In the early 1950s, the PZPR organized numerous ideological 
courses for conductors and musical directors, as well as musicians.200 Officials 
also constantly exhorted the professional ensembles to reach out to their amateur 
counterparts and set up programs where the former would serve as patron and ad-
visor to the latter.201 Few of the professionals showed much interest in this unpaid 
work, and the amateur ensemble directors were often unenthusiastic as well, as 
the advice and criticism of the experts often undermined their authority with their 
musicians.202 In all these ways, the party attempted to include orchestra members 
in its vision and further sought to draw them into the project to make contact with 
and influence the wider population.
In the GDR, the party’s interaction with orchestras shared the same broad 
outlines as the situation in Poland but was much more intensive and ambitious 
in all aspects, with the notable exception of a concession on control over concert 
programming. While the sizeable number of 48 ensembles existed in the territory 
of the GDR before 1945, and there was a long history of state support for musical 
ensembles in German-speaking Central Europe, only eight years later cultural 
officials could claim to oversee roughly 200 large and small orchestras.203 As 
in Poland, the party supervised concert programs, provided ideological training, 
and linked professional and amateur musicians as means to control the political 
content of the music being performed.
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The goals for East Germany’s orchestras were identical to those in Poland: 
to perform party-approved music from the past and present in front of ever-larger 
sectors of the population. Cultural officials expected that these musical ensem-
bles would:
bring the national cultural heritage and contemporary musical production to 
the working people. The decisive factor is that, through the manner in which 
it is conveyed, music, like the other arts, can function as a rousing (begeis-
ternde) force for the construction of society; but this can only happen when 
every [musician] is filled with the awareness of music’s societal meaning 
and is willing to collaborate with the workers on the building of socialism.204
The party demanded that orchestra members and conductors embrace its pro-
gram fully and help communicate its goals to society. Ensemble directors were 
charged with the goal of “winning the working masses” through “progressive 
programs” and bluntly told that “programming is a political question.”205 Cul-
tural officials constantly pushed these musical ensembles to give 60 to 80 per-
cent of their concerts in factories and out in the countryside, especially with 
the focus of the 1953 New Course on satisfying the needs of workers and peas-
ants.206 Concerts were to be accompanied by effective brochures or preceded by 
lectures, and when offered by an ensemble that “combines technical skills with 
ideological knowledge” would create a “receptive listener attuned to the educa-
tional influence of the musical art.”207 These efforts produced a mixed success, 
as some orchestras claimed enthusiastic audiences, while others reported low 
attendance.208
Although the specific categories changed several times during this period, 
the general outlines remained the same (and were broadly similar to the catego-
ries introduced under National Socialism in 1938). There were seven “nationally 
important” (republikwichtig) philharmonic orchestras in the top level, followed 
by a handful of regional symphony orchestras (Landessinfonieorchester, later 
Staatliche Sinfonie-Orchester).209 Underneath the elite orchestras were “district 
cultural orchestras” (Kreiskulturorchester) divided into five levels of compe-
tence, a group of orchestras associated with theaters, and finally a large group 
of “community orchestras” (Gemeinschaftsorchester).210 During the first half of 
the 1950s, a veritable explosion took place, as a dozen or so district orchestras 
grew to around 40, and a few dozen “community orchestras” mushroomed to 
over 135.211 Justification for this expansion was founded on music’s “immediate 
means to raise consciousness, especially in our current fight for peace . . . convey-
ing our classical cultural legacy and good light music must both take place . . . 
also our dance music must be refined and newly formulated, and private interests 
must be removed.”212 This new orchestral landscape thus bore heavy responsibil-
ity, and initially received significant support from the state for these tasks.
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This proliferation of ensembles naturally required the people to staff them, 
and there were simply not enough to go around. Some of the shortage was due to 
musicians relocating to the West, and officials speculated that they were dissatis-
fied with their treatment by state authorities or pursued higher salaries there, of 
roughly 30 percent.213 A related failure to attract West German musicians to the 
East also pertained, but a chronic problem was an undersupply of East German 
performers more generally—in early 1955, 300 positions were unfilled through-
out the country. Far more dramatically than in Poland, a process of cannibaliza-
tion took place on all levels: the many theater orchestras lost members to the 
district orchestras, while the latter in turn saw musicians leave for the police 
orchestras (Volkspolizeiorchester).214 Even in light of the fact that many less-
qualified freelance performers of popular light entertainment music had joined 
district orchestras, the gap remained, and indeed an intensified negative effect 
occurred as then both a lesser amount of quality popular music was performed 
and the weaker skills of these musicians dragged down the overall proficiency 
of the district orchestras.215 This all came at a time when officials were increas-
ingly concerned with providing “worthwhile” popular music to “drive out . . . the 
influence of the capitalist music industry—kitsch.”216 The SED simply could not 
hope to realize its far-reaching cultural-political aims with the existing financial 
and human resources.
This Darwinian state of affairs also extended to the structure of the biosphere, 
as it were. Ensembles jockeyed to be moved up a level and sought to justify their 
advancement and related funding through both artistic prowess but also social 
and political engagement. The early 1950s must have seemed like golden years 
to directors and musicians, especially after late Weimar privation and the dif-
ficult economic situation in the early years of Nazism.217 But then the high point 
of this frenzied creation and movement of ensembles was reached in 1954 and 
a die-off began, due to lack of funding and insufficient audience numbers. Offi-
cials increasingly viewed the initiative as a flawed one due to a perceived excess 
of light music on offer and not enough serious, a failure to more systematically 
attract and educate potential audiences, and in general the blunt truth that they 
“had not been able to win over workers, peasants, and the youth as a regular 
audience.”218 As a consequence, a major reorganization reduced the number of 
ensembles in East Germany by merging many of the smaller orchestras. Ministry 
officials in particular criticized some of the district orchestras for playing too 
much light entertainment music, and not enough of the more serious music for 
which these 42-person “cultural orchestras” had been developed. Perhaps more 
important was the staggering cost to the state; the district orchestras recouped 
less than 15 percent of their expenses from ticket sales, and required a collective 
subsidy of over eight million marks. As a solution, the ministry merged some 
district orchestras with the theater orchestra of the same city, and in other cases 
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combined two nearby district orchestras to produce a stronger ensemble as well 
as a smaller orchestra to play lighter music.219 The remaining orchestras were to 
increase their number of concerts so as to “satisfy the diverse needs of workers in 
city and country as much as possible” and also to strive to be more profitable.220 
The “community orchestras” on the lowest rung suffered the most from the re-
duction in ministry largesse; after seventy of these orchestras had received subsi-
dies in 1953, the Stakuko withdrew most funding, and many simply collapsed.221 
This drive to amalgamate and reduce the number of orchestras, while increasing 
their concerts and focusing on providing quality light music, remained priorities 
through 1957 and beyond.222 Nonetheless, a large number of ensembles continued 
to perform for millions of audience members each year.223
As in Poland, East German cultural officials considered control over concert 
programs a high priority, but in a significant concession tactically abandoned this 
aim as part of the New Course. Initially, in the interests of promoting “progres-
sive musical development,” starting in the fall of 1951 the Stakuko required that 
the “nationally important” orchestras have their repertoire approved by the cen-
tral authorities, while smaller orchestras should submit their programs to regional 
Stakuko officials.224 All were to follow the same guidelines for the year’s musical 
programming: 25 percent contemporary East German, half from the European 
“classical cultural heritage,” and a final quarter from the Soviet Union, the other 
People’s Democracies, or “progressive composers” from other countries.225 The 
goal was to have a mix of classic and new that would entertain and educate a 
broad audience.226 In the spring of 1953, the Stakuko sent orchestras one list of 
recommended contemporary works as well as a second with approved works 
from the past, both compiled to “promote patriotic education.”227
During this phase of heavy interference in the early 1950s, Stakuko officials 
made regular interventions into the programming of ensembles large and small. 
The latter, lacking institutional prestige and a well-respected conductor, were 
particularly susceptible; indeed their funding and very existence depended on 
official approval of the kind of music they performed and the contexts in which 
they performed it.228 Often these official actions took the form of generalized di-
rectives like reminders about the percentages above, as well as of encouraging the 
inclusion of Estradenkonzerte.229 Tables and reports were generated to keep track 
of the amount and kinds of programming, and ensembles received a reprimand 
if they strayed too far from the recommended proportions.230 For the 1952-1953 
season, for instance, the Rostock theater orchestra was taken to task for having 
only one East German work, and an insufficient number from the Soviet Union 
and the people’s democracies. The Greifswald theater orchestra was condemned 
even more harshly for its complete lack of East German and Soviet bloc compos-
ers and but one Soviet work. These two orchestras were admonished to improve 
their programs for the next year, while the theater orchestra in Stralsund—with 
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only two contemporary works, and both from West Germany—was forced to 
modify its programming after the start of the season to correct its apparently 
grave mistakes.231 Uszkoreit went so far as to make suggestions about individual 
concerts within a season. In the first half of 1953, he pressed the music director 
of the Plauen theater orchestra to abandon plans for a concert of all contemporary 
music in the interest of sprinkling such works in a variety of programs so as to 
better maintain audience interest.232 With respect to the culture orchestra in Riesa, 
he pushed for specific East German works to be included, and suggested Günter 
Kochan’s celebrated socialist-realist Violin Concerto in the seventh concert of 
the season.233 The culture orchestras of Hildburghausen and Sonneberg were both 
instructed to replace Prokofiev’s Suite from The Love for Three Oranges with “a 
more successful, realistic work” by that iconic composer.234 At the height of the 
Stakuko’s power, such interventions were legion.235
The programs of the more prominent ensembles were also subject to of-
ficial scrutiny, but their musical directors were better able to assert a measure of 
autonomy, although officials did reject some works deemed too formalist. Dur-
ing the 1952-53 concert season, for example, the Dresden Staatskapelle under 
Rudolf Kempe was ordered to remove a 12-tone symphony by Swiss composer 
Rolf Liebermann and criticized for an inadequate number of Soviet composi-
tions, even as it received praise for its programming of new works from the GDR 
and other people’s democracies.236 Franz Konwitschny took over from Kempe in 
1953 and was similarly taken to task for neglecting Soviet and Soviet-bloc com-
posers and for underprogramming East German works.237 In his other position 
as conductor of the Gewandhausorchester in Leipzig, he even dared in the early 
1950s to include the personification of formalism, Stravinsky, with his Firebird 
Suite.238 Curiously and spectacularly, he was forced to remove it from the pro-
gram on such short notice that some audience members reacted with loud and 
unpleasant surprise to the substitution of Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony. (Inter-
estingly, Konwitschny chose not to capitalize on this audience dissatisfaction but 
instead responded by turning from the podium and shouting “rascals” into the 
hall.)239 He also received a mild rebuke for a dearth of Soviet compositions and 
for overprogramming Bruckner with six major works from a composer officials 
deemed too mystical and not so appropriate for the building of socialism.240
Those ensemble directors like Konwitschny with a reputation and tied to 
an elite institution, could and did push back at times. A particularly high-profile 
and revealing example of the dynamic between cultural officials and ensemble 
leaders can been seen in the interaction between cultural official Hans-Georg 
Uszkoreit and Heinz Bongartz, artistic director of the Dresden Philharmonic and 
a member of the SED. The latter’s programming for the 1952-53 season had 
come under fire for its lack of sufficient contemporary works from the Soviet 
Union and other bloc countries.241 And Uszkoreit alleged serious problems in 
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the upcoming 1953-54 season, in particular criticizing a ten-concert series en-
titled “Masterworks of the Twentieth Century.” In Uszkoreit’s view, works by 
Werner Egk, Hans Pfitzner, Gustav Mahler, and Paul Hindemith—the first two 
seen as aesthetically linked to Nazism and the last to Western modernism—did 
not “do justice to our cultural-political mission.” He requested that their works 
be replaced, and he also asked that some music by East German composers be 
included. Bongartz rejected Uszkoreit’s demands on the grounds that there were 
no East German masterpieces yet—and he referenced a recent Composers’ Union 
statement to back up his claim. And besides, he noted, other concerts that sea-
son featured works by GDR composers like Günter Kochan, Fidelio Finke, and 
Ottmar Gerster. He defended all the programmed works as appropriate and chal-
lenged Uszkoreit to demonstrate why they were problematic. Bongartz conducted 
two discussions of the issue with the ensemble’s musicians and claimed they 
also fully supported the programming. With respect to audiences, he asserted that 
their working-class attendees did indeed have the sophistication to appreciate the 
concerts, as evidenced by purchased subscriptions and sold-out concerts. Uszko-
reit attempted to garner support for his position from the Composers’ Union and 
from leading musicologist Eberhard Rebling, but in the end the series remained 
as originally programmed.242 Through skillful aesthetic and political argumenta-
tion, Bongartz mediated the demands of the state and maintained the musical 
autonomy of his ensemble. His SED membership surely strengthened an already 
powerful position as a respected musical figure, and furthermore the exchange 
took place in May and early June of 1953, so perhaps Bongartz also sensed the 
impending relaxation of control as part of the New Course and in the aftermath of 
the June 17 Uprising. Nonetheless, this episode shows that the party was hardly 
monolithic, even near its peak of power.
A few years later, Bongartz was still complaining about contemporary East 
German works, and demanded that composers create for ensembles and audi-
ences “from the heart, with gravity, and with a greater sense of responsibility.”243 
As a seeming consequence of his frustration with the oeuvre of his contemporary 
composers, he consistently gave less attention to their works, which made up, for 
example, only ten percent of the Dresden Philharmonic’s 1955-56 season.244 He 
also continued to program problematic composers like Hans Pfitzner, eliciting an 
impassioned plea from Culture Ministry official Pischner related to one concert’s 
program booklet that overly praised the fascist-leaning composer: “Certainly we 
want to cultivate and value everything beautiful and great in our German cultural 
tradition. But I believe that we cannot abdicate our ideological vigilance for one 
moment. So for this reason I write with the request that you influence more effec-
tively these concert overviews, which can lead our audiences astray.”245 Cultural 
officials considered the stakes high, but with prominent musical figures could not 
simply impose their will.
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In a major concession to ensembles and their leaders, cultural officials ended 
direct control over concert programs in July 1953 as part of the cultural thaw in 
the New Course and post-June 17 era, although guidelines remained.246 As in 
other areas, the authorities were henceforth supposed to rely on persuasion rather 
than direct intervention, and these limited but significant concessions combined 
with less intrusive means helped the party to maintain control far better than its 
counterpart could in Poland.247 The new regulation went into effect on July 16, 
1953, but as recently as June 15, the Stakuko had reaffirmed the requirement that 
orchestras obtain approval of their concert programs, and Uszkoreit continued to 
make significant suggestions to regional orchestra leaders as late as early July.248 
Nonetheless, the course correction was swift and helped to satisfy the demand for 
more autonomy in the musical world. Orchestra directors were still required to 
submit programs, and cultural officials continued to try to influence repertoire, 
albeit through “patient convincing” and criticism in the press.249
In practical terms, this new approach produced contradictory effects. Start-
ing in the summer of 1953, Stakuko officials undertook a major inspection of 
all the district orchestras, including a critical examination of their repertoire, 
but refrained from directly forcing changes in concert programs.250 Uszkoreit 
noted two negative outcomes to the revised cultural policy: some music direc-
tors performed only safe classics, for fear of presenting a work deemed formal-
ist and then getting criticized after the concert, while others seized the new 
opportunities to program “formalist” compositions. Konwitschny immediately 
put the Firebird Suite back into a concert. During a discussion of this situa-
tion, Soviet musicologist Georgij Chubov agreed with the revised guidelines, 
preferring discussion with the aim of convincing instead of the prohibition of 
works.251 Many orchestras had difficulty fulfilling the guidelines that 25 per-
cent of the music be contemporary, and even when the ministry provisionally 
reduced this figure to 15 percent in 1955, many ensembles still found this figure 
difficult to achieve.252
Both before and after the policy change on programming, many of the lead-
ing conductors were consistently faulted, but made only minor concessions, and 
seem to have suffered no sanction for their alleged failings. They were constantly 
reminded to fulfill the recommended percentages, as in 1956 when the ensembles 
in Halle and Schwerin were taken to task for programming contemporary East 
German music for only 12 and 13 percent of their programs, while that in Gotha 
and the Gewandhausorchester both received praise for coming close to the 25 
percent mark.253 Officials faced ensembles that had cultural prestige and insti-
tutional authority, and could not simply dictate policy. Futhermore, the interna-
tional standing of the ensembles and their directors also gave conductors leverage 
with respect to programming.
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Through the 1950s, East German cultural officials continued a broader of-
fensive to influence the activities of musical ensembles. They mandated politi-
cal schooling and encouraged contact with workers and peasants. The Stakuko 
introduced a wide-ranging program of ideological training that far exceeded the 
one implemented by its counterpart in Poland. Each orchestra was to conduct a 
seminar every two weeks dealing with topics on the relationship between music 
and socialism, including socialist realism and music in the Soviet Union. Twice 
a year, musical directors and conductors were to take part in centrally-directed 
seminars on similar themes.254 Officials frequently proved unable to realize their 
aims here, as for instance in 1955, when only a third of district cultural orchestras 
responded to the first invitation, and some who did so did not even attend in the 
end.255 On at least one other occasion, the music directors and conductors who 
attended found it a waste of time.256 In a related initiative, to facilitate contact 
between musicians and workers, and in hopes of more enthusiastically enlist-
ing performers in the party’s program, officials encouraged orchestras to make 
“friendship contracts” to improve cultural life in factories and thereby to influ-
ence broad swaths of society.257 This contact proved successful in many cases, 
as for instance a Saalfeld ensemble that maintained close links with the local 
iron ore mine in Kamsdorf and the porcelain factory in Könitz, including discus-
sions of “problems of production...contemporary political issues . . . the program-
ming of our concerts.”258 On the other hand, cultural officials constantly found 
themselves fighting the “arrogance” of many of the larger orchestras, which were 
reluctant to travel outside of the concert halls of their own cities, let alone to 
outlying factories or to the countryside.259 In both areas, officials struggled to 
motivate orchestra directors and musicians, who often refused to carry out party 
directives despite pressure from above.
Attendance figures for both countries are hard to come by and of uncertain 
reliability, but do show a genuine increase. Musical directors had an incentive 
to inflate audience numbers so as to justify the ensemble’s existence or to claim 
that its success argued for a higher position in the hierarchy. Furthermore, some 
of the tickets were sold in block subscription form to workplaces and mass orga-
nizations, which could result in empty seats. Officials made such subscriptions 
for workers a priority as part of their general aim to expand the audience base, 
with mixed success.260 The Gewandhausorchester, for example, in its 1954-55 
season sold 2074 subscriptions, of which 1741 came from workplaces, and it be-
gan to hold its open rehearsal on Wednesday evenings in an effort to attract more 
workers to its performances.261 Overall, in Poland reported attendance rose from 
560,000 in 1949 to over 1.5 million in 1954, while the 1955/56 concert year in 
the GDR attracted almost 2.2 million concertgoers.262 The Philharmonic in War-
saw, for instance, regularly reported exceeding planned attendance figures, with 
houses of over 1000 for most concerts.263 Cultural officials in East Germany noted 
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that concert halls were sometimes half full or less and blamed this on music direc-
tors who were not making sufficient efforts to reach out to new audiences.264 In 
general, audience numbers in both countries were considered relatively healthy, 
although efforts were unsurprisingly made to increase them.
In both countries, the parties directed a massive expansion in the number 
of musical ensembles and lavished subsidies on a breathtaking number of or-
chestras of varying size and quality. Concert life in East Germany was more 
developed, and the SED devoted more resources and attention to it. This state of 
affairs was surely due to the longer and more developed tradition of symphonic 
music in Germany, as well as the desire of the SED to prove its legitimacy by 
demonstrating that music was cultivated more assiduously in the GDR than in 
the Federal Republic. The less dramatic but nonetheless sizeable increase in 
orchestral activity in Poland produced a more stable situation than the overly 
ambitious goals set in East Germany. Cultural officials in both attempted to 
control much of the orchestras’ activities—most obviously concert programs, 
but also the choice of concert venue, as well as the ideological formation of 
both musicians and audiences. The Stakuko appeared most interventionist in 
controlling repertoire in the early 1950s, but made the key decision to abandon 
this direct oversight in the context of the New Course, and thereafter officials 
maintained less formal but still significant influence. Cultural officials in Poland 
tried to maintain their control over concert programs throughout the period, 
but were forced to largely abandon this effort by the mid-1950s as orchestras, 
as well as the musical world more generally, achieved considerable autonomy 
from the state.
Conclusion
The SED and PZPR attempted to control the music heard in all venues, from the 
grandest concert hall to the smallest factory clubroom. With the belief that music 
was a powerful means of communicating a political message to large numbers of 
people, the parties created these state concert agencies and expanded the number 
of orchestras. On the surface, it did seem that the utopian goal of bringing the best 
of past and present music to formerly neglected workers and peasants, while also 
shaping them ideologically, had been fulfilled. Using these resources, officials 
then worked to create and promote specific programming in order to appeal to 
and influence new ears in factories and the countryside. In these ways, the parties’ 
overarching goal of dominating the musical world, as well as worldviews more 
generally, was advanced, if only partially. By enlisting large numbers of perform-
ers and musical directors in this project, they gained cooperation in helping to 
build socialism. The parties hoped that by showing themselves committed both to 
fostering culture and to cultivating their respective national traditions, they would 
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establish their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations. And indeed, many mil-
lions attended performances organized by these institutions and ensembles, and 
thus experienced pre-screened music in selected contexts.
But there were simply too many obstacles to the complete, effective imple-
mentation of the parties’ totalizing program. The two state concert agencies en-
countered significant problems in the creation of appropriate, appealing programs 
with capable artists and managed by competent administrators. In the case of 
orchestras, the parties directed an impressive expansion in the number of ensem-
bles and concerts offered, but struggled to maintain influence over the musicians 
as well as control over programming. While East German officials abandoned 
formal rights to the latter, they were nonetheless able to direct orchestral life 
towards promoting party goals more effectively than in Poland. Ordinary citizens 
did have real say as well, seen when the concert agencies responded to audience 
tastes and offered programs that entertained as well as educated. The stage revue 
emerged as a compromise between party aims of politically educative concerts 
and audience demands for an entertaining musical experience. Although the par-
ties, through musical institutions both large and small, aspired to total control of 
performance halls and the symbolic messages communicated there, such a state 
of affairs was never achieved since officials regularly made concessions to the 
demands and desires of both musical elites and ordinary citizens.
The concert agency and cultural officials in the GDR on balance fulfilled the 
SED’s aims more successfully than their counterparts in Poland. East Germany 
had a more highly developed musical tradition and many more musical ensem-
bles, and thus its officials organized concerts for a more receptive audience. They 
did, however, have to eliminate significant competition from private agencies so 
as to clear the field for their desired programs; Artos initially had an easier time in 
this respect. Germany also had a stronger tradition of cultural activities for work-
ers, and thus the DVD/DKGD followed paths already trodden by the pre-1933 
socialist and communist parties, and also inherited the legacy of an extensive 
Nazi musical infrastructure. Further, the SED was simply more powerful than the 
PZPR, and could count on a greater number of party members in cultural institu-
tions, local administrations, and factories to help carry through its plans. When 
the thaw came in 1953, the authorities were forced to concede more concert-
related freedom in Poland, while in the GDR the brief relaxation was followed by 
renewed control with a somewhat lighter touch shortly thereafter.
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In the early Cold War years in Poland and the GDR, the ruling parties and their 
formidable state bureaucracies possessed considerable power to remake their so-
cieties. PZPR and SED officials, along with their allies more broadly, attempted 
total transformation and control at the apex of their strength around 1950. In-
spired by the idea of music’s outsized role in influencing worldviews, the parties 
sought to utilize this art form’s distinctive properties to help reconstruct the social 
world in line with party goals. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the two parties 
achieved notable successes in working with composers to create a new music, 
and then in disseminating these works to the broader population. In their thrust 
to dominate both the real and symbolic terrain of the musical world, as well as 
to shape and control the “new socialist person” more generally, the PZPR and 
SED devoted considerable monetary and political capital to this important sector 
of both cultural production and everyday life. The parties created an extensive 
music-related apparatus within their own party organizations as well as the state 
bureaucracy, though they constantly battled with underqualified and insufficient 
personnel. Officials then strove to extend their influence to musical institutions 
they helped promote, such as the Composers’ Unions, festivals, concert agencies, 
and performing ensembles. This impressive musical infrastructure demonstrated 
the parties’ claim to be serious and enthusiastic wards of tradition, as well as 
their commitment to making that cultural patrimony available to every worker 
and peasant—in addition to, of course, a blunt desire for control by tapping the 
potential of music. As part of the project to create a contemporary and politicized 
new music and make it widely accessible, the parties distributed lavish support 
among composers and made inexpensive entertainment available to audiences, 
thereby earning appreciation as well as a basis of legitimacy.
The SED and PZPR ultimately proved unable to master the musical realm 
completely. Although often amenable to following party directives, composers, 
musicians, and audiences expressed and achieved their own, sometimes opposing 
goals, or at times worked with officials to modify them in a form they preferred. 
While the parties had great influence, developments in the musical world were 
the product of negotiation between cultural officials and musical figures. The 
Composers’ Unions in particular were key sites for this interaction between mu-
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sic and politics, since officials and their musical allies used them as a transmis-
sion belt for party directives. But more importantly, the unions provided a milieu 
for composers to regulate their professional lives and discuss their aesthetic am-
bitions, and changing factions in their membership debated and worked out the 
pressing issues of the day. An increasing majority of Polish composers pushed a 
gradual process of professionalization, which helped to emancipate themselves 
from party control, while the SED succeeded in maintaining its influence through 
the loyal union leadership despite similar developments in East Germany.
Instead of a still-common conception of artists forced into compliance by 
an omnipotent party, this study describes a situation where nearly all composers 
willingly cooperated in creating a new, socialist-realist music for the emerging 
stalinist reality. Furthermore, the parties never presented themselves as a unified 
front to the music world. Especially in Poland, party members in the bureaucracy 
and among composers vied to realize their own visions for this music, even as 
nonparty musical figures adopted or abandoned positions from the hardline to 
the lukewarm. Composers in both countries found significant common ground 
with a party that sought to educate the population about both past and present 
music, and also cooperated for other reasons such as financial incentives, a desire 
for recognition, and political pressure, though this last was much less powerful 
than is often asserted in the literature. In the early 1950s, this room for maneuver 
was at its narrowest, but composers always had more options than submission, 
silence, or writing for the desk drawer.
Relatedly, the encounter between the musical world and socialist realism 
was by no means as bleak as often asserted. Initially, Polish and East German 
composers approached the new aesthetic ideas with interest and responded in an 
astonishingly productive manner, creating countless mass songs, cantatas, and or-
chestral works that aspired to high artistic standards and contributed to a vibrant 
musical life. Frustration only came when the parties pushed to narrow the bound-
aries of the acceptable around 1950. A growing resistance to these strictures from 
some composers already in 1951, and then an initial and tentative willingness 
by the party to relax them beginning in late 1952 in Poland and a bit later in the 
GDR, fed into the broader thaw after Stalin’s death in March 1953. In Poland, 
composers achieved nearly complete autonomy by 1956, while their colleagues 
in the GDR continued to work within the—henceforth expanded—tenets of so-
cialist realism.
The music of the stalinist era, then, emerged in a complex context of many 
actors pursuing diverse agendas. These overlapping groupings complicate an un-
derstanding of these countries as separated into a clear division between state and 
society. Though the parties attempted to oversee an assertion of control from the 
top-down and were partially successful, multiple and mediating layers filtered 
power in all directions, with cultural officials, composers, ensemble directors, 
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concert organizers, musicians, and audience members of many backgounds help-
ing to shape the creation of music and the manner and spaces in which it was 
performed.
The populations of Poland and the GDR could experience extensive mu-
sical offerings at festivals, in the formal concert hall, or in the factory or ru-
ral clubroom. During this period, society engaged with a music strongly, albeit 
not exclusively, influenced by the parties. Concerts of all kinds and sizes were 
largely devoid of the music of “formalist” composers until the mid-1950s, and 
often included party-approved, contemporary works that fit the socialist-realist 
paradigm and also included mass songs, some of which achieved significant and 
enduring popularity. Musical icons like Bach and Beethoven in the GDR and 
Chopin in Poland were cast as progressives of their time, and press articles and 
concert booklets formulated this interpretation for wider consumption. Opportu-
nities to negotiate existed here too, as festival organizers, musical directors, and 
individual ensemble members interacted directly with the state over policy or in-
directly by moving to a different ensemble—or even to a different country. Audi-
ences shaped events as well by staying away from some concerts, thus prompting 
the development of lighter music programs with less overt ideological content. 
These citizens did make themselves heard, and often criticized both the party 
and composers for not supplying them with sufficient and acceptable music that 
entertained. Increasingly, people turned to the popular music of the West instead 
of domestic production.
Equally important is the Cold War context of fierce competition between the 
two opposing systems. For much of the period, the parties were able to mobilize 
a large section of the music world against what it demonized as soulless experi-
mentation or popular kitsch coming from the West. By the mid-1950s, however, 
Western culture, both high and low, proved too seductive to both composers and 
audiences, and the weakened, destalinizing regimes were no longer able to keep 
it out. Works by formerly condemned composers came to concert halls, and jazz 
and Western popular music gained an increasing audience. In Poland, officials 
largely gave up the fight, even as their East German counterparts continued a pol-
icy of granting some concessions while energetically promoting musical works 
more aligned with official ideology.
This story has been both a comparative and also a transnational one, with 
ideas, people, and music crossing the Oder-Neisse border. More significant, how-
ever, was that fact each country derived the templates for many aspects of musi-
cal life from the Soviet Union. Articles from the Soviet musical press appeared 
in both countries, and Soviet composers and musicologists made regular visits 
to Poland and East Germany in order to consult and advise, while leading Polish 
and East German musical figures traveled to the Soviet Union in return. Socialist 
realism, the party and state cultural apparatus, the organization of festivals and 
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concert life—all were largely based on the Soviet model. But the outward, seem-
ingly uniform appearance of these Soviet-like structures in both countries should 
not deceive. These two representative members of the communist bloc exhibited 
significant differences in their own particular, national encounter with stalinism, 
thus demonstrating intra-bloc diversity during the postwar decade.
Indeed, despite the many similarities between the two countries, especially 
in the years around 1950, the SED was undeniably more successful in influenc-
ing the musical world in East Germany than its counterpart to the east. Although 
many in Poland were willing to tolerate communist rule, and a minority actively 
supported it, the SED enjoyed a higher level of cooperation in both the musical 
world and in society more generally. In relative terms, East German composers 
carried party cards at twice the level of their Polish counterparts. More signifi-
cantly, many of the influential, major composers and musicologists in the GDR 
were communists or strong sympathizers, while most of the leading composers 
in Poland held the PZPR and its goals at a greater distance. Furthermore, the 
existence of West Germany played a dual role as both an escape valve to those 
dissatisfied in the GDR, as well as a useful “other” against which to consolidate 
the SED’s own vision of a progressive, anti-fascist polity. Both aesthetically and 
politically, a larger number of East German composers had a broader affinity for 
the communist project than their counterparts in Poland. Germany had a stron-
ger working-class musical tradition, including significant Social Democratic and 
communist parties that had an active presence in the musical realm before 1933. 
Additionally, in the 1920s and 1930s, many of the leading East German figures 
in the cultural and musical world had engaged in Soviet aesthetic debates, or had 
even spent time in Moscow. In contrast, during the same period many Poles trav-
eled to Paris to study the music of the neoclassical school, with artistic ideas quite 
different from those of socialist realism.
The key institutions of the Composers’ Unions, while similar in structure, 
also played differing roles in the two countries. Polish composers had banded to-
gether to weather the Nazi occupation, and thereby possessed a sense of solidarity 
and autonomy that East German composers, who had been in exile or made com-
promises with Nazism, had not. The Polish Composers’ Union was a continuation 
of an interwar institution, and its founding in 1945 pre-dated significant party 
involvement in the arts. Save for a brief time in around 1950, the union leadership 
in Poland consisted largely of members who were not strong supporters of the 
PZPR’s goals. In contrast, the East German union was led throughout the period 
by an SED member, Nathan Notowicz, and party allies dominated its Presidium. 
Party officials also closely supervised the very creation of the East German union 
in 1951, and it never enjoyed the relative freedoms of its counterpart in Poland.
In addition to these advantages, the SED operated more cleverly and ef-
fectively than the PZPR. In 1953, a year of gathering crisis in both countries, 
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the East German party made a series of concessions to the musical world. The 
much-hated Stakuko was replaced at the start of 1954 by a Ministry of Culture 
that acted less dogmatically; officials also gave composers more autonomy over 
the commissioning process, and granted orchestras the formal right to determine 
their own programs. These limited but meaningful compromises proved to be 
sufficient to satisfy most musical figures, and thus East German cultural officials 
maintained a reduced but significant amount of influence. In Poland, the party 
backed off its hard line in a reluctant, halting, and clumsy manner, which further 
alienated composers already chafing at party restrictions. A majority of Polish 
composers pressed for increased professional autonomy and achieved near-total 
independence by 1956.
After 1957, the differences between the two countries only increased. In 
Poland, socialist realism was scarcely mentioned again, and the party and state 
cultural institutions rarely interfered in the music world. A vibrant jazz scene 
emerged and popular music exhibited strong Western influences, while an impres-
sive number of annual festivals featured this music and popularized it throughout 
society. Composers created largely as they wished, and concert programs often 
offered music formerly discouraged, both domestic and from abroad. The Warsaw 
Autumn festival, begun in 1956 and then occurring annually starting in 1958, was 
representative for Poland’s openness to Western and modernist music. The “Pol-
ish School” of music took form in the late 1950s, and composers like Lutosławski 
as well as younger composers such as Krzysztof Penderecki and Henryk Mikołaj 
Górecki achieved international acclaim for their modernist works.1 Though the 
stalinist decade is largely forgotten in light of these impressive developments, 
this study suggests that the extensive institutional and monetary support provided 
to composers and musical ensembles during the early Cold War years established 
a crucial foundation for these later achievements.
In the GDR, the increased freedoms of the thaw were somewhat restricted 
once again in the late 1950s, and the SED maintained considerable influence 
over the musical world. In the realm of popular music, cultural authorities shifted 
between greater and lesser acceptance of Western trends over the succeeding de-
cades. The “Bitterfeld Way” was proclaimed in 1959 and called for a partnership 
between creative artists and workers, intensifying trends seen earlier in the decade 
such as composers reaching out to workers and musical ensembles performing 
in factories. East German composers continued to produce music in a socialist-
realist idiom, though the style was expanded considerably and opened to Western 
influences and experimentation.2 Musical elites worked more than less willingly 
for the party’s goals beyond the 1950s, and accommodated themselves or took 
pride in their country’s achievements, as can be seen in numerous memoirs from 
the Honecker era.3 Such an interpretation has largely continued in Germany after 
1989, as many East Germans affirm their culture, including that from the 1950s.
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In Poland in recent years, while there is some nostalgia for the culture of 
the stalinist era—as evidenced in the profusion of CD collections of stalinist 
mass songs—the postwar decade is viewed quite negatively and with a decided 
lack of context. Composers have often attempted to bury their socialist-realist 
compositions, and generally disavow any association with the political develop-
ments of the time. The claims later in life of Poland’s two leading composers 
of the day, Andrzej Panufnik and Witold Lutosławski, prove instructive. Both 
cooperated with the party in the early 1950s, but had achieved autonomy by the 
mid-1950s in very different ways. Panufnik, to a greater extent than most of his 
colleagues, worked closely with the party and benefited handsomely through the 
writing of numerous socialist-realist works. He then chose the path of emigra-
tion, to Great Britain, at the curiously late date of July 1954, when the political 
winds had begun to shift clearly in the direction of more openness and composers 
had achieved ever-increasing autonomy. Near the end of his life, he published a 
highly problematic memoir that tried to explain away and justify his involvement 
with the party and his musical production of the time.4 His celebrated contem-
porary who stayed, Witold Lutosławski, went even further, claiming: “I’ve never 
been disposed to make a compromise.”5 This statement is surely untenable given 
that he composed a number of political mass songs, a highly ideological cantata, 
and several folk-based instrumental works that fit comfortably within the concept 
of socialist realism. The contemporary resonance of and motivations behind this 
music are more comprehensible in light of this study—like nearly all composers 
in both countries, he found much common ground with a party determined to 
create, fund, and propagate a new, socialist-realist music for the hoped-for new 
socialist society.
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